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Abstract – Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as ―the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.‖ The implementation of 
adequate internal and external controls, a corporate governance system, is central to assuring an investor‘s 
return. This dissertation focuses on these internal and external control mechanisms and tests their 
effectiveness in ensuring that management acts in shareholders‘ interests. The three essays contained 
herein document substantial costs to shareholders when these controls fail to restrain management from 
engaging in self-dealing, yielding substantial agency costs. However, the internal and external controls 
studied play an important and effective role in curtailing these costs. 
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1. Introduction 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as ―the ways in which suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.‖ In the United States, 
diffuse shareholder ownership results in a separation of ownership and control. This leaves the majority of 
decisions up to agents with little or no stake in the economic fortunes of the company. Thus, central to 
assuring an investor‘s return in the modern corporate system is the implementation of adequate controls, a 
corporate governance system to prevent rational self-interested agents from engaging in self-dealing 
[Monks and Minow (2008)].   
Most researchers divide the corporate governance system of controls into two component parts: 
those mechanisms that are internal to the firm and those that are external [Gillan (2006)]. Internal controls 
consist of those concerns dealing with the board and top management while external controls include 
factors such as the product and capital markets, influential outside shareholders, information producers, 
financial and legal service providers, and regulators. These two dimensions should not be studied in 
isolation. As noted by Cremers and Nair (2005), internal and external governance mechanisms are strong 
compliments for one another as determinants of long-run stock returns and accounting performance.  
This dissertation focuses on these internal and external controls and tests their effectiveness in 
ensuring that management acts in shareholders‘ interests. It also documents the costs to shareholders 
when they fail to restrain management from engaging in self-dealing. The evidence provided herein 
reports the existence of sizeable agency costs associated with management‘s discretion over corporate 
resources. However, the internal and external controls studied play an important and effective role in 
curtailing these costs. 
The remainder of this preface is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses internal control 
mechanisms and summarizes the first essay in this dissertation, which investigates how these mechanisms 
affect a CEO‘s incentives to undertake corporate deals. Section 3 reviews the second essay in this 
dissertation, which looks at the impact of external control mechanisms upon corporate conglomerates. 
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Section 4 discusses the impact of failures in internal and external controls and summarizes the final essay 
in this dissertation. Section 5 provides some concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Internal Control Mechanisms, Managerial Incentives, and Corporate Deal-Making 
Recently, research on internal control measures has taken center stage in corporate governance 
research [Netter, Poulsen, and Stegemoller (2009)]. At the forefront of this work is the literature on the 
effectiveness of corporate boards and executive compensation.
3
 In a model of distributed ownership with 
a separation of ownership and control, the board plays a critical role in monitoring and advising 
management to direct the firm in shareholders‘ interests [Fama and Jensen (1983)]. While their advising 
role is important, numerous studies have documented the perils associated with ineffective boards that do 
not defend shareholders‘ interests [Yermack (1996); Larcker, Richardson, Seary, and Tuna (2005); Fich 
and Shivdasani (2006)]. 
In addition to monitoring and advising management, the board also plays a definitive role in 
setting executive pay. Management is delegated substantial control rights over the allocation of 
shareholders‘ resources. Since equity represents a residual claim, incentive contracts between 
shareholders and managers are necessarily incomplete. Consequently, it is crucial that the board designs 
incentive contracts properly so that they align management‘s interests with that of shareholders.  This is 
especially important around major corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions due to the 
magnitude of consequences surrounding a failed deal [Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2006)]. 
However, several recent studies report that compensation contracts at large firms appear to incentivize 
CEOs to undertake deals which may not be in shareholders‘ best interests [Grinstein and Hribar (2004), 
Harford and Li (2007)].  
The first essay in this dissertation, CEO Deal-Making Activity, CEO Compensation and Firm 
Value, further explores the relation between executive compensation and corporate deals under differing 
                                                          
3 Other work on internal controls include bylaw and charter provisions [Bebchuk and Cohen (2005); Bates, Becher, and Lemmon (2008)], internal 
control systems [Gillan and Martin (2007)], capital structure [Grossman and Hart (1982); Shleifer and Vishny (1997)], and voting rights [Lehn, 
Netter, and Poulsen (1990); Zingales (1995)]. 
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internal control environments. This paper asks whether CEOs undertake deals (ex. joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, seasoned equity offerings, and spinoffs.) to signal their quality or to extract compensation rents 
from shareholders. That is, are CEOs ex-ante incentivized to undertake corporate deals, independent of 
the deal‘s expected success? Alternatively, corporate deals are skill and labor intensive activities that 
require the personal involvement of the chief executive. When an agent‘s actions are unobservable, even 
imperfect signals of effort and skill are useful for designing optimal incentive contracts that minimize 
moral hazard [Hölmstrom (1979)]. Thus, the completion of a deal might provide an effective signal of the 
CEO‘s quality to the board and the firm‘s shareholders. These two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses 
can be differentiated by analyzing the levels of unexplained CEO compensation in environments with 
poor internal controls since only one of the aforementioned hypotheses advances a rent-seeking argument.  
The results in this essay indicate that CEOs are abnormally compensated for undertaking deals, 
even when a vast majority of deals studied are not expected to create value for shareholders. The presence 
of strong board oversight appears to mitigate this effect. Consistent with a rent-seeking explanation, 
powerful and poorly monitored CEOs are more likely to undertake deals. Again, attentive boards mitigate 
this effect and serve to lessen the likelihood of undertaking a deal. CEO deal-making might also serve an 
entrenchment role since deal-making significantly diminishes the CEO performance-turnover relationship 
[Weisbach (1988); Parrino (1997)]. Overall, CEOs appear ex-ante incentivized to undertake deals in order 
to justify higher levels of compensation rather than to signal their quality. However, the effects appear 
concentrated at those firms without strong internal controls (i.e. sufficient board oversight). Thus, internal 
controls appear effective at curtailing managerial agency costs. 
 
3. External Control Mechanisms and the Agency Costs Associated with Managerial Discretion over 
Free Cash Flow 
Complimenting the internal controls in place, outside market forces serve as an additional check 
upon the firm to mitigate agency costs. The penultimate external governance mechanism is the market for 
corporate control. Management teams that misuse shareholder resources expose themselves to the risk of 
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being replaced by alternative management teams that can better utilize the firm‘s assets and opportunities 
[Jensen and Ruback (1983)]. This market mechanism is not without its cost. The available evidence 
indicates that, on average, corporate acquisitions create little net value for acquiring firm shareholders 
[Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001)]. Further, this corrective instrument requires the payment of 
substantial control premiums to target shareholders and is typically enacted only after significant 
shareholder value has already been lost [Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989); Weston, Mitchell, and 
Mulherin (2004)].
4
 
Despite their popularity in the literature, corporate takeovers are a relatively rare event. The 
hazard rate has rarely exceeded 1.5% of all listed firms and hostile takeovers are even more scarce 
[Comment and Schwert (1995); Schwert (2000)]. Given the violent and infrequent nature of corporate 
takeovers, the more prevalent forms of external controls involve the continuous monitoring from outside 
stakeholders. These external monitors include banks and blockholders [Hartzell and Starks (2003)], 
information producers such as securities analysts or the financial press [Moyer, Chatfield, and Sinsneros 
(1989); Bens and Monahan (2004); Dyck, Volchkova, and Zingales (2008)], and the product and capital 
markets themselves [Easterbrook (1984); Jensen (1993); Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996)].
5
 
The second essay in this dissertation, titled Firm Size, Internal Capital Markets, and the 
Diversification Discount, examines the effectiveness of these external control measures upon corporate 
conglomerates. The prevailing wisdom is that corporate diversification destroys shareholder value [Lang 
and Stulz (1994); Berger and Ofek (1995)]. The most common explanation for the observed 
―diversification discount‖ in the literature is that managers at diversified firms misuse and misallocate 
corporate resources, yielding a suboptimal investment policy. Rather than paying out excess free cash 
flow to shareholders, it is used to cross-subsidize failing business units or deployed to non-core 
businesses [Jensen (1986); Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)]. Previous work documents that free cash 
                                                          
4 Andrade et al document that, when analyzing the wealth effects of mergers over the [-20, close] window, even the combined bidder and target 
returns are insignificantly different than zero at conventional levels. This suggests that the corporate control market, on average, does little to 
reverse the value destruction caused by the previous management team. 
5 The abovementioned factors are certainly not an exhaustive list. Other forms of external controls also include: the managerial labor markets 
[Fama (1980); Brickley, Linck, and Coles (1999)], D&O insurance providers [Core (2000)], auditors [Larker and Richardson (2004)], shareholder 
litigation [Farber (2005), Ferris, Lawless, and Makhija (2005)], regulatory agencies [Daouk, Lee, and Ng (2006)], and the legal environment [La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)]. 
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flow, product and capital market dependence, analyst oversight, and dividend policy vary systematically 
with firm size [Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988); Chung and Jo (1996)]. This paper asks whether all 
diversified firms are uniformly valued at a discount or whether variances in free cash flow and external 
controls related to firm size explain the cross-sectional variation in the diversification discount. 
The results indicate that the diversification discount, as demonstrated in the literature, can be 
explained as a free cash flow problem since coincidently high levels of free cash flow and corporate 
investment are associated with inefficient resource allocations and greater discounts. The estimates imply 
that the magnitude of this effect is sizeable (as much as fifteen percent of total firm value). This effect 
varies directly and monotonically with the levels of free cash flow and the size of the firm. The effect is 
also robust across time, excess-value methodology, degree of diversification, and after controlling for 
endogeneity or any omitted variable bias.   
Consistent with the argument that external controls are effective tools for limiting agency costs 
associated with the firm‘s investment policy, increased security analyst oversight and committing to pay-
out excess cash flows in the form of dividends reduces the discount and improves the quality of the 
conglomerate‘s internal resource allocations. Further, the estimates imply that the benefits from these 
prescriptive effects are most salient for the mid-sized conglomerates with healthy free cash flow, but little 
oversight from the analyst community and the financial press. Finally, the small conglomerates in the 
sample suffer little from inefficient capital allocations and the diversification discount, indicating that 
product market competition and capital market dependence yield their own forms of external control.
6
 
The conclusions from this essay imply that, while managerial discretion over free cash flow 
remains a problem at some firms, external controls are an effective mechanism for limiting the agency 
costs associated with this discretion. There is a substantial improvement in corporate resource allocation 
when managers subject their investment decisions to the outside monitoring of securities analysts. There 
is also a degree of substitutability among the external controls, as the evidence indicates that both product 
                                                          
6 Smaller firms, including those in the sample, have little cash reserves, are generally heavily dependent upon the capital markets [Fazzari et al. 
(1988)], and have greater exposure to the product markets [Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005)]. 
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and capital market discipline is effective at controlling agency costs associated with managerial excess as 
well.
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4. Failures of Internal and External Controls and the Importance of Managerial Character to Firm 
Value 
There is a sizeable literature that documents the cost to shareholders when the internal and 
external controls discussed in Sections 2 and 3 fail to contain the agency costs originating from 
management‘s self-dealing or even malfeasance [Jensen and Meckling (1976); Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1989); Bebchuk and Fried (2003); Yermack (2006); Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2006); Bernile and Jarrell 
(2008)]. However, nearly every study of the top management team has focused on tangible and 
quantitative measures of managerial quality and little work exists in the realm of financial economics to 
determine whether intangible characteristics, such as reputation and potential signals of managerial 
integrity, are important to shareholders.
8
 The third essay in this dissertation, The Agency Costs of 
Managerial Indiscretions, fills this gap in the literature by asking whether a manager‘s personal and 
professional lives are separable or if acts of questionable integrity in one‘s private affairs represent a 
greater moral hazard when executing the duties of their office.
9
 
The evidence indicates that personal managerial misconduct negatively affects firm value and 
operating performance around the disclosure of an indiscretion. There is an immediate 3.2% loss in 
shareholder value at the revelation of an indiscretion, which translates to an average loss of $129 M in 
market capitalization. The sample firms also suffer a significant abnormal decline of -2.5% in ROA 
during the same fiscal year in which an indiscretion is disclosed. The results are consistent with 
distraction of top management from concentrating on their responsibilities governing the firm. However, 
the results suggest that investors are also concerned with the integrity of top management since low-
                                                          
7 Berry, Fields, and Wilkins (2006) also document that some internal (insider ownership and board independence) and external controls 
(blockholder ownership and VC involvements) may serve as substitutes for one another at IPO firms. 
8 Notable exceptions include Williamson (1975), Tirole (1996), and Erhard, Jensen, and Zaffron (2008). Of these three works, only Erhard et al. 
considers the integrity of top management. 
9 The indiscretions studied include cases of sexual misadventure, violence, substance abuse, and public dishonesty. 
 7 
distraction, low-integrity indiscretions, such as public dishonesty, are associated with lower firm value as 
well. Further, the evidence indicates that executives accused of an indiscretion significantly manage their 
reported earnings upward during the year in which the indiscretion is disclosed. These last results provide 
the most support for the argument that managerial character is an input factor of production at the firm. 
Finally, evidence indicates that improved internal controls might decrease the likelihood of an 
indiscretion occurring. That these events occur more frequently at founder-led firms indicates that the 
external controls, such as the managerial labor markets, may be effective at curtailing managerial excess. 
If these activities do represent an agency cost to shareholders as suggested by the data, it appears 
that corporate boards are ambivalent towards their consequences. Indeed, most boards appear to respond 
to these events as if they have no effect upon shareholder value or firm performance. There is little 
disciplinary turnover in spite of the fact that a substantial fraction of executives are repeat offenders. The 
evidence in this final essay suggests shareholders suffer significantly under regimes of poor managerial 
oversight and corporate control. Thus, poor corporate governance is a risk factor that should be 
appropriately considered. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This dissertation emphasizes that the existence of an adequate corporate governance system, 
comprised of both internal and external control mechanisms, is a necessary condition for assuring the 
providers of finance to corporations a return on their investment. However, it appears that in many firms, 
there are failures in the implementation of these controls.  
The first essay in this dissertation, CEO Deal-Making Activity, CEO Compensation and Firm 
Value, reports that, on average, incentive contracts are not performing as desired in the context of 
corporate deals. CEOs at deal-making firms receive unexplained increases in their total compensation for 
orchestrating deals, of which the vast majority are not expected to create any value for shareholders. At 
best, there is evidence of rent-seeking by the CEO. At worst, there is unchecked shareholder value 
destruction from the undertaking of needless corporate deals. The second essay in this dissertation, Firm 
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Size, Internal Capital Markets, and the Diversification Discount, shows management‘s desire for 
corporate empire building leads to overinvestment and the cross-subsidization business of units within 
corporate conglomerates. The final essay in this dissertation, The Agency Costs of Managerial 
Indiscretions, documents that impairments in the character of the top management team represent a clear 
and present risk to the firm‘s shareholders. Further, inadequate managerial oversight may be partially to 
blame for the presence of managerial indiscretions. 
However, the good news is that the research contained within this dissertation is also indicative 
that the internal and external controls studied here are effective in curtailing the identified managerial 
agency costs. As identified in the first essay, the presence of empowered corporate directors and balanced 
power in the boardroom yields significantly fewer deals and unjustified pay. The second essay shows that, 
by subjecting the firm‘s investment policy to the discipline of the capital markets and information 
producers, firm value is significantly improved. The third essay suggests that adequate corporate 
governance controls may even counter the personal failings of the top management team. Thus, the 
controls identified herein serve to enhance shareholder value and better incentivize management to work 
in shareholders‘ interests. 
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Abstract 
 
CEOs often engage in deal-making activities.  We explore whether the motivation for these activities is 
related more to compensation increases or to signals of CEO quality.  To investigate this question, we 
analyze firms executing joint ventures, strategic alliances, seasoned equity offerings, and spinoffs. We 
find that total CEO compensation increases when any of these transactions are completed even when the 
deals are not expected to improve firm value. A further way to distinguish between our hypotheses is to 
determine the role of board monitoring.  We find that pay increases received by CEOs executing deals 
that do not increase firm value are dispensed when monitoring appears to be weak, as proxied by busy 
and/or hand-picked boards. Our results also indicate that deal-making CEOs are less likely to be fired for 
poor performance.  Overall, the results support the CEO activity hypothesis over the CEO quality 
signaling hypothesis. 
 
JEL classification: G30, G34, K22 
Keywords: Deals, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance 
                                                          
* This manuscript represents one of three essays in my dissertation. We acknowledge the helpful comments of N. K. Chidambaran, Kose John, 
Ralph Walkling, seminar participants at Clemson University, Instituto de Empresa (IE), Northern Illinois University, Pace University, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Universidad Carlos III, University of Mississippi, University of Wyoming, and at the 2008 
meetings of the Financial Management Association (Gaylord, TX). All errors are our responsibility. 
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On July 27
th
, 1999 AT&T announced it was undertaking a joint venture project with British Telecom 
plc. The announcement was met with a $4.2 billion decline in the market capitalization of AT&T.
10
 
Despite this lackluster market response to the joint venture, which was completed on October 26
th
, 2000, 
and a dismal stock market performance during the year 2000, in early 2001, the AT&T board rewarded its 
CEO, Mr. C. Michael Armstrong, with a salary increase. His total compensation rose from $17.6 million 
to $24.6 million. When justifying the pay raise, the board cited Mr. Armstrong‘s leadership in executing 
the joint venture.  
This anecdote raises the question of whether and how CEO activity affects CEO compensation.  
Absent the moral hazard problem described by Hölmstrom (1979) and others, CEOs would be expected to 
only enter into deals that enhance their shareholders‘ value.  In the presence of moral hazard, however, 
boards should attempt to provide their executives with the appropriate incentives to choose activities that 
increase shareholder wealth.  Often these incentives are embedded in the compensation system.  Thus, in 
well-governed firms, top management compensation would be expected to be related to a deal‘s expected 
success or failure.  Alternatively, given the difficulty of ascertaining a deal‘s success until some period 
after its inception, it is possible that top managers orchestrate deals in order to enhance their 
compensation regardless of the deal‘s impact on shareholder wealth.  That is, CEOs might want to show 
that they are active in brokering deals in order to justify a pay raise. Indeed, as the AT&T example 
suggests, such deals could appear detrimental to firm value from investors‘ perspectives and yet might 
ultimately serve as justification for corporate boards and compensation committees to raise the CEOs‘ 
pay. 
In this paper, we consider the issue of CEO activity and its relation to CEO compensation.  If 
executives are compensated on the basis of their activities (e.g., mergers, joint ventures, seasoned equity 
offerings, strategic alliances or spinoffs), then the question arises as to the rationale for such 
compensation increases.  There exist at least two potential hypotheses.  First, there is the active CEO 
                                                          
10 This estimate is based on a 5-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for AT&T. Section V provides a detailed explanation on the calculation of 
the CARs. 
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hypothesis, which posits that CEOs are rewarded for executing corporate deals, irrespective of whether 
such deals enhance shareholders‘ wealth.  Second, there is the signal of CEO quality hypothesis, which 
posits that CEOs are rewarded for executing corporate deals because they are a signal of CEO quality.   
We study which of these hypotheses is the most likely to hold, although they are not completely 
mutually exclusive.  For this purpose, we conduct several tests to distinguish between the hypotheses.  
First, we establish whether CEO compensation is, in fact, related to CEO activity.  Second, we investigate 
the relation between CEO compensation and the expected performance of the deal (as reflected in the 
market reaction to the announcements).  A positive relation would support the signal of CEO quality 
hypothesis and a negative relation would support the active CEO hypothesis.  Third, since the CEO‘s 
compensation is set by the firm‘s board of directors, we examine the characteristics of the board to 
determine whether the board and its decisions about compensation may be influenced by the CEO.  In 
particular, we examine whether managerial power, busy boards of directors, or CEO-hand-picked boards 
are more likely to raise the compensation of CEOs that execute the deals that do not appear to improve 
firm value.  Such a result would be more consistent with the active CEO hypothesis. 
We examine compensation surrounding four types of corporate actions that would indicate CEO deal-
making activity:  joint ventures, seasoned equity offerings (SEO), strategic alliances and spin-offs.  We 
begin by evaluating firms that broker at least one joint venture, strategic alliance or SEO deal between 
1996 and 2004.
11
 Comparing firms initiating these deals to other companies in the Execucomp database 
during the sample period, we find evidence in support of both the active CEO and the signal of CEO 
quality hypotheses.  We find that for all types of deals studied, the compensation for the CEOs increases.  
For example, during the year of an initiation of a joint venture deal, the deal-making CEOs experience a 
non-trivial average increase in their total compensation of $2.6 million.  These results, which obtain in 
different empirical specifications and are robust to numerous controls, suggest that deal-making activity 
                                                          
11 A joint venture is an entity formed between two or more parties to undertake economic activity together. The parties agree to create a new 
entity by both contributing equity, and they then share in the revenues, expenses, and control of the enterprise. The venture can be for one specific 
project only, or a continuing business relationship such as Verizon Wireless which is a joint venture between Verizon Communications and 
Vodafone. This is in contrast to strategic alliances, a deal type that we also analyze in this paper, which involve no equity stake by the 
participants, and is a less rigid arrangement. The joint venture can be organized as a partnership, a corporation, or any other form of business 
organization the participating firms choose. In the United States, joint ventures are often governed by state Partnership, Contracts, and 
Commercial Transactions law and are treated like a partnership for Federal Income Tax purposes.  
 15 
may be a vehicle for corporate boards to justify a pay raise for their CEOs.  While the majority of deal-
making CEOs receive higher pay increases than non-deal-making CEOs in terms of pay increases, only 6 
percent of the deals we analyze are expected to increase their firms‘ value.  
When we examine board monitoring of the CEOs who engage in these deals, we find that the 
monitoring appears to be weaker than for other CEOs.  We employ three proxies for the level of board 
monitoring:  the managerial power index (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), the board‘s ability to devote 
attention to monitoring due to other board positions (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) and the fraction of 
directors appointed while the CEO brokering the deal has been in office (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). 
We find that weak and/or inattentive boards pay more to their CEOs during the year a deal is executed.  
Further, the higher compensation occurs regardless of the deal‘s performance.  
SEOs increase the size of the firm.  Joint ventures and strategic alliances do not, although they do 
give the CEO some control over a larger base of assets.  Thus, a potential concern with our results is that 
a CEO pay increase related to any of these activities might be due to the increase in firm size or effective 
firm size. To address this issue, we investigate our research questions in a different sample of firms in 
which the deal-making activity is more likely to result in firm size decreases:  firms that spin off 
divisions. The results related to spinoffs also indicate that CEOs are rewarded for increased activity even 
if the deal has no material effect on shareholder wealth and that the increases are more likely to come 
from weak boards.  
Another potential concern is whether the deals cause a firm‘s level of diversification to increase. Rose 
and Shepard (1997) find that CEOs leading more diversified firms command higher levels of 
compensation. However, the multivariate results related to all of the different deals we consider are robust 
to firm effects, which alleviate concerns that the pay increases we uncover are due to firm diversification. 
In general, our results indicate that CEOs receive pay increases for executing certain corporate 
transactions whether or not the deals appear to improve firm value.  Moreover, our findings also indicate 
that the compensation increases dispensed to CEOs appear to be more pervasive when board monitoring 
is weak. These findings support the active CEO hypothesis over the signaling of CEO quality hypothesis. 
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Beyond the compensation increases, additional tests reveal that deal-making benefits CEOs in other 
ways. Our findings indicate that deal-making severely curtails the inverse firm performance-CEO 
turnover relation documented in other studies (see, for example, Weisbach, 1988 and Parrino, 1997a). We 
view this result as evidence that deal-making might help CEOs become entrenched.  Under this 
interpretation, our turnover results also support the CEO activity hypothesis. 
Our paper is related to two strands of literature.  The first is the literature that examines the relation 
between CEO compensation and acquisitions. For example, Harford and Li (2007) show that, even in 
mergers in which bidding shareholders are worse off, bidding CEOs experience wealth increases three 
quarters of the time. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that acquiring CEOs receive a larger bonus after the 
deal is completed, even if the acquisition is not value increasing.  Denis et al. (1997) and Datta et al. 
(2001) examine CEO compensation and ownership structures prior to M&A deals, and independently 
show that increased insider ownership and equity-based compensation improve long-run post-acquisition 
performance. Likewise, Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that CEO pay often increases following bank 
mergers even if the acquirer's stock price declines.  Our paper differs in that we consider other types of 
CEO-deal-making, which diverge from mergers in terms of both motivation and payoffs. Given the 
results in the extant literature, is not ex-ante obvious that other types of corporate transactions will have a 
meaningful effect on CEO compensation or that CEO pay will rise or fall with the success or failure of 
different corporate activities. The existing evidence documents pay increases for CEOs engaged in 
mergers and acquisitions, an activity that typically increases the size of the firm. On the other hand, in our 
study we examine how deals that often leave the size of the firm unchanged affect CEO compensation.  In 
addition, we provide further analysis of the effects of these deals by examining the motivations of CEOs 
to enter such activities as well as the impact of the deals on CEO turnover. 
The second strand of literature related to our paper is the empirical research based on the premise that 
compensation contracts fail to align the incentives of managers with those of shareholders when 
governance structures are weak. For example, Hallock (1997) and Fich and White (2005) find that 
interlocking boards provide higher compensation for their CEOs. Core et al. (1999) find that CEOs that 
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also hold the title of ―Chairman of the Board‖ receive larger compensation. Blanchard, Lopez De Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1994) find that when companies receive cash for reasons unrelated to corporate 
performance, CEOs receive a compensation increase. In contrast, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that 
institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
executive compensation. They argue that institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency 
problem between shareholders and top-managers. A characteristic common to these studies is their static 
analysis of the firm. That is, the empirical design of these studies does not require a specific firm action in 
order to study the relation between CEO compensation and corporate governance.
12
  Therefore, our paper 
goes beyond this literature by examining how the dynamic setting of the performance of a given deal 
affects the compensation of the CEO under different governance structures. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we discuss our hypotheses. We describe our data in 
Section III and present the empirical analyses in Sections IV and V. We conclude in Section VI. 
 
I. Theories and Hypothesis 
Hölmstrom (1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), and Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) among others, show 
that accounting for the moral hazard problem is essential when designing effective managerial 
compensation contracts. In Hölmstrom's model, the agent (CEO) performs a series of unobservable 
actions aimed at maximizing the utility of the principals (investors). However, Hölmstrom argues that the 
lack of observability by investors may induce CEOs to undertake actions that do not maximize investors‘ 
wealth.  Hölmstrom also argues that, in order to alleviate the moral hazard problem, the board should 
align managerial incentives with those of shareholders by tying CEO compensation to observable 
outcomes that are correlated with a CEO‘s activities.   Thus, boards may interpret a CEO‘s activity as 
meaningful accomplishments and reward the CEO accordingly.  This leads to our active CEO hypothesis 
which predicts that CEOs will undertake actions that improve their own wealth even when such actions 
do not enhance shareholders‘ wealth.  Alternatively, the CEO‘s activities could be a way of signaling his 
                                                          
12 However, all these studies control for contemporaneous and/or lagged performance. 
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quality to the board and the market and the compensation is appropriate for the activity.  We term this the 
signal of CEO quality hypothesis.  That is, CEOs are rewarded for executing corporate deals because they 
are a signal of CEO quality.   
These hypotheses are somewhat difficult to differentiate because both suggest that a CEO‘s activities 
would increase the CEO‗s compensation.  Two tests can aid in differentiating the hypotheses.  First, an 
examination of whether the deals are value-increasing should help in understanding the CEO‘s 
motivation.  Unfortunately, we cannot directly measure the value of a deal ex ante, only whether the 
market believes the deal to be value-increasing on its announcement.  A second way to attempt to 
distinguish between the hypotheses is by examining the quality of the corporate board.  Hölmstrom's 
arguments suggest that essential to a successful managerial compensation arrangement is an effective 
board that writes the contract, and closely monitors the CEO. Indeed, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue 
that in many instances the firm's governance is too weak to effectively enforce top-management 
compensation contracts and Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) show that board monitoring efficacy weakens 
over time as the CEO gains power over the board. Thus, we examine whether weak boards are more 
likely to authorize a pay raise for CEOs during the year when a deal that does not increase firm value is 
executed.  
 
II. Data 
A. Selection criteria 
Our sample consists of firms executing one or more joint ventures, strategic alliances, seasoned 
equity offerings, or spinoffs between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2004 for which we were able to 
retrieve data on the deals from the Thomson Financial database. We also require that each observation has 
complete governance, compensation, stock market, and accounting data from IRRC, Execucomp, CRSP, 
and Compustat, respectively.   
Over our sample period, we obtain the initial joint venture and strategic alliance samples from the 
Thomson Financial‘s SDC Platinum Joint Ventures/Alliances database. We restrict our analyses to U.S. 
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joint ventures and strategic alliances and require that there be only two participants in each deal, where 
each party is a publicly traded U.S. company.
13
  We construct the initial SEO sample by identifying all 
US common stock secondary issuances in Thomson Financial‘s SDC Platinum IPO database and the 
initial spinoff sample by identifying these transactions in the Thomson Financial database. We require that 
each observation has complete data in Execucomp on salary and bonus, equity-based compensation, 
perquisite compensation, and total compensation for the chief executive officer for the year preceding, the 
year of, and the year after each deal type is undertaken.
14
  We also require that each firm has governance 
data in the IRRC database and accounting and stock market data from Compustat and CRSP, respectively. 
After excluding observations for which data are not available in any of these sources, our final sample 
consists of 450 participant-year observations for the joint venture sample, 3,147 observations for the 
strategic alliance sample, 469 observations for the SEO sample, and 141 observations for the spinoff 
sample.   
 
B. Sample characteristics 
Panel A of Table I shows that the temporal distribution of the deals included in the final sample. The 
temporal distribution varies by type of deal.  For example, the peak year for joint ventures is 1997, which 
contains the largest numbers of deals at 113 (25% of the total), while the largest peak years for strategic 
alliances, SEOs, and spinoffs occurred in 1999, 2002, and 2000, respectively.  The smallest number of 
joint ventures, strategic alliances and spinoffs occurred in the same year, 2004. 
Sample statistics for key variables are reported in Panel B of Table I. The median firm in the sample 
has about $9 billion in assets and provides about $6.3 million to its CEO in total annual compensation. 
The average board has 11 directors, 66% of whom are independent. About 36% of the independent 
directors are appointed while the current CEO is in office. These statistics are comparable to those 
                                                          
13 Limiting our samples to two parties does not eliminate a large number of firms.  For example, ninety-five percent of all domestic joint ventures 
involve only two participants. 
14 We utilize four proxies to measure the annual compensation of the CEO. The first is Salary & Bonus Compensation which sums the annual 
cash and bonus compensation. The second is Equity-Based Compensation it adds the Black-Scholes value of options granted, restricted stock 
grants, and any long-term incentive payouts. Next is Perquisite Compensation which aggregates other annual compensation and all other total 
compensation. Our last proxy is Total Compensation which adds Salary & Bonus, Equity-Based, and Perquisite Compensation. 
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presented by Yermack (1996), who studies governance data from 1984-1991, and to those by Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2007) who examine board data from 1996-2005. 
 
III. Empirical Analyses 
A. The effects of deal-making on CEO compensation 
Because of the differences in motivations and outcomes across deal types, we examine each type of 
deal separately.  For each type, we analyze all of the firms in the Execucomp database over the 1996-2004 
sample period, a total of 9.587 observations.  We estimate CEO-compensation regressions using salary 
and bonus, equity-based pay, perquisites, and total compensation, as separate dependent variables. The 
key independent variable in each of these regressions is an indicator that is ―1‖ if the firm is involved in 
the deal-making activity during the year and is ―0‖ otherwise.  
We first test whether the level of total compensation CEOs receive in a given year is related to their 
joint venture deal-making activity.  Table II presents our compensation regressions using two different 
econometric specifications. Since executive compensation is a left-censored variable with a lower bound 
at zero, for the regressions in Panel A of Table II, we use a Tobit specification that controls for industry 
and calendar year effects. For the regressions in Panel B, we use a fixed-effects specification in order to 
account for unobservable attributes of each firm in our panel. The fixed-effects regression assigns a 
unique intercept to each firm in the sample. The results in both panels of Table II are generally consistent 
and indicate that engaging in joint venture deals enhances CEOs‘ wealth significantly. In model (4), Panel 
B, the fixed-effects coefficient estimate for the joint venture indicator implies that CEOs of joint venture 
firms receive an additional $2.6 million in total compensation during the year of the deal, the bulk of 
which ($2.3 million) comes from equity-based pay (model (2)). 
Table III presents the two sets of compensation regressions for our strategic alliance and SEO 
samples, respectively.  In models (1) and (2) we use an indicator variable that is ―1‖ whenever a deal is 
completed and ―0‖ otherwise.  The coefficient estimate for this variable in model (2) shows that CEOs of 
strategic alliance firms earn an additional $3.8 million in total pay during the year of the deal.  In models 
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(3) and (4) our key independent variable is a dummy that is ―1‖ if an SEO takes place and ―0‖ otherwise.  
The coefficient estimate for this variable in model (4) indicates that CEOs of firms that initiated an SEO 
earn an additional $2.0 million in total pay during the year. The results in Table III show strategic 
alliances and SEOs appear to have a non-trivial effect on CEO compensation.  
We note that the results in Tables II and III are robust to several firm- and CEO-specific 
characteristics. Moreover, these controls generate inferences analogous to those in other CEO 
compensation studies. For example, we find an inverse association between total CEO pay and CEO 
ownership and a positive association between total CEO pay and the firm‘s lagged stock return. These 
results are similar to those in Core et al. (1999) and Core et al. (2008), respectively. 
Overall, the results in Tables II and III suggest that deal-making is important for CEOs in achieving 
increases in pay. Such interpretation is consistent with both the active CEO hypothesis, which predicts a 
pay raise from deal-making activity, and the CEO quality signaling hypothesis, which predicts the deal-
making signals CEOs of higher quality.  A first step in differentiating these two hypotheses is to examine 
whether the compensation increases are related to expected deal performance, which we measure through 
changes in shareholder wealth at the announcement of the deal.  However, before addressing that issue, 
we probe the robustness of our results. 
 
B. Robustness issues 
B.1 Firm size 
In the previous section, we find that CEOs who engage in deal-making activities such as joint 
ventures, strategic alliances or SEOs receive pay raises related to their undertaking of these deals.  
Similarly, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that CEOs of acquiring firms experience a pay raise during 
the year of the merger. It is possible that the CEO pay increases documented by Grinstein and Hribar and 
this paper occur because of the relation between compensation and firm size (e.g., Baker, 1939; Murphy, 
1998; and Frydman and Saks, 2007).  That is, the deals increase firm size (or effective firm size), which 
then enable CEOs to command higher levels of compensation.  (Although joint ventures and strategic 
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alliances do not actually increase firm size, as do SEOs, they provide the CEO with some control over a 
larger set of assets.  This could be viewed as effectively increasing firm size, resulting in a rationale for 
greater compensation.) 
We note that all of our multivariate tests control for the firms‘ assets (Compustat data item 6), which 
is a commonly used proxy for firm size. Moreover, in unreported tests we replace assets with the firms‘ 
total capital or the firms‘ net sales. The use of these alternative size proxies does not alter the significance 
and inferences of our results.
15
 Notwithstanding our firm size controls, one might still be concerned that 
the pay increases for CEOs of firms that engage in joint ventures, strategic alliances, and SEOs arise 
because these deals cause effective firm size to increase. If CEOs of larger firms are paid more than those 
who head smaller companies, then pay increases to CEOs in our sample may simply reflect increases in 
firm size.  
To address this issue, we assemble a separate sample of 141 firms that undergo the type of deal that 
lowers firm size rather than increase it – a spinoff.16  In terms of assets, firms are likely to experience a 
reduction in firm size after spinning off one or more of its divisions.    
To be consistent with our previous tests, we analyze our spinoff firms together with all firms in the 
Execucomp database during the sample period. Table IV presents the results of our analysis where the 
key independent variable is a (0,1) indicator for spinoffs. Consistent with our earlier results on CEO deal-
making activities, we find that firms undergoing a spinoff increase the total compensation of their CEOs.   
The coefficient for the spinoff (0,1) variable implies that this activity is associated with a $4.2 million 
increase in total CEO compensation.  These analyses involving firms that spinoff a division should 
alleviate concerns that the foregoing results obtain simply due to increases in firm size. The results related 
                                                          
15 Sales are Compustat data item 12 and total capital adds the market value of the firm‘s equity, book value, long-term debt, and an estimated 
market value of preferred stock. We calculate the market value of preferred stock by dividing preferred dividends over the prevailing yield on 
Moody‘s index of high-grade industrial preferred stocks. 
16 A spinoff is a divestiture by a corporation of a division or subsidiary by issuing to stockholders shares in a new company set up to continue the 
operations of the division or subsidiary. Spinoffs involve the transfer of corporate assets of a subsidiary to shareholders in the form of a pro-rata 
stock dividend distribution without the surrender of any stock by the shareholders of the corporation. It is important to note that the parent firm‘s 
management relinquishes all control over the spun-off unit and, unlike an asset sale or equity carve-out, no cash is generated by the transaction. 
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to spinoff deals are consistent with those related to joint venture, strategic alliance, and SEO deals and 
again provide support for both the active CEO hypothesis and the CEO quality signaling hypothesis.
17
 
 
B.2 Empirical specification 
The compensation regressions we run in Tables II, III, and IV use the actual dollar amount the CEOs 
earn as the dependent variable. This choice causes the coefficient on the deal indicator variables in these 
tests to reflect the change in the actual dollar compensation associated with each deal type for firms in our 
sample. Consequently, our specification produces deal indicator coefficients which are readily 
interpretable.  However, several existing compensation studies use logarithms of the compensation, sales, 
and performance variables, instead of levels. Murphy (1985) argues that the logarithmic transformation 
reduces the skewness of the size distribution of sample firms. 
We repeat all of our tests using the logarithmic transformation for the compensation and size 
variables. In these tests, we are mindful that the economic effect of the deal indicators will be calculated 
with the standard e
β
 – 1 transformation, where β is the coefficient for the deal indicator variable. The 
results of these tests yield inferences similar to those reported.  
In addition, we also construct a deal indicator variable that is ―1‖ if any of the deals we study is 
announced during the year. We use this indicator as the key independent variable in a regression in which 
the natural log of total compensation is the dependent variable. Control variables are similar to those in 
Table IV and logarithmically transformed when appropriate. The statistically significant coefficient 
estimate for the deal indicator variable is 0.149403 which implies that total compensation for deal-making 
CEOs is about 16% higher than in other firms. 
 
                                                          
17 A further concern may be that the results here may be driven by other, more impactful deal-making activity (i.e. mergers) that occur 
simultaneously with our observed deals. To address this concern, we create an indicator (0,1) for whether the sample firm makes a bid for another 
U.S. publicly traded firm and entered the dummy into the models in Table 2-4. Consistent with Grinstein and Hribar (2004), the indicator is 
everywhere positive and significant, implying that CEOs undertaking a merger receive an unexplained increase in total compensation ranging 
from $2.9 M (p-value 0.00) to $3.2 M (p-value 0.00). While differing in magnitude, each of the deal-making indicators remain positive and 
significant. The point estimates are $4.9 M (p-value 0.00) for JVs, $3.5 M (p-value 0.00) for SAs, $1.9 M (p-value 0.00) for SEOs, and $4.0 M 
(p-value 0.00) for Spinoffs. The point estimates for each deal type are lower than without the merger dummy, indicating that some of the 
compensation increases we found in each deal might have been attributable to an acquisition in that year. 
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B.3 Firm diversification 
A further issue of potential concern is that deals such as joint ventures or strategic alliances may not 
necessarily enhance firm value, but may provide additional effective diversification for the firm. Rose and 
Shepard (1997) show that CEOs of diversified firms tend to earn higher compensation levels. Hence, it is 
possible that the pay raise documented for CEOs of joint ventures and strategic alliances might be due to 
the diversifying effect these deals have on the firm. We note however that, (1) our results in all deal types 
hold after controlling for industry effects, and (2) our results also hold in SEOs, and spinoffs, and these 
deals are unlikely to diversify the firm. 
 
B.4 Periodic compensation increases 
One additional potential concern may be that the increases in compensation we document simply 
reflect annual pay raises received by CEOs, rather than the result of CEO deal-making. We note that the 
tests in Tables II, III, and IV analyze our deal-making firms in tandem with all firms in the Execucomp 
database. Therefore, our results indicate that deal-making has a meaningful effect on total CEO pay. To 
illustrate our result, Figure 1 displays mean levels of total CEO pay during the year of the deal (year t), as 
well as during the years immediately surrounding the deal. The pattern represented in Figure 1 suggests 
that deal-making has a material impact on total CEO pay above any periodic pay raise given to CEOs. 
Indeed, according to Figure 1, total CEO pay in year t exceeds total pay in year t-1 and in year t+1. Total 
CEO pay in years t is statistically significantly larger at better than the 1 percent level when compared to 
total CEO pay in year t-1 and at better than the 2 percent level when compared to total pay in year t+1. 
 
B.5 The effect of stock options on total compensation 
Our tests reveal that deal making CEOs experience a meaningful increase in their total compensation 
during the year they execute a seasoned equity offering, strategic alliance, joint venture, and/or spinoff. 
Our results also show that, for any of these deals, the lion‘s share of the pay raise is in the form of equity-
based compensation. Because stock options and other equity-based instruments increase in value with the 
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firm‘s equity, it is possible that the total pay increases we detect for deal making CEOs result from stock 
price appreciations. Alternatively, it is also possible that, all else equal, the total pay increases result from 
an increase in the number of options awarded to CEOs during the deal year. 
Figure 2 illustrates the mean number of stock options awarded to deal making CEOs in our sample 
(normalized by the number of shares outstanding) during the year of the deal (t) as well as the years 
immediately preceding and following the deal. The patterns in Figure 2 indicate that the mean number of 
options is higher in year t than in t-1 and t+1, respectively. These differences are statistically significant. 
For instance, the mean difference of the stock options awarded between t-1 and t has a p-value of 0.03. 
Similarly, the mean difference between t and t+1 exhibits a p-value of 0.00. We also find median 
differences between t-1 and t as well as between t and t+1 to be statistically significant.
18
 In contrast, 
when we compare the number of options granted in t-1 with the options granted in t+1, we find that 
neither the mean nor the median difference is statistically significant. The fact that the increase in the 
number of options awarded to CEOs occurs only during the year of the deal suggests that deal making 
materially affects compensation. 
The statistically significant increase in options during the year of the deal alleviates our concerns on 
whether stock price appreciations drive the total compensation increases we detect for deal making CEOs 
in our sample. The patterns in the number of options granted around the deal making might be noteworthy 
in light of the predictions in Bebchuk and Fried (2003) that increases in option-based pay facilitates rent 
extraction by top managers in public firms. To investigate this issue further, we now examine the 
shareholder wealth effects of deal making for firms in our sample.  
 
C. The expected performance of the deals and shareholder wealth  
There is also the question of whether spinoffs increase firm value as there exists mixed evidence.  For 
example, Burch and Nanda (2003) show that spinoffs reduce diversification losses and Ahn and Denis 
                                                          
18 For instance, the median difference between t-1 and t exhibits a p-value of 0.00 whereas the median difference between t and t+1 exhibits a p-
value of 0.08. 
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(2004) argue that spinoffs that break up the conglomerate create value by improving investment 
efficiency. In contrast, Desai and Jain (1999) find that only those spinoffs that increase the firm‘s focus 
enhance firm performance.  Moreover, Parrino (1997b), who studies the 1993 Marriott spinoff, shows a 
decline in the total value of the firm following the spinoff announcement. Parrino argues that transaction 
costs and inefficiencies resulting from the spinoff, explain much of the decline. Given this literature, it is 
not ex-ante clear whether spinoffs increase shareholder wealth. In fact, it is possible than none of the 
corporate deals we study increase firm value. 
In order to estimate the expected value of the deals, in Table V, we report investor reactions arising 
from the joint venture, strategic alliance, SEO, and spinoff announcements. To ensure that the 
announcements are not contaminated by other major events and that the abnormal returns we estimate are 
not the result of confounding events such as dividend or earning announcements, executive resignations, 
patent approvals, or lawsuit filings, we search the Lexis/Nexis data retrieval system for contemporary 
news that may affect our sample firms.
19
  We use a standard event-study methodology (Dodd and Warner, 
1983) to compute abnormal returns (ARs) for the deal announcement date and for the two days preceding 
and following the event.
20
  
Panel A of Table V reports the results of separate market reactions for each type of event.  The results   
indicate that announcements of joint ventures elicit a generally muted market reaction, which suggests 
that joint ventures are not expected to significantly affect shareholder wealth.  When we disaggregate the 
450 announcements, we find that the overwhelming majority of announcements, 394 or about 87 percent, 
                                                          
19 Very few announcements are confounded by other events. The exclusion of these announcements does not alter our results. 
20 The announcement returns are estimated over the (-2,+2) window immediately surrounding the announcement date. We compute daily 
abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as: 
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where RETt and VWRETDt are the daily stock and CRSP Value Weighted Index holding period returns, respectively. We determine the 
significance of each observation‘s cumulative abnormal return by computing the  Patell‘s (1976) test statistic as 
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where nCAR is the number of days in the announcement window, σ
2is the daily AR variance estimate computed from the 250-day (-290, -41) 
estimation window, and nest is the number of days in the estimation window. Patell‘s t is distributed as a standard normal. Prior year stock returns 
are the sum of the log daily abnormal stock returns for the 250-day window ending forty days prior to the announcement date. 
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are not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. Only 56 announcements are statistically 
significant, 31 are positive and 25 are negative.    
Announcements of strategic alliances have a statistically significant positive market reaction on 
average, but both the mean and median are very small in value, again suggesting generally muted market 
reactions.  Similarly, announcements of SEOs are met with a small negative market reaction, on average, 
that is only marginally significant.  In contrast, the announcements of spin offs are met with positive 
market reactions that are both economically and statistically significant.  Investors appear to find these 
CEO activities as significantly value-increasing, on average.   
In an informationally efficient market, the fact that a firm is about to execute specific deals might be 
anticipated by market participants. Therefore, the potential effect of any deal on firm value should be 
probabilistically incorporated into securities prices prior to the announcement of the deal. This fact might 
explain the relatively muted reaction we estimate when certain deals, such as joint ventures, are 
announced. In order to purge the CARs of bias arising from anticipations and to establish the relevance of 
prior anticipations across the deal sub-samples, we estimate a two-stage CAR analysis similar to that in 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999). In the first stage, we estimate the probability that a specific deal will 
take place. We use these probabilities to adjust the CARs in Panel A of Table V by a factor of 1/(1 - p), 
where p is the estimated probability of the deal.  Hence, each probability-adjusted CAR represents an 
estimate of what the stock price reaction would have been if the deal announcement had not been 
anticipated.  
We report the results for the two-stage CARs estimation in Panel B of Table V. The results of this 
analysis lend support to the idea that the CARs across the deal sub-samples in Panel A are generally not 
caused by anticipation bias. Moreover, the magnitude and significance of the two-stage CARs is similar to 
the regular CARs. One exception is the two-stage CARs related to strategic alliances. The strategic 
alliance results suggest that the magnitude of investor reactions to this deal type may be larger if the 
investors‘ anticipation is factored in. However, the larger effect is marginally significant for the mean and 
has relatively small magnitude for the median.  In subsequent tests we use both measures of CAR to proxy 
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for each deal‘s expected performance and find no qualitative difference between the two.  Consequently, 
we report the results for the first specification. 
In general, the results from Table V suggest that the average announcements for the CEO deal-
making activities of joint ventures and SEOs do not indicate that the prospects for these deals are value-
increasing for the shareholders, the average effects for strategic alliances appear to be only slightly value-
increasing, and. the average announcements for spin offs appear to be value-increasing to some extent.
21
 
In the next section, we consider the determinants of CEO compensation in light of the market reaction to 
the CEO activities.    
 
B. Corporate governance, deal performance, and CEO compensation 
As discussed earlier, we can potentially differentiate between our hypotheses by examining measures 
of the quality of the firm‘s board monitoring.  The active CEO hypothesis can hold only if the monitoring 
is deficient.  Thus, we now turn our attention to whether the differences in governance structures for 
boards are related to the compensation increases, controlling for the deal announcement effect.  
We consider three different variables as proxies for effective corporate governance and attentive 
boards. Our first proxy is based on measuring whether the board appears to be attentive based on the 
findings in Fich and Shivdasani (2006). They show that firms with busy boards, those in which 50 percent 
or more of the outside directors hold three or more directorships, exhibit poor performance. We construct 
an indicator that is ―1‖ if the board is busy and is ―0‖ if it is not. Our second proxy for board monitoring 
is an indicator that is ―1‖ if 50 percent of the board‘s outside directors are appointed while the current 
CEO is in office. We refer to this variable, which is partially based on the findings of Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007), as a ―hand-picked board.‖ If hand-picked boards 
                                                          
21 We find that some of the deals we study, joint ventures; strategic alliances; and seasoned equity offerings, fail to trigger meaningful market 
reactions at their announcement and argue that, on average, these deals do not substantially enhance shareholder wealth. Nonetheless, there might 
be alternative explanations for the muted reactions we estimate. For example, it is possible that the deals are value increasing but that the market 
under-reacts to their announcements. Under these circumstances, one would expect the long-run performance of deal-making firms to improve. 
To consider this possibility, we construct equal- and value- weighted portfolios of all Execucomp firms and of deal-making firms tracking their 
performance for 120 months. We benchmark these portfolios by the Carhart (1997) 4-factors. Overall, we find the alphas associated with the 
portfolios of deal-making firms yield statistically insignificant coefficients. These findings are in line with those in the event study tests reported 
in Table V, and indicate that the deals studied do not, for the most part, increase firm value. 
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are loyal to their appointing CEOs, they are more likely to go along with the CEO and less likely to be 
strict monitors.  Our third proxy is a managerial power index constructed similar to that in Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004). They construct an index of managerial power by adding the following three (0,1) indicator 
variables: (1) whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board, (2) whether the CEO is on the 
nominating committee, and (3) whether the board‘s size is smaller than the median size in the sample. 
Thus, the managerial power index can range from zero (least managerial power), to three (greatest 
power). 
Using these variables, we run Tobit models of total CEO compensation on governance for our deal-
making firms.  All regressions control for firm size, stock returns during the previous year, and the deal‘s 
expected performance as proxied by its announcement return. In addition, all regressions control for year 
and industry effects.  An important issue in estimating the relations between CEO compensation, 
governance and deal announcement effects is the endogeneity we encounter due to self-selection. That is, 
the decision to undertake a deal has its own determinants, which we estimate separately and for each 
individual deal using the entire Execucomp database.  We use the results of the separate estimations to 
construct an inverse Mill‘s ratio for each deal type to control for self selection. This two-stage approach 
follows the procedure outlined in Heckman (1979).
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Table VI provides the results of these regressions for joint ventures in Panel A, strategic alliances in 
Panel B, SEOs in Panel C, and spinoffs in Panel D.  The key independent variable is the busy board 
indicator in Model 1 and the handpicked board indicator in Model 2. In the interest of space we omit the 
results for the managerial power index because the coefficient on this index is not statistically significant 
in any of the regressions. The results in all four panels indicate that busy boards are associated with 
higher levels of total CEO compensation.  For example, Panel A shows that companies with new joint 
ventures and busy boards pay their CEOs an additional $20.7 million in compensation. Similarly, 
estimates in Model (1) of Panel B indicate that busy boards give CEOs of strategic alliance deals over $10 
                                                          
22 The first stage model is a function of firm size, market-to-book, cash-to-assets, leverage, ROA, number of same type of deals in the prior two 
years, CEO age, industry-adjusted compensation, tenure, ownership, industry dummies, and year dummies. This specification augments that in 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004). 
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million in additional total compensation during the year. These additional compensation levels related to 
busy boards are over 50 percent larger than the $5.5 million pay earned by the median CEO in the entire 
Execucomp database during our sample period, which suggests that busy boards overpay their CEOs. 
This interpretation of our finding is similar to that in Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999).  They also 
find that busy boards likely overpay their CEOs. 
The results in Table VI also indicate that hand-picked boards overpay their CEOs that implement 
joint ventures, strategic alliances and SEOs.  For example, Model 2 of Panel A shows that hand-picked 
boards reward their CEOs with additional total compensation worth almost $14 million.   
Also noteworthy is that the deal-making CEOs receive these hefty pay levels despite the apparent lack 
of association between their compensation and the expected deal performance. Indeed, in all the 
regressions in Table VI, expected deal performance, measured by the investors‘ reaction to the deal 
announcement, is unrelated to CEO pay. This result is robust to numerous controls, including the firm‘s 
stock performance during the previous year. We interpret the results in Table VI as evidence indicating 
that weak monitors, which we proxy with busy and hand-picked boards, do not tie deal performance with 
CEO pay, resulting in total pay packages granted to CEOs that are larger than their contemporaries. 
In summary, the results that consider the expected performance of the deal and the quality of board 
monitoring are supportive of the active CEO hypothesis.  They do not support the CEO quality signaling 
hypothesis.   
 
IV. Motivations for CEO Deal-making Activities 
A. Monitoring quality 
Our evidence to this point has somewhat supported the active CEO hypothesis over the CEO quality 
signal hypothesis.  If the active CEO hypothesis is valid, then an implication is that firms which engage in 
more deal-making activities should display certain characteristics, namely that their governance structures 
should be weaker in monitoring than other firms and the weaker monitoring should be related to the 
existence or number of deals.  To test the determinants of deal-making activities across firms, we employ 
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our entire sample of 9,587 firm-year observations from Execucomp and estimate two types of regressions.  
First, we estimate a logit regression in which the independent variable is ―1‖ if the firm makes any type of 
deal during the year (joint venture, strategic alliance, seasoned equity offering or spinoff) and ―0‖ 
otherwise. Second, we estimate a Poisson regression in which the dependent variable is the number of 
deals a firm completes in a given year.  The logit regression in Model (1) of Table VII thus considers 
whether a CEO entered into at least one deal in a given year but does not consider the number of deals 
that the CEO undertakes.  The Poisson regression in Model (2) of Table VII takes the number of deals 
into consideration.     
The results of the logit regression show that the managerial power index is strongly related to the 
likelihood of deal-making activity, suggesting that CEOs with more power are more likely to enter into 
such deals as are CEOs of firms with busy boards.  The marginal effects implied by our coefficient 
estimates indicate that busy boards increase the probability of deal-making by 3.81 percentage points in 
any given year whereas a one standard deviation in ownership for the average CEO reduces it by 1.07 
percentage points.  The results for the Poisson regression in Model (2) are very similar to those for the 
logit regression in Model (1).   The results further show that CEOs with more tenure and more ownership 
are less likely to enter into such activities.  CEOs of older, larger firms with more cash and higher book to 
market value, are more likely to enter these deals and enter into more deals than CEOs of other firms.  
Not surprisingly, having larger past stock returns contributes to more deals.    
In general, the findings of Table VII suggest that CEOs‘ deal-making is related to the lack of strong 
monitoring in the firm, which supports the active CEO hypothesis over the CEO quality signaling 
hypothesis.  CEOs of firms who are more entrenched, have greater managerial power, and weaker, less 
attentive boards, are more likely to engage in deal-making activities. 
 
B. Deal-making and CEO turnover 
One further question with relation to CEOs who engage in deal-making is whether such deal-making 
activity influences the tenure of the CEO.  We address this question by examining whether there exist any 
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differences in the relation between CEO turnover and firm performance across deal-making versus non-
deal-making firms.  Table VIII provides the results of logit regressions of CEO turnover in which we use 
the entire Execucomp database during our sample period. In the estimation, the dependent variable takes a 
value of ―1‖ if the CEO leaves office during the year and the value of ―0‖ otherwise.  We use two proxies 
for the CEO deal-making activities.  In Panel A, we use an indicator variable that takes a value of ―1‖ if 
the CEO engages in at least one deal-making activity during the year and a value of ―0‖ otherwise.  In 
Panel B, we use the actual count of the number of deals that the CEO completes during the year.  Model 
(1) of Panel A and Model (4) of Panel B show the results from a simple regression of CEO turnover 
against firm performance as measured by the return on assets for the previous year.  Consistent with 
previous evidence on CEO turnover, e.g. Weisbach (1988) and Parrino (1997a), we find that CEO 
turnover is significantly negatively related to the firm‘s performance.   Poorly performing CEOs are more 
likely to leave their jobs.  In Model (2) of Panel A and Model (5) of Panel B we add control variables as 
well as the proxies for CEO deal-making activities in the current year.  These regressions suggest that 
CEO deal-making has no direct effect on CEO turnover probabilities.  However, in Model (3) of Panel A 
and Model (6) of Panel B, we include an interaction term between the firm‘s return on assets and the 
proxies for CEO deal-making activities.  The results show that engaging in deal-making activities 
significantly lowers the probability of being fired because of poor performance.  In fact, the deal-making 
activities appear to make the CEO turnover insensitive to firm performance. In terms of the marginal 
effects implied by our coefficient estimates, for all firms, a one standard deviation decrease in ROA 
increases the probability of CEO turnover by 1.45 percentage points. In contrast, for deal-making firms, a 
similar decline in performance insignificantly increases the probability of turnover by only 0.21 
percentage points.
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  The implication of these results is that CEOs would be motivated to engage in deal-
making activities in order to lower their turnover risk.  Such activities appear to be particularly important 
for CEOs of poorly performing firms.   
                                                          
23 To assess the robustness of these marginal effects, we utilize the methodology proposed by Ai and Norton (2003) which estimates the 
interaction term‘s marginal effect at each point in the distribution of the sample data. The marginal effects implied by their methodology indicate 
that, for deal-making firms, a one standard deviation decline in ROA insignificantly decreases the probability of turnover by 0.71 percentage 
points. Overall, the marginal effects arising from the Ai and Norton (2003) method are in line with those we report. 
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 These results appear to be more consistent with the active CEO hypothesis than the CEO 
signaling quality hypothesis.  Although neither hypothesis as developed has direct implications for the 
relation between CEO turnover and firm performance, the implications of this last test would appear to be 
more consistent with a CEO engaging in activities for personal gain. 
 
V. Conclusions 
Principal-agent theories predict that, under moral hazard, agents (CEOs) might take actions that 
maximize their own utility, but not necessarily that of the principals (shareholders). Other theories 
indicate that to alleviate the moral hazard problem, boards should write and enforce compensation 
contracts that effectively align the incentives of CEOs and shareholders. However, if boards are weak 
monitors, the moral hazard problem may persist, and self-dealing CEOs could choose actions that 
improve their own wealth, but not the wealth of the firms‘ shareholders. The questions we address in this 
paper are rooted in these hypotheses.  
We investigate the effects of CEO deal-making activities on the compensation of the CEO, 
considering whether the activities appear to enhance firm value.  We propose two hypotheses for the 
relation between CEO compensation and CEO deal-making activities:  the active CEO hypothesis and the 
CEO quality signaling hypothesis.  The active CEO tenet predicts that deal-making CEOs will be 
rewarded even if the deals they execute do not raise shareholders‘ wealth. That is, the CEO engages in the 
deals in the interest of increasing his or her compensation.  The CEO quality signaling premise predicts 
that CEO deal-making activities are signals of higher quality CEOs.  Under this view, the CEO engages in 
the deals in the interest of the shareholders.  The hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, which implies 
that we cannot completely differentiate between them.  We have designed empirical tests to determine 
which hypothesis has more support.   
We conduct our analyses in firms that engage in a variety of corporate deals: joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, seasoned equity offerings, and spinoffs. Our findings indicate that total CEO pay increases in 
firms executing any of these deals, even when the deal fails to increase firm value.  In addition, we also 
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find that pay increases for CEOs of deals that do not enhance shareholder wealth are dispensed by weak 
monitors, as proxied by busy or hand-picked boards. These results are consistent with the idea that weak 
or inattentive boards do not link CEO compensation to deal performance.  Although certain aspects of our 
findings support both the active CEO hypothesis and the CEO quality signaling hypothesis, the totality of 
our results provide more support for the active CEO hypothesis. 
Moreover in terms of the motivations of the CEO, we find that CEOs with more managerial power 
and less attentive boards are more likely to engage in deal-making activities.  Further, we show that deal-
making activities remove the impact of the relation between CEO turnover probability and firm 
performance, providing further motivation for CEOs, particularly those with poor performance, to engage 
in deal-making activities, even if they are not value-increasing for the firm. 
Our findings are in line with the theoretical predictions in Dow and Raposo (2005). Their model 
predicts that CEO compensation influences the kinds of strategies firms adopt.  Our results show that 
CEOs adopt strategies that increase their compensation, but not necessarily their firms‘ value. Our 
findings related to compensation increases being dispensed by weak boards also provide support for – and 
conform to – the theories in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) that the power of CEOs increases when 
boards are weak monitors, and with the argument of Bebchuk and Fried (2003) that CEO power is a 
significant driver of CEO compensation. 
Our findings indicate that self-dealing by CEOs and the lack of attentive monitoring can have non-
trivial economic effects. For instance, we show that regardless of the deal-making activity we study, CEO 
pay increases, on average, even when firm value does not.  In fact, we find that CEO pay goes up even 
after executing deals that appear to cause firm value to severely decrease, as in the case of joint ventures 
that trigger average market reactions of -9.23%. At best, the evidence we present is consistent with CEOs 
choosing activities that maximize their own wealth rather than shareholder value. At worst, the CEO 
compensation and shareholder wealth patterns we uncover could represent unjustified rent extraction by 
CEOs and unchecked firm value destruction by the firms‘ monitors. 
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Table I 
Sample Description 
Our sample consists of firms executing one or more joint venture, strategic alliance, seasoned equity offering, and or spinoff. Data on these deals 
are collected from the Thomson Financial database from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2004. We require that each observation has complete 
governance, compensation, stock market, and accounting data from IRRC, Execucomp, CRSP, and Compustat, respectively. Panel A provides the 
sample‘s temporal distribution. Panel B presents sample statistics for key variables. Firm size is total assets (Compustat item 6), ROA is operating 
income before depreciation (Compustat item 13) plus the decrease in receivables (Compustat item 2), the decrease in inventory (Compustat item 
3), the increase in current liabilities (Compustat item 72) and the decrease in other current assets (Compustat item 68). We scale this measure by 
the average of beginning- and ending-year book value of total assets (Compustat item 6). Equity-Based pay is the sum of the Black-Scholes value 
of options granted, restricted stock grants, and any long-term incentive payouts. Perquisites sum all other annual pay the firm reports. Total pay 
adds all the above pay categories. The managerial power index is based on Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and sums the following three (0,1) 
indicator variables: (1) whether the CEO also chairs the board, (2) whether the CEO is on the nominating committee, and (3) whether the board‘s 
size is smaller than the median size in the sample. Independent directors are those are not relatives of corporate officers, do not have a business 
relationship with the firm, and are those whose board seat is their only link with the firm. The Hand Picked Board dummy follows Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007) and is ―1‖ if 50 percent of the board‘s outside directors are appointed while the current 
CEO is in office. The Busy Board indicator follows Fich and Shivdasani (2006) and is ―1‖ if 50 percent or more of the ou tside directors hold 
three or more directorships. 
Panel A: Temporal Distribution by Deal Type 
Year 
Joint Ventures Strategic Alliances Seasoned Equity Offerings Spinoffs All Deals 
Count % Sample Count % Sample Count % Sample Count % Sample Count % Sample 
1996 67 14.89% 243 7.72% 23 4.90% 8 5.67% 341 8.11% 
1997 113 25.11% 490 15.57% 33 7.04% 16 11.35% 652 15.50% 
1998 65 14.44% 521 16.56% 42 8.96% 18 12.77% 646 15.36% 
1999 42 9.33% 593 18.84% 51 10.87% 25 17.73% 711 16.90% 
2000 82 18.22% 352 11.19% 53 11.30% 40 28.37% 527 12.53% 
2001 33 7.33% 249 7.91% 51 10.87% 9 6.38% 342 8.13% 
2002 23 5.11% 222 7.05% 75 15.99% 12 8.51% 332 7.89% 
2003 15 3.33% 275 8.74% 68 14.50% 10 7.09% 368 8.75% 
2004 10 2.22% 202 6.42% 73 15.57% 3 2.13% 288 6.85% 
Total 450 100.00% 3,147 100.00% 469 100.00% 141 100.00% 4,207 100.00% 
Panel B: Sample Statistics for All Deals 
  Mean Std. Dev Min Median Max 
Financial and Deal Characteristics (t-1)      
Market Value 40,015.49 98,722.05 35.68 9,215.00 1,264,032.00 
EBITDA 4,114.80 7,036.81 -3,695.00 1,271.40 61,188.00 
Return on Assets 15.60% 10.34% -99.82% 14.93% 82.11% 
Previous Year Return 15.88% 45.06% -285.63% 17.95% 323.54% 
 
Governance Characteristics (t-1)      
Managerial Power Index 1.87 0.88 0.00 2.00 3.00 
Board Size 10.89 3.29 4.00 11.00 29.00 
Percent Independent Directors 65.57% 16.45% 7.69% 66.67% 100.00% 
Hand-picked independent directors (0,1) 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Busy Board (0,1) 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 
 
Compensation Characteristics (t)      
Salary and Bonus 2,509.99 2,775.19 0.00 1,697.61 30,000.00 
Equity-Based Pay 10,101.06 27,147.30 0.00 3,316.71 600,347.36 
Perks 1,055.70 3,013.70 0.00 160.95 37,291.56 
Total Pay 13,666.75 28,279.14 0.00 6,318.93 600,347.36 
 
CEO Characteristics (t)      
Age 55.20 6.93 34.00 56.00 86.00 
Ownership (% of common) 1.78% 5.37% 0.00% 0.00% 42.77% 
Tenure (years) 7.28 6.58 0.00 5.00 48.03 
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Table II 
Joint Venture Activity and CEO Compensation for the Entire Execucomp Universe 
In this table we analyze all of the firms in the Execucomp database from 1996 to 2004 and estimate CEO-compensation regressions using (1) 
salary and bonus, (2) equity-based pay, (3) perks, and (4) total compensation, as separate dependent variables. Our sample of Execucomp firms 
consists of 9,587 firm-year observations with complete governance, stock-market, and accounting data.  The key independent variable in each of 
these regressions is an indicator that is ―1‖ if the firm is involved in a Joint Venture during the year and is ―0‖ otherwise. We use two different 
econometric specifications to estimate our compensation regressions. Since executive compensation is a left-censored variable with a lower 
bound at zero, for the regressions in Panel A, we use a Tobit specification that controls for industry and calendar year effects. For the regressions 
in Panel B, we use a fixed-effects specification in order to account for unobservable attributes of each firm in our panel. The fixed-effects 
regression assigns a unique intercept to each firm in the sample. All variables are defined in Table I. 
Panel A: Tobit Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Salary and Bonus Equity-Based Pay Perks Total Pay 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Intercept 880.75 0.00 2,810.09 0.15 -219.05 0.48 4,411.11 0.01 
Joint Venture (0,1) 652.00 0.00 4,208.58 0.00 594.01 0.00 5,252.88 0.00 
CEO Age 12.79 0.00 -78.26 0.00 20.10 0.00 -6.02 0.73 
CEO Ownership (% of common) -2,080.34 0.00 -25,820.91 0.00 -2,414.87 0.00 -11,522.98 0.00 
CEO Tenure (years) 11.14 0.00 -6.22 0.76 0.06 0.99 23.15 0.20 
Firm Size (t-1) 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 
Return on Assets (t-1) 1,005.45 0.00 5,269.46 0.00 178.94 0.51 6,115.64 0.00 
ROA Growth 46.44 0.59 -653.66 0.27 -91.26 0.36 -817.86 0.13 
Previous Year Stock Return 422.10 0.00 501.99 0.09 112.65 0.02 655.37 0.01 
Return on Sales (t-1) -4.58 0.66 298.88 0.34 48.69 0.35 -2.65 0.97 
ROS Growth -1.15 0.99 1,125.95 0.08 116.83 0.27 1,186.37 0.04 
         
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Panel B: Fixed Effects Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Salary and Bonus Equity-Based Pay Perks Total Pay 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Joint Venture (0,1) 107.02 0.08 2,289.36 0.00 198.98 0.05 2,595.35 0.00 
CEO Age 5.88 0.08 -7.60 0.80 17.23 0.00 15.50 0.61 
CEO Ownership (% of common) -554.21 0.21 -5,244.52 0.17 -534.00 0.46 -6,332.73 0.11 
CEO Tenure (years) 15.65 0.00 -19.81 0.55 8.46 0.18 4.30 0.90 
Firm Size (t-1) 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.47 -0.02 0.00 
Return on Assets (t-1) 1,664.25 0.00 9,312.03 0.00 1,069.99 0.02 12,046.27 0.00 
ROA Growth -42.31 0.48 -751.19 0.15 -134.60 0.17 -928.10 0.08 
Previous Year Stock Return 341.86 0.00 -92.04 0.72 111.70 0.02 361.51 0.18 
Return on Sales (t-1) -4.13 0.66 13.32 0.87 -1.52 0.92 7.67 0.93 
ROS Growth 56.12 0.38 819.36 0.14 126.06 0.23 1,001.55 0.08 
         
Industry Dummies No  No  No  No  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
F-Statistic p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
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Table III 
Effect of Strategic Alliances and Seasoned Equity Offerings on CEO Compensation 
This table presents results on the relation between entering into strategic alliances and seasoned equity offerings and CEO compensation.  Our 
sample selection process, which is described in the text, yields SA and SEO samples consisting of 3,147 and 469 observations, respectively. We 
present two sets of compensation regressions for each sample. We evaluate SEO and SA firms against companies in the Execucomp universe, a 
total of 9,587 firm-year observations. In models (1) and (2) we use an indicator variable that is ―1‖ whenever a strategic alliance is completed. In 
models (3) and (4) our key independent variable is a (0,1) dummy that is ―1‖ if an SEO takes place. Variable definitions appear in Table I. 
  Strategic Alliances Seasoned Equity Offerings 
  Equity-Based Pay Total Compensation Equity-Based Pay Total Compensation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Intercept 3,050.52 0.11 4,680.56 0.01 2,964.42 0.13 4,703.63 0.01 
Completed SA (0,1) 3,394.89 0.00 3,767.58 0.00     
Completed SEO (0,1)     1,808.54 0.00 1,985.60 0.00 
CEO Age -79.95 0.00 -6.95 0.69 -76.88 0.00 -5.04 0.77 
CEO Ownership (% of common) -25,056.32 0.00 -10,850.65 0.00 -26,194.93 0.00 -11,840.76 0.00 
CEO Tenure (years) -1.59 0.94 28.24 0.11 -8.43 0.68 21.36 0.23 
Firm size (t-1) 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Return on Assets (t-1) 4,132.72 0.01 5,119.84 0.00 5,311.64 0.00 6,145.52 0.00 
ROA Growth -675.97 0.25 -818.42 0.13 -522.43 0.38 -666.33 0.22 
Previous Year Stock Return 487.07 0.09 635.52 0.02 503.62 0.09 658.54 0.01 
Return on Sales (t-1) 421.22 0.23 3.45 0.96 303.62 0.33 -0.69 0.99 
ROS Growth 1,209.06 0.06 1,252.00 0.03 1,017.16 0.11 1,067.90 0.07 
         
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
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Table IV 
Spinoff Activity 
This table analyzes our spinoff firms together with all firms in the Execucomp database during the sample period for a total of 9,587 firm-year 
observations. We run Tobit compensation regressions. The key independent variable is a (0,1) indicator for spinoffs. We construct the spinoff 
sample by identifying these transactions in the Thomson Financial database from January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2004. After removing 
observations without data in Execucomp, Compustat, IRRC, or CRSP, we arrive at a final sample of 141 spinoffs. All variables are defined in 
Table I. 
  Equity-Based Pay Total Compensation 
  (1) (2) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Intercept 3,244.30 0.09 4,987.40 0.00 
Completed Spinoff (0,1) 4,414.11 0.00 4,225.01 0.00 
CEO Age -78.02 0.00 -6.32 0.72 
CEO Ownership (% of common) -26,201.51 0.00 -11,886.95 0.00 
CEO Tenure (years) -6.81 0.74 22.87 0.20 
Firm size (t-1) 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Return on Assets (t-1) 5,100.89 0.00 5,913.73 0.00 
ROA Growth -563.23 0.34 -723.17 0.18 
Previous Year Stock Return 534.67 0.07 692.52 0.01 
Return on Sales (t-1) 291.07 0.34 0.60 0.99 
ROS Growth 1,056.99 0.10 1,129.32 0.05 
     
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  
     
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  
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Table V 
Deal-Making Announcement Returns and Executive Compensation 
This table reports investor reactions arising from announcements of deals for our sample firms.  We search the Lexis/Nexis data retrieval system 
for contemporary news that may affect our sample firms and eliminate observations that may be contaminated by other major events such as 
dividend or earning announcements, executive resignations, patent approvals, or lawsuit filings. We use the standard event-study methodology 
(Dodd and Warner, 1983) to compute abnormal returns (ARs) for the announcement date of the deal and for the two days preceding and following 
the event. Market model parameters are computed from one year of trading data preceding the event window.  We report a two-tailed t-statistic 
(Z-statistic) as a parametric (non-parametric) way to assess the statistical significance of the mean (median) CARs. 
Panel A: Market-Adjusted CARs 
Activity N Mean CARs Median CARs 
Joint Ventures 450 0.15% 0.11% 
  (0.55) (0.91) 
Strategic Alliances 3,147 0.24% 0.19% 
  (0.02) (0.01) 
Seasoned Equity Offerings 469 -0.44% -0.89% 
  (0.17) (0.02) 
Spinoffs 141 1.76% 2.11% 
    (0.02) (0.01) 
Panel B: Two-stage CARs 
Activity N Mean CARs Median CARs 
Joint Ventures 450 -0.18% 0.14% 
  (0.82) (0.93) 
Strategic Alliances 3,147 1.74% 0.45% 
  (0.07) (0.01) 
Seasoned Equity Offerings 469 -0.57% -0.95% 
  (0.12) (0.02) 
Spinoffs 141 1.83% 2.13% 
    (0.02) (0.01) 
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Table VI 
Performance on Strategic Alliance, SEO, Spinoff Deals and Total CEO Compensation 
Tobit models of CEO compensation on governance for our 450 joint venture, 3,147 strategic alliance, 469 SEO, and 141 spinoff firms. The 
dependent variable in all regressions is the total compensation for the year. The key independent variable in Model 1 is a busy board 
indicator and in Model 2, a hand-picked board indicator. All regressions control for firm size, stock return during the previous year, the 
deals‘ performance as proxied by its announcement return, year and firm effects as well as for self-selection. The self-selection control is 
estimated separately using the entire Execucomp database. We use the results of the separate estimation to construct the inverse mill‘s ratio 
to control for self selection. This two-stage approach follows the procedure outlined in Heckman (1979). The first stage model is a function 
of firm size, market-to-book, cash-to-assets, leverage, ROA, number of same type of deals in the prior two years, CEO age, industry-
adjusted total compensation, tenure, ownership, industry dummies, and year dummies. This specification augments that in Grinstein and 
Hribar (2004). All variables are defined in Table I. 
Panel A: Joint Ventures 
  (1) (2) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Intercept 2,415.43 0.88 2,871.23 0.86 
Firm Size 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00 
Announcement CAR -36,433.12 0.20 -43,606.33 0.12 
Return on Assets -4,434.69 0.83 -10,662.87 0.60 
Previous Year Stock Return 21,580.03 0.00 22,565.73 0.00 
Busy Board 20,702.23 0.00   
Hand-Picked Boards   13,934.74 0.00 
Heckman Correction 1,780.04 0.55 569.00 0.85 
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  
 
Panel B: Strategic Alliances 
  (1) (2) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Intercept 8,624.19 0.00 7,561.15 0.00 
Firm Size 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Announcement CAR 12,441.16 0.14 11,495.32 0.17 
Return on Assets 9,485.31 0.06 10,249.97 0.05 
Previous Year Stock Return 6,067.68 0.00 6,118.83 0.00 
Busy Board 10,331.59 0.00   
Hand-Picked Boards   4,019.96 0.00 
Heckman Correction 636.96 0.09 279.99 0.45 
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  
Panel C: Seasoned Equity Offerings 
  (1) (2) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Intercept -2,639.87 0.31 -2,935.69 0.26 
Firm Size 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 
Announcement CAR -7,936.03 0.29 -8,773.24 0.25 
Return on Assets 18,436.44 0.00 19,030.40 0.00 
Previous Year Stock Return -587.66 0.64 -624.01 0.62 
Busy Board 5,463.91 0.05   
Hand-Picked Boards   2,226.14 0.04 
Heckman Correction 4,008.50 0.00 3,707.51 0.01 
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  
 
  
 43 
Panel D: Spinoffs 
  (1) (2) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Intercept 3,870.54 0.52 5,233.44 0.39 
Firm Size 0.03 0.11 0.04 0.09 
Announcement CAR -17,950.66 0.42 -15,873.07 0.48 
Return on Assets 31,857.78 0.20 32,093.84 0.21 
Previous Year Stock Return 1,976.65 0.67 2,622.20 0.58 
Busy Board 14,773.25 0.03   
Hand-Picked Boards   2,527.92 0.56 
Heckman Correction 599.76 0.79 53.81 0.98 
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.05  0.13  
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Table VII 
Determinants of Deal-Making 
In this table we estimate the determinants of deal-making for a sample of 9,587 firm-year observations from the Execucomp database from 1996 
to 2004. To be included in the sample observations must have complete governance, stock-market, and accounting data from IRC, CRSP, and 
Compustat, respectively.  We use two different econometric specifications to estimate the determinants of deal-making. Model (1) estimates a 
logit regression in which the key independent variable is ―1‖ if the firm makes any deal during the year and is ―0‖ otherwise. Model (2) estimates 
a Poisson regression in which the dependent variable counts the number of deals a firm completes in a given year. The deals considered are Joint 
Ventures, Strategic Alliances, Seasoned Equity Offerings, and Spinoffs. Variable definitions are similar to those in Table I. 
  (1) Logit (2) Poisson 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Constant -2.537 0.46 -2.401 0.00 
Managerial power index (t-1) 0.294 0.00 0.236 0.00 
Busy board (t-1) 0.248 0.03 0.197 0.00 
Hand-picked board (t-1) -0.011 0.85 0.029 0.43 
CEO tenure (years as CEO) (t-1) -0.007 0.11 -0.005 0.06 
CEO ownership (% of common) -1.057 0.03 -0.892 0.01 
Cash to Assets (t-1) 0.443 0.03 0.396 0.00 
Market to Book (t-1) 0.011 0.01 0.002 0.00 
Firm Age (t-1) 0.012 0.00 0.009 0.00 
Firm size (t-1) 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 
Return on assets (t-1) (ROA) 0.079 0.80 -0.015 0.94 
ROA growth (t-1) -0.137 0.25 -0.090 0.23 
Return on sales (t-1) (ROS) 0.012 0.53 0.010 0.47 
ROS growth (t-1) 0.168 0.19 0.122 0.13 
Previous Year Stock Return 0.114 0.06 0.084 0.03 
     
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  
     
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  
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Table VIII 
Deal-Making and CEO Turnover 
Logit coefficient estimates of CEO turnover. The dependent variable takes the value of ―one‖ if the CEO leaves office during the year and the 
value of ―zero‖ otherwise. A board is classified to be independent if 50 percent or more of its directors are independent, thus, we construct an 
indicator that is ―one‖ in these cases and is ―zero‖ otherwise. Firm size is total sales (Compustat item 12). Board size is the natural log of board 
size. Ownership for the CEO, institutions is measured as a percentage of common. All other variables are defined as in Table I. The sample 
consists of 9,587 CEO-year observations drawn from the Execucomp database from 1996 to 2004. In Panel A (regressions 1—3), the key 
independent variable is a deal-making (0,1) indicator that is ―one‖ if the firm completes a JV, SA, SEO, or spinoff during the year. In Panel B 
(regressions 4—6), the key independent variable counts the number of deals completed during the year. P-values are reported next to each 
coefficient estimate.  
Panel A: Using Deal-Making (0,1) indicator 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Constant -2.303 0.59 -7.842 0.07 -7.834 0.07 
ROA (t-1) -0.664 0.03 -0.877 0.01 -1.933 0.00 
Firm size   0.016 0.58 0.020 0.51 
Independent board (t-1)   0.259 0.01 0.254 0.01 
Board size (t-1)   0.316 0.04 0.303 0.04 
CEO Age (t-1)   0.079 0.00 0.080 0.00 
CEO ownership (t-1)   -4.083 0.00 -4.093 0.00 
Deal-making firm (0,1)   -0.083 0.32 -0.160 0.08 
ROA (t-1) x Deal-making firm (0,1)     2.163 0.02 
       
Interaction term + ROA (t-1)     0.2299 0.77 
       
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  
Panel B: Using Deal Count 
  (4) (5) (6) 
  Parameter p-value Parameter p-value Parameter p-value 
Constant -2.303 0.59 -7.839 0.07 -7.835 0.07 
ROA (t-1) -0.664 0.03 -0.876 0.01 -1.755 0.00 
Firm size   0.015 0.60 0.018 0.55 
Independent board (t-1)   0.258 0.01 0.255 0.01 
Board size (t-1)   0.315 0.04 0.305 0.04 
CEO Age (t-1)   0.079 0.00 0.080 0.00 
CEO ownership (t-1)   -4.079 0.00 -4.099 0.00 
Deal Count (0,4)   -0.054 0.43 -0.113 0.12 
ROA (t-1) x Deal Count (0,4)     1.602 0.01 
       
Interaction term + ROA (t-1)     -0.1530 0.75 
       
Industry Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year Dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Likelihood Ratio p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  
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Figure 1: 
Total Compensation Surrounding Deals
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Figure 2:
Number of Options Granted Surrounding Deals
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Abstract – All diversified firms are not created equal. Size matters when it comes to the functioning of 
corporate internal capital markets and the value of corporate diversification. The ―diversification 
discount‖ is largely driven by mid-sized conglomerates with annual revenues of $20 to $400 million. 
These conglomerates experience an average discount of 18% and significantly cross-subsidize their 
business units. By comparison, small and large conglomerates suffer lesser discounts of 5% and 3%, 
respectively. This paper argues that the differences in excess value are due to agency issues originating 
from managerial discretion over free cash flow and a lack of external oversight. The results show that 
high levels of coincident free cash flow and corporate investment disrupt the efficient operation of the 
firm‘s internal capital market and lead to lower excess value. The free cash flow problem appears 
concentrated in mid-sized and large conglomerates which produce substantially higher cash flow than 
small conglomerates. Diversified firms that increase their disclosure or commit to pay out excess cash 
flow to shareholders can substantially mitigate these negative effects. Unlike large conglomerates, mid-
sized conglomerates opt not to pay out free cash flow nor do they have substantial analyst coverage to 
monitor their investment activities and these factors alone can potentially explain their relatively lower 
excess values. 
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I. Introduction 
The literature on corporate diversification has advanced under the prevailing notion that 
diversification destroys value and that this effect is unilateral across all firms. Contrary to this belief, 
investors do not value all diversified firms equally. Size matters when it comes to the value of corporate 
diversification and the functioning of internal capital markets. This paper shows that the investment 
efficiency and market valuation of conglomerates differs substantially by firm size. To date, there is no 
explanation or empirical evidence of why this relation exists. 
There are economic rationales as for why the value of the diversified firm might vary by size. The 
most commonly advanced explanation for the diversification discount is the inefficient use of resources 
by corporate management, which leads to value destroying investment policies (Shin and Stulz, 1998; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000; Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000). Stulz (1990) shows that, rather than 
paying free cash flow to investors, management often prefers to reinvest it within the firm to maintain 
their corporate empire, even if the investments are in negative net present value projects. It is generally 
recognized that the degree of financial constraints and level of free cash flow varies by the scale and 
maturity of the firm‘s operations.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) document significant 
differences between small and large firms in terms of financial constraints. Although they show that 
nearly all firms rely extensively on retained funds, smaller firms have little cash flow after investment and 
are more reliant on the external capital markets. Larger, more mature firms payout greater fractions of 
their internal cash flow, are less reliant on the capital markets, and spend relatively less on investment 
expenditures.  
Besides the availability of resources, external forces impact corporate investment policy as well. 
Jensen (1993) argues that outside control forces monitor management‘s deployment of excess cash flow 
and can possibly mitigate the agency issues associated with managerial discretion over excess capital.  
Jiraporn et al. (2006) present evidence that the market for corporate control reduces these agency conflicts 
and increases shareholder value in diversified firms. If free cash flow, investment behavior, and external 
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monitoring differ by the size of the diversified firm, it is plausible that these varying firm characteristics 
can explain any differences in excess value.  
In this paper, I investigate whether these factors explain the cross-sectional differences in 
investment efficiency and market valuation in conglomerates of varying sizes. In doing so, I present three 
contributions to the literature. First, to my knowledge, no study has thoroughly examined how the 
diversification discount varies with firm size and why this relation might exist. Berger and Ofek (1995) 
present introductory evidence of how excess value from diversification varies across size quartiles.
26
 
However, their analysis does not fully explore the size-excess value relation, but instead focuses on the 
existence of the discount itself. Using similar methodologies, this paper expands upon their initial results 
by examining how the diversified firm‘s value varies by size as well as why this relation exists.  
The second contribution of this research is an examination of smaller conglomerates. The 
diversification literature has excluded this important subset of the corporate universe by its focus on large, 
established conglomerates and has almost completely omitted smaller diversified firms. This is due, in 
large part, to the success of Berger and Ofek‘s (1995) sample selection methodology which requires that 
sample firms produce at least $20 M in annual revenues. While academics and practitioners alike have 
learned much from their pioneering work and the work of others that followed, we know almost nothing 
about the value impacts of diversification in smaller firms or how these conglomerates manage their 
internal capital markets. The second aim of this study is to fill this gap in the literature.  
Finally, this paper presents evidence on the efficiency of corporate internal capital markets and 
the value impacts of diversification using the more recent SFAS 131 segment data. In 1997, FASB issued 
SFAS 131 which superseded SFAS 14 and changed how multi-segment firms report their business 
segments. Due to the difficulties of directly comparing SFAS 131 and SFAS 14 data, recent studies on 
corporate diversification have been forced to terminate their samples at the 1997 reporting standard 
change. I develop and utilize a novel algorithm for transforming the SFAS 131 segment data so that it 
resembles the SFAS 14 data. Using this new data, this paper provides some initial evidence on the 
                                                          
26 See Berger and Ofek (1995) Table 4, Panel B. 
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efficiency of corporate internal capital markets and the value of corporate diversification in the post-
SFAS 131 era. Although some studies have examined conglomerates under the SFAS 131 standard, either 
in part or pooled with their existing sample,
27
 this paper presents some of the first isolated large-sample 
evidence on the value impacts of corporate diversification under the new reporting standard. 
[Figure 1 and 2] 
The results in this paper demonstrate that there are economically and statistically significant 
differences in the excess value attributed to diversified firms. As depicted in Figures 1 and 2, the 
empirical evidence indicates that mid-sized conglomerates are valued significantly less than either small 
or large conglomerates and are the driving force behind the observed ―diversification discount.‖28 The 
relation between firm size is persistent across methodologies and subperiods. The data shows that mid-
sized firms significantly cross-subsidize their business units and operate inefficient internal capital 
markets. Although their resource allocation improves in the more recent SFAS 131 (1998-2005) era, they 
continue to operate inefficient internal capital markets and have significantly negative excess values. 
Further investigation reveals that these mid-sized firms possess substantial levels of free cash flow and 
that the coincidence of excess cash flow and corporate investment is a significant factor in explaining 
their lower firm values. Finally, the evidence suggests if these mid-sized conglomerates‘ investment 
activities were subjected to greater analyst scrutiny or if they committed to pay out free cash flow to 
shareholders, they would enjoy substantially higher excess values thereby substantially reducing, or 
perhaps even eliminating, the diversification discount.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief review of the 
conglomerate literature. It also develops hypotheses for why internal capital market efficiency and excess 
value varies with free cash flow and, consequently, firm size. Section III discusses the sample selection 
and methodology and provides a description of the observations. Section IV demonstrates how excess 
                                                          
27 Berger and Hann (2003) present evidence for only the year before and after the SFAS 131 reporting standard change. Ahn, Denis, and Denis 
(2006) present very limited results using a subset of the SFAS 131 data, while Hund, Monk, and Tice (2007) pool the SFAS 14 results with the 
SFAS 131 results.  
28 Figures 1 and 2 present evidence utilizing the universe of firms in the Compustat Business Segment database and only require that there is 
complete data to compute both Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz‘s (1994) excess value measures. All future test employ the sample 
restrictions documented in the Section III. As shown in Figure 3, the general conclusions are not sensitive to these restrictions. 
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free cash flow negatively affects internal capital market efficiency and firm excess value. Sections V and 
VI show how external control forces and the firm‘s payout policy moderates the agency issues associated 
with free cash flow. The robustness of my results are tested in Section VII and I conclude the paper in 
Section VI. Appendix A presents an algorithm for augmenting the SFAS 131 segment data so that it may 
be used in conjunction with the SFAS 14 data. 
 
II. Discussion and Hypotheses 
Since Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995), the conglomerate literature has 
repeatedly documented a ―diversification discount.‖ That is, multi-segment firms suffer from valuation 
multiples that are lower than those derived from a portfolio of their single-segment peers. One of the most 
common explanations for the diversification discount is the misuse and misallocation of corporate 
resources within the conglomerate firm. Existing evidence shows that management distributes capital 
socialistically within the conglomerate firm rather than to their value maximizing uses. Berger and Ofek 
(1995) and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) show that the cross-subsidization of business units does 
occur and that the subversion of corporate internal capital markets destroys value. 
Clearly the constrained manager would prefer to allocate scarce capital to its first best use, 
everything being equal. There is little reason to believe that management would prefer to fund poor 
projects over good ones. Indeed, some authors argue that the conglomerate structure can create substantial 
value for shareholders. Stein (1997) shows that conglomerates can create value from corporate internal 
capital markets by engaging in ―winner-picking‖ when allocating capital among the firm's divisions. 
Matusaka and Nanda (2002) argue that efficient internal capital markets can also add value by giving the 
conglomerate a real option to avoid the deadweight costs associated with external financing. 
However, given ample slack, corporate headquarters has the ability to fund a greater universe of 
projects and may overinvest rather than return excess capital to shareholders. Lamont (1997) provides 
evidence from the 1986 oil industry shocks where the subsidization of underperforming non-oil divisions 
was highly dependent on the oil divisions‘ free cash flow. Given this evidence, I hypothesize that those 
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conglomerates which choose to invest large amounts of free cash flow will do so in a manner that worsens 
the efficiency of their resource allocation process. 
Large amounts of free cash flow may cause further problems with investment project selection, 
not just in a relative sense, but in an absolute sense as well. Stulz (1990) and Jensen (1986, 1988) argue 
that management derives private benefits from corporate investment and prefers to retain resources under 
its control. They show that managers prefer to apply excess capital to potentially value-destroying uses 
rather than reducing their corporate empire by distributing cash to shareholders. Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling (1991) and Harford (1999) provide evidence in support of this conjecture by showing that cash-
rich firms tend to make value destroying acquisitions. Doukas and Kan (2004) extend this research to 
diversified acquires. They document that high free cash conglomerate bidders conducting unrelated 
acquisitions experience significant declines in future profitability and excess value relative to those 
conducting related acquisitions.  
The product markets are a powerful controlling force over management (Jensen, 1993). Although 
they are slow to act for large firms, it is likely that smaller firms are far more responsive to its discipline. 
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) show that negative demand shocks significantly curtail investment 
expenditures for those firms that are highly dependent on external capital. Further, Kedia (2006) and 
Karuna (2007) find that product market competition does, in fact, alter managerial incentives. In small 
firms, there is little internally generated capital and raising additional external capital often difficult. This 
demands that available resources are put to their first-best use. Indeed, Vogt (1997) shows that value 
impacts of capital expenditure announcements are decreasing in both free cash flow and firm size. I 
hypothesize that firms with high levels of free cash flow will choose to invest it in negative net present 
value projects. Smaller conglomerates should be less prone to value-destroying investment due to the 
scarcity of capital and dependence on the product markets. 
Hypothesis 1a – Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Resource Allocation Process: 
With high levels of free cash flow, the unconstrained manager can socialistically fund investment 
projects by choosing to invest both in positive and negative net present value projects. 
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Consequently, the efficiency of the resource allocation process within a corporate internal capital 
market should be decreasing with the coincident levels of total firm investment and free cash 
flow. Since small firms are more closely tied to the product markets and the capital markets, the 
detrimental effects of free cash flow should be significantly less for smaller firms than in larger 
firms. 
Hypothesis 1b – Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and Firm Value: 
Firm excess value should be negatively related to the coincident levels of free cash flow and firm 
investment due to management‘s decision to fund too many investment projects as well as a sub-
optimal allocation of resources among the projects chosen. These effects should be limited to 
larger conglomerates. 
Outside controlling forces can also be powerful motivators for management to utilize their 
investment resources properly. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that, if management can subject itself to 
effective monitoring, agency costs can be reduced or eliminated. The monitoring forces can come from a 
number of sources including information producers, the capital markets, and the market for corporate 
control. 
As a byproduct of their dealings with financial institutions, conglomerates often garner a 
following in the analyst community. Further, management can encourage increased analyst coverage by 
improving the quality of their disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Francis, Hanna, and Philbrick, 
1998). A number of studies have found that, by uncovering and disseminating the value of managerial 
resource allocations, securities analysts perform an important monitoring function for the firm‘s 
shareholders (Moyer, Chatfield, and Sinsneros, 1989; Chung and Jo, 1996). Bens and Monahan (2004) 
argue that thorough disclosure to the analyst community plays an important role in monitoring investment 
behavior within conglomerates and they document a positive association between disclosure quality and 
firm value.  However, other information producers such as the financial press, also perform a significant 
monitoring function (Dyck and Zingales, 2002) and might provide a viable substitute for analyst 
oversight. Since Vega (2006) shows that media coverage substantially increases with the scale of the firm, 
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the benefits of analyst oversight are likely to be decreasing with conglomerate size. I hypothesize that 
increased analyst coverage will improve resource allocations and firm excess value. Analyst oversight 
should be most beneficial for those firms that are perceived to have an overinvestment problem and who 
lack other forms of oversight from other information producers such as the financial press.  
The recurrent need for capital presents another avenue for oversight. If management is dependent 
on the financial markets for current and future infusions of capital, it is likely that they will curtail value-
destroying investments to maintain a reputation for value-maximizing behavior. Conglomerates renown 
for destroying shareholder value will find themselves either refused or disadvantaged the next time they 
visit the financial markets for additional capital. This form of oversight should matter the most for those 
firms who depend on the capital markets for recurrent financing. I hypothesize that the issuance of 
external capital will improve resource allocation and firm excess value, especially in constrained firms. 
The market for corporate control is also often an effective monitor over managerial behavior 
since management teams compete for corporate assets (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). Management teams 
that abuse free cash flow will often find themselves replaced. Berger and Ofek (1996) find that the most 
value-reducing conglomerates are the ones most likely to be taken over and broken-up. Management has a 
strong disincentive to being acquired since corporate takeovers are typically associated with top 
management turnover, especially at underperforming firms (Martin and McConnell, 1991). The 
realization of a corporate takeover is not a necessary condition to curtail management‘s empire building 
behavior. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) show that an active takeover market restrains value-destroying 
investment while Berger and Ofek (1999) show that external disciplinary forces, excluding takeovers, are 
effective for inducing refocusing programs. However, a number of studies have shown that firm size is a 
substantial deterrent to takeover activity (Palepu, 1986; Song and Walkling, 1993; Bates, Becher, and 
Lemmon, 2007). So it is likely that the beneficial influence of the corporate control market will be 
restricted to smaller firms. I hypothesize that an active corporate control market will improve both 
internal capital market efficiency and firm excess value. 
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Hypothesis 2 – Monitoring:  
External monitoring pressure from information producers, the capital markets, and the market for 
corporate control should mitigate the negative effect of free cash flow on the efficiency of the 
resource allocation process and on overall firm investment. Proxies for the monitoring forces of 
the capital markets and the market for corporate control should be positively related to both 
internal capital market efficiency and excess value. Outside monitoring should be most beneficial 
for those firms with high free cash flow and little oversight. 
 Management often claims that the retention of excess cash flow to reinvest in the firm is essential 
for future growth and the success of the firm. However, Easterbrook (1984) argues that management 
habitually overinvests and advocates the use of dividends to mitigate this agency problem. Since 
dividends disgorge excess cash, the constrained firm must often subject itself to the monitoring of the 
external capital markets each time it wishes to make a major investment. The requisite approval of the 
firm‘s investment program from the capital markets serves to limit the free cash flow problem. 
There is empirical evidence that the use of dividends for this purpose has the desired effect. Lang 
and Linzenberger (1989) show that investors substantially reward overinvesting firms that commit to pay 
out free cash flow in the form of dividends. The initiation or the increase of dividends represents a 
significant commitment as the decision cannot be reversed without a substantial penalty to shareholder 
value. Christie (1994) documents that dividend cuts and omissions are associated with 7% reduction in 
the firm‘s stock price. I hypothesize that a dividend commitment will improve firm excess value for those 
firms with high levels of excess cash flow. 
―Levering-up‖ the firm is an alternative method for compelling management to expel free cash 
flow and increase operational efficiency. Jensen (1986) advocates the heavy use of debt for mature firms. 
Debt credibly bonds management to pay out in a way that dividends cannot, since skipping an interest 
payment places the firm in default. Hart and Moore (1995) show that leverage restricts management to 
invest in only profitable investments which leads to an increase in firm value.  
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The diversified firm can also benefit from increased leverage in another dimension. Lewellen 
(1971) argues that the coinsurance of imperfectly correlated cash flow streams from the business units 
allows an increased debt capacity. A higher debt capacity allows the diversified firm to capitalize on the 
tax-deductibility of interest and can potentially add value. Berger and Ofek (1995) provide some evidence 
that diversified firms take advantage of this, but the effects are not economically significant enough to 
overcome the other deleterious effects associated with corporate diversification.  
However, there are some potential pitfalls to the use of leverage in the diversified firm. Mansi and 
Reeb (2002) show that diversification for the purposes advanced by Lewellen induces a risk transfer from 
bondholders to stockholders and can be partially responsible for the observed diversification discount. 
Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) also show that leverage negatively impacts the resource allocation process 
since management often chooses to shift their debt service to their high q segments and focus their 
investment on high cash flow, but lower q segments.  
It is unclear which effect dominates from the interplay of these advantages and disadvantages of 
leverage. It seems likely that these detrimental side-effects should be concentrated in those firms where 
current cash flow is required for survival and quick access to the capital markets for emergency funding 
may be denied. Thus, the beneficial effects of leverage should be increasing in firm size. I hypothesize 
that levering up and committing to pay out free cash flow as interest payments will improve internal 
capital market efficiency and firm excess value, but the purely positive effects may be limited to larger 
firms. 
Hypothesis 3a – Dividend Payout:  
Those firms that choose to pay out excess free cash flow using dividends should lessen the 
negative impact of free cash flow on firm value. The positive influence should be greatest for 
mature firms with large amounts of free cash flow. 
Hypothesis 3b – Interest Payout:  
Firms committing to pay out free cash flow by levering up should experience higher excess 
values. Larger firms should benefit the most from additional leverage. 
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Given the above arguments, one expects that the conglomerates with the largest diversification 
discounts should be those with the highest levels of coincident free cash flow and investment who also 
have the smallest analyst following, use little external capital, are exposed to little corporate control 
activity, and have not made any commitment to disgorge excess cash flow. 
 
III. Sample Selection, Methodology, and Data Description 
Sample Selection 
The initial sample consists of the universe of publicly traded multi-segment firms listed in the 
COMPUSTAT industrial annual and business segment databases from 1978-2005.
29
 Firms began 
reporting financials for their business segments in 1976 under FASB rule SFAS 14 and did so across 
industry lines. Material business activities
30
 residing in a different 4-digit SIC code than the primary 
segment had to be reported as a separate business segment. FASB implemented SFAS 131 in 1998 which 
changed the way firms report their segment data. Rather than reporting across industry lines, firms now 
must report their business segments as they are organized internally. It is likely that the new data is 
superior to the old, since it is now representative of the firm‘s internal workings rather than an artificial 
construct developed to conform to reporting standards. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) advocate the 
use of the SFAS 131 data due to its increased precision, but lament the fact that it came too late to use 
within their study. However, the direct comparability of pre- and post-1998 segment data is compromised 
by the new FASB standard. It is thus necessary to augment the SFAS 131 segment data to use it in 
conjunction with the SFAS 14 data. This process is described in the Appendix. 
 Each firm in the sample must have complete firm-level and segment-level data to compute all of 
the explanatory variables used in the analysis.
31
 Following Berger and Ofek (1995), all financials (SIC 
codes 6000-6999) as well as any firm with a financial business segment are excluded from the sample. 
                                                          
29 I require one-year‘s lagged data, so the final sample begins in 1979. 
30 Operations are considered material if they possess sales, assets, or profits in excess of 10% of consolidated firm totals. 
31 This amounts to requiring firm-level data on market value of equity, book value of assets and equity, net sales, deferred taxes, tax expense, 
interest expense, dividends paid, capital expenditures, investments, and acquisitions. This also requires that each firm have segment data on sales, 
assets, profit, and capital expenditures. Each of the firm‘s segments must reside in an industry with at least five single-segment firms so that I can 
minimize the noise associated with imputing Tobin‘s q for the business segments. 
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The sum of segment sales must also be within 1% of firm sales and the sum of segment assets be within 
25% of firm assets. For those firms where segment assets do not sum up to firm assets, but do meet the 
25% threshold, segment asset weights are either grossed up or down to account for the discrepancy 
wherever necessary. 
In contrast to an overwhelming majority of the literature on conglomerates, I do not impose the 
Berger and Ofek (1995) requirement that sample firms have at least $20 M in total sales. Admitting these 
firms allows the first glimpse of the workings of the internal capital markets and the value associated with 
diversification in small conglomerates. To help restrict the analysis to economically relevant firms and to 
avoid valuation multiples with components close to zero (the original size restriction reasoning in Berger 
and Ofek), both firm sales and assets must exceed $1 million in 1986 dollars. By comparison, the smallest 
firm listed in the 1986 S&P Composite had total assets of $1.24 million and net sales of $0.63 million.
32
 
To maximize the separation in excess values among firm size constituencies the sample firms are 
partitioned into like size groups with similar excess values according to distribution in Figure 1. There is 
a natural separation in excess value from the first decile to the second decile as well between the sixth and 
seventh decile. Firms are classified as small if they reside in the first decile of my sample in terms of 
deflated sales in 1986$s, mid-sized firms are those residing in the second through sixth deciles, and large 
firms are those residing in the seventh through tenth deciles.
33
 The median sales for small firms are 
$10.22 M and range from $1.01 M to $19.0 M. Mid-sized and large conglomerates have median sales of 
$130.9 M and $2,699.5 M and range from $19.0 M to $394.7 M and $395.0 M to $102,813.0 M, 
respectively. 
[Table 1] 
The resultant sample consists of 11,111 multi-segment firm-year observations from 1978-2005. 
Table 1 lists the sample counts by year for small firms, mid-sized firms, large firms, and the entire 
sample. The entire sample consists of 1,111 small, 5,555 mid-sized, and 4,445 large firm-year 
                                                          
32 The first year in the Berger and Ofek sample is 1986 and that is the reason behind choosing this deflation basis. All values are deflated using 
the GDP Deflator (1986 = 100). 
33 The results are similar if I utilize quintiles or deciles. For my sample, median sales for decile 1 are $10.2 M, median sales for deciles 2-6 range 
from $28.3 M to $ 294.7 M, and the median sales deciles 7-10 range from $520.1 M - $5,287.3 M. 
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observations. There is an average of 40 small firms, 198 mid-sized firms, and 159 large firms in each year 
of the sample. The proportion of small firms is fairly consistent in calendar time, but large conglomerates 
have become increasingly common in the latter half of the sample. All regressions utilize calendar year 
dummies to control for this possible heterogeneity. 
 
Measure of Firm Value 
To measure the value of the diversified firm, I implement the sales multiplier approach advocated 
in Berger and Ofek (1995).
34
 They argue that the market value of the diversified firm should be the sum 
of the imputed market values of the individual business segments. Consequently, if a conglomerate has a 
market-to-sales ratio is less (greater) than the weighted sum of the imputed market-to-sales ratios of the 
individual business segments, then there is evidence of value loss (gain) from diversification. Berger and 
Ofek (1995) Excess Value is computed as 
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where Total Capital is the value of the firm‘s total capital (market value of common equity plus the book 
value of debt), Sales is the total sales of the consolidated firm, wi is the sales weight of the ith business 
segment, and Total Capitali
SS 
/ Salesi
SS
 is the market-to-sales ratio of the median firm in ith business 
segment‘s industry. Imputed values are determined by taking the industry median from a sample of 
single-segment or ―pure-play‖ firms residing in the same 4-digit, 3-digit, or 2-digit SIC code as the 
business segment in the diversified firm. 
 
Measure of Internal Capital Market Efficiency 
Relative Investment from Ahn and Denis (2004) is utilized to measure the efficiency of resource 
allocations within the diversified firm.
35
 Relative Investment is interpreted as the sales-weighted sum of 
                                                          
34 As evidenced in Figures 1 and 3 and in unreported tests, the results are unchanged if I use Lang and Stulz‘s (1994) excess value measure 
instead. The non-linear in excess value identified Figures 1-3 are unchanged, even if I use Lang and Stulz excess value where the imputed q is 
fitted using segment characteristics (including size) as specified in Billett and Mauer (2003). 
35 The conclusions are unchanged if I use Relative Value by Allocation developed by Rajan et al. (2000). 
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firm- and industry-adjusted investment in high q segments less the sales-weighted sum of firm- and 
industry-adjusted investment in low q segments. Relative Investment is specified as 
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where SALE represents the firm‘s net sales, SALEj is segment j‘s net sales,. CAPEXj / SALEj is the 
investment ratio for segment j while CAPEXj
SS
 / SALEj
 SS
 is the median investment ratio for the pure-play 
firms that reside in segment j‘s industry. Segments j = 1 to k are the segments with an imputed q greater 
than the firm‘s sales-weighted average imputed q, while j = (n – k + 1) to n are the segments with an 
imputed q less than the sales-weighted average imputed q of the firm. The Tobin‘s q of individual 
business segments is imputed by using the median Tobin‘s q ratio using the narrowest SIC grouping 
containing at least five ―pure-play‖ single segment firms. Tobin‘s q is defined as the market value of 
equity plus the book value of assets less the book value of equity and deferred taxes divided by the book 
value of assets. Positive (negative) values of RINV indicate efficient (inefficient) resource allocations. 
 
Measures of Free Cash Flow and Firm Investment 
The level of free cash flow is proxied by the level of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, 
and amortization, normalized by consolidated firm total sales. The choice of EBITDA as the measure of 
free cash flow follows is a long tradition in the conglomerate literature (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Shin and 
Stulz, 1998; Billett and Mauer, 2003; Dittmar and Shivdasani, 2003; Dimitrov and Tice, 2006). Firm 
investment is measured using firm capital expenditures normalized by sales which is also common in the 
literature. The robustness of the results to these choices is discussed in Section VII using alternative 
measures. 
[Table 2] 
Sample Description 
 Table 2 presents a description of the sample. On average, each sample firm reports 2.7 business 
segments and operates within two distinct SIC codes. This is similar to the numbers reported in other 
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large-sample studies (Lang and Stulz, 1994). The sample firms demonstrate the ―diversification discount‖ 
that is frequently documented in the literature. Using Berger and Ofek‘s (1995) Excess Value measure, 
the mean (median) firm in my sample exhibits a significant discount of -10.58% (-12.10%). As in Rajan, 
Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006), there is some evidence the sample firms 
exhibit the cross-subsidization of their business units since median relative investment is significantly 
negative. Mean relative investment is also negative, but it is not significant at conventional levels.
36
 On 
average, the firms in my sample produce positive cash flow and they reinvest a significant fraction of it 
back into the firm. There is substantial skewness in terms of firm size, as the mean (median) firm has 
$1,282 M ($188 M) under management and produces $1,146 M ($222 M) in annual revenues. 
[Table 3] 
Sample Description by Size and Reporting Regime 
 In Table 3, the sample is partitioned by firm size and by reporting standard. Univariate statistics 
for the entire sample period, for both the SFAS 14 (1979-1997) and the SFAS 131 (1998-2005) reporting 
regimes, and for each of the three size classes are displayed in Panels A through C. Table 3 presents some 
of the first comprehensive large-sample evidence of the value impacts of corporate diversification under 
the new reporting standard. Further, it presents the first look at the internal capital markets and the excess 
value from diversification for small conglomerates under either reporting regime.  
The differences between firm size classes come to light in Table 3. Panel A shows that, the 
pooled sample, each increase in size category is by an order of magnitude. The mean (median) sales of 
small firms are $10 M ($10 M) while the sales of mid-sized firms and large firms are $131 M ($97 M) 
and $2,699 M ($1,257 M), respectively. While firm sales have been reasonably constant over time, the 
size of the assets under management for all three firm size categories has increased substantially in 
constant dollars during the later subperiod. Not surprisingly, the number of business segments and the 
degree of diversification increases significantly with firm size. Small conglomerates operate an average of 
2.3 business segments in 1.8 distinct 2-digit SIC codes while large conglomerates operate 3.1 business 
                                                          
36 The 1998-2005 subperiod is the cause of the insignificance and is discussed below. 
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segments in 2.1 distinct SIC codes. Lang and Stulz (1994) find that three-segment firms are valued 8-10% 
lower than two-segment firms. Consequently, the differences in the number of business segments and 
industries by size indicate that it is important to control for these factors when examining size and excess 
value relation.  
[Figure 3] 
There are significant differences between the size of the conglomerate and firm excess value even 
after imposing my sample requirements. Overall, Figures 3 and Table 3 show that small and large 
conglomerates are valued significantly higher than mid-sized conglomerates and the difference is robust 
to how excess value is computed. Mid-sized conglomerates suffer significant mean (median) excess 
values of -17.82% (-20.42%) while small and large firms have mean (median) excess values of -5.11% (-
12.35%) and -2.90% (-3.78%).
37
 The valuation difference between mid-sized firms and the small and 
large firms is significant beyond the 1% level. Thus, the diversification discount is driven largely by the 
negative excess value multiples of the mid-sized diversified firms. 
Comparing Panels B and C for the full sample, there has been an overall decline in firm excess 
value from a mean (median) of -9.99% (-11.81%) in the 1979-1997 subperiod to -12.04% (-12.84%) 
during the 1998-2005 subperiod. This change is largely driven by a precipitous decline in excess value for 
small conglomerates during the 1998-2005 subperiod from a mean (median) of -2.69% (-9.32%) to -
13.36. Mid-sized firms also experienced a statistically significant decline in excess value from a mean 
(median) of -16.82% (-19.56%) to -20.63% (-22.32%). The evidence is mixed for large conglomerates. 
The average large conglomerate experienced an insignificant decline, while the median large 
conglomerate significantly appreciated in excess value from -4.03% to -2.63%. The divergence is likely 
due to changes in the risk preferences of investors subsequent to the 2001-2002 market decline. In 
unreported tests, small conglomerates experience their most severe declines during the 2001 economic 
slow-down while larger conglomerates enjoyed a premium during the same interval. This consistent with 
                                                          
37 Comparing Figure 1 and Figure 3 also shows that my sample requirements have had the greatest attrition on the small conglomerates as the 
smallest size decile has gone from an insignificant premium of 2.1% to a significant discount of -5.1%. 
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Dimitrov and Tice (2006) who show that large conglomerates are better able to survive the product 
markets and enjoy higher sales growth during recessions relative to focused firms due to an alleviation of 
credit constraints.
38
 
Table 3 offers some suggestive evidence of why small, mid-sized, and large conglomerates 
experience differing overall valuation multiples. The level of free cash flow is monotonically increasing 
with firm size. Small, mid-sized, and large conglomerates have mean (median) free cash flow levels of 
3.65% (7.03%), 12.17% (12.71%), and 14.83% (14.32%), respectively. Mean levels of investment 
decreasing with firm size with CAPX / SALE ratios of 10.98%, 7.81%, and 7.42% for small, mid-sized, 
and large firms, respectively. The differences for both free cash flow and firm investment are significant 
at better than the 1% level for all size categories.  
There is some evidence that the interaction of free cash flow and investment levels has 
detrimentally impacted the resource allocation process.
39
 Unconstrained mid-sized conglomerates have 
significantly negative mean relative investment levels of -0.00074, indicating an inefficient internal 
capital market, while the constrained small conglomerates‘ relative investment levels are insignificantly 
different from zero. The contrasting levels of free cash flow and relative investment for small and mid-
sized conglomerates are broadly consistent with Hypothesis 1a. However, some outside force interrupts 
the free cash flow problem in large conglomerates since they have insignificantly positive mean relative 
investment levels of 0.00029. The internal capital market efficiency of large conglomerates is 
significantly better than that in mid-sized conglomerates at conventional levels. This mitigating force is 
explored in subsequent tests.   
The subperiod comparisons in Panels B and C further explore the free cash flow and relative 
investment link. For the full sample, the reduction in free cash flow and has yielded a simultaneous 
increase in focus and a significantly improved resource allocation process which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1a. The mean (median) level of free cash flow was 12.94% (13.69%) during the 1979-1997 
                                                          
38 The mean firm in their sample has sales of $2,300 M which most closely places them in the large firm sample. 
39 Although the median values of Relative Investment for all three size classes are zero, rank-sign tests show that they are each significant in the 
direction indicated by the mean value at the 2% level or better. 
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subperiod, but it declined to 11.03% (11.99%) during the 1998-2005 subperiod. At the same time, 
conglomerates have increased in focus and have improved their resource allocation process. While overall 
the number of business segments reported has slightly increased in the recent subperiod, the number of 2-
digit SIC codes has decreased significantly from an average of 2.07 to 1.77. Coincident with the increase 
in focus, the full sample mean and median relative investment efficiency has gone from significantly 
negative during the 1979-1997 subperiod to significantly positive during the 1998-2005 subperiod. The 
effect is similar across size classes. These results are congruent with Ahn, Denis, and Denis‘ (2006) 
subperiod analysis which shows that relative investment is significantly higher in the post-1997 period 
than it was in the 1980s.  
Overall, small conglomerates are characterized as relatively focused, constrained firms which 
invest heavily, on average, while large conglomerates are characterized as having high free cash flow and 
are extensively diversified. Mid-sized conglomerates are characterized as unconstrained. moderately 
diversified firms which operate inefficient internal capital markets. Given that small and large 
conglomerates are valued significantly higher than mid-sized conglomerates and that there is an overall 
inverse relation between free cash flow and excess value, there is supportive evidence of Hypothesis 1a 
and 1b. However, the occasional dissonance between the mean and median results for free cash flow, firm 
investment, and relative investment implies that there is more at work for explaining differences in excess 
value than simply cash flow and investment behavior. These other factors are explored below in multiple 
regression tests in Sections IV-VII. 
 
IV. Effects of Free Cash Flow on Resource Allocation and Excess Value 
There is a substantial literature showing the dangers of free cash flow and its potential to distort 
project selection (Shin and Stulz, 1998; Goel, Nanda, and Narayanan, 2004) and the optimal level of 
investment (Jensen, 1986; Lamont, 1997). Given the significant differences between the degree of 
financial constraints and the internal capital market efficiency among small, mid-sized, and large 
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conglomerates identified in Section III, these factors can potentially explain the relation between the 
value of corporate diversification and firm size. 
[Table 4] 
 Table 4 directly tests the prediction of Hypothesis 1a that coincident levels of both free cash flow 
and corporate investment will lead to the cross-subsidization of the business units in the corporate internal 
capital market. Hypothesis 1a also implies that the free cash flow problem should be most severe in those 
firms that are relatively unconstrained and who can withstand negative feedback from the product 
markets. To test these predictions, I conduct firm fixed effects regressions with calendar year dummies of 
the form 







SALE
CAPX
SALE
CF
SALE
CAPX
SALE
CF
SizeSICNum
q
RINV 6543210
1
  
where RINV is Relative Investment, q1  is the inverse of the average of segment imputed Tobin‘s q, 
NumSIC is the number of two-digit SIC codes represented by the diversified firm, Size is the natural log 
of deflated firm sales, CF is EBITDA, CAPX is capital expenditures, and SALE is firm sales. Absent the 
cash flow and investment terms, this specification is similar to that employed in Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales (2000).
40
 Hypothesis 1a predicts a negative coefficient on the interaction of firm cash flow and 
corporate investment, especially for larger firms. 
 As predicted by Hypothesis 1a, the coefficient on the free cash flow and investment interaction 
term is negative for the entire sample. A closer examination stratified by firm size reveals that the free 
cash flow problem is concentrated within the mid-sized and large conglomerates. The coincidence of free 
cash flow and firm investment in these firms leads the corporate headquarters to cross-subsidize its 
business units since the interaction is negative and significant at the 5% level or better. Further, the 
increasing magnitude of the coefficients implies that the greater the size of the diversified firm, the more 
the detrimental coincident free cash flow and corporate investment are to the efficiency of the internal 
                                                          
40 Rajan et al. (2000) use their Diversity measure and their efficiency measure, RVA. The results are unchanged under their exact specification. 
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capital market. In contrast, the coefficient is positive and insignificant for small conglomerates. This is 
not surprising considering that these firms have little or no excess cash flow.   
[Table 5] 
Table 5 tests the prediction of Hypothesis 1b that coincident levels of both free cash flow and 
corporate investment destroy shareholder wealth and lead to lower excess value. Again, Hypothesis 1b 
implies that the free cash flow problem should be concentrated in those relatively unconstrained firms 
who can withstand negative feedback from the product markets. To test these predictions, I conduct firm 
fixed effects regressions with calendar year dummies of the form 


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
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where EV is excess value from diversification, RINV is Relative Investment, NumSIC is the number of 
two-digit SIC codes represented by the diversified firm, Size is the natural log of deflated firm sales, CF is 
EBITDA, CAPX is capital expenditures, and SALE is firm sales. 
 There is strong support for Hypothesis 1b in Table 5 for the full sample. The coefficient on the 
interaction between free cash flow and investment is significantly negative at better than the 1% level. 
Further, the coefficient on Relative Investment is significantly positive beyond the 1% level. Recall that 
the results in Table 4 show that the coincidence of free cash flow and investment negatively impacts 
Relative Investment. Thus, the free cash flow problem identified in Hypotheses 1a and 1b have a dual 
negative effect on firm value, one indirectly via Relative Investment and one directly on firm excess 
value. 
 When the regressions are split by size, the relation between firm size, excess value, and the free 
cash flow problem becomes clear. Both mid-sized and large conglomerates are negatively impacted by 
the coincidence of free cash flow and firm investment. In contrast, the small conglomerates with little or 
no free cash flow, suffer no ill effects. The coefficient on the interaction between free cash flow and firm 
investment is significantly negative at better than the 1% level for mid-sized and large firms, but it is 
insignificantly positive for small firms.  
 68 
 Overall, there is substantial support for Hypotheses 1a and 1b. The free cash flow problem most 
adversely impacts those conglomerates that are most susceptible, namely unconstrained diversified firms 
with high levels of excess cash flow. The results in Tables 4 and 5 explain why mid-sized firms 
experience significant discounts relative to small conglomerates since they appear to deploy excess firm 
resources to value-destroying uses. However, Tables 4 and 5 show that large conglomerates, who are also 
unconstrained, suffer from the free cash flow problem as well, but they do not experience the degree of 
―diversification discount‖ as the mid-sized firms. This mystery is resolved in the following two sections. 
 
V. The Impact of External Monitoring on the Free Cash Flow Problem 
This section shows that one of the foremost reasons why large conglomerates do not suffer the 
same negative excess values as mid-sized conglomerates is due to the influence of monitoring forces from 
outside of the firm. Jensen (1993) stresses the importance of outside control forces to constrain 
management from engaging in rent-seeking behavior. This paper implements three proxies to analyze the 
impact of these external monitoring forces on resource allocation and firm value. The number of analysts 
tracking a firm is used to proxy for the degree of information asymmetry between management and 
investors and the amount of capital issued is used to proxy for the degree to which management subjects 
itself to the disciplinary forces of the capital markets. Finally, the number of completed mergers in an 
industry-year is used to proxy for the market for corporate control.  
The number of analysts is defined as the number of analysts listed in the I/B/E/S database 
providing an annual earnings forecast for the firm in a given fiscal year. If analysts either initiate or drop 
coverage during the estimation period, the number of analysts is set to the maximum number of 
concurrent estimates at a given point in time. If a firm is not listed in I/B/E/S during a fiscal year, it is 
presumed they do not have any significant analyst coverage and the number of analysts is set to zero. 
Excess Net External Capital, developed in Peyer (2002), is used to measure the extent to which a 
firm utilizes the external capital markets and is subject to its oversight. This flow-based measure differs 
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from stock-based measures such as total leverage since it captures the amount of securities issued in the 
current period and not the cumulative totals. Excess Net External Capital is computed as 
11
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where Net External Capitalt is defined as net stock issued plus net long-term debt issued plus the change 
in short-term debt, SALEj,t is segment j‘s net sales, ASSETt-1 is beginning-of-period firm assets, and Net 
External Capitalj,t
SS
 / SALEj,t
SS
 is the median net external capital to sales ratio for the single-segment firms 
in segment j‘s industry. 
The number of completed M&A transactions is defined as the total number completed 
transactions in a given calendar year and Fama and French (1997) industry. Completed acquisitions are 
identified using the Compustat reason for deletion footnotes where the code indicates a completed 
acquisition.  
[Table 6] 
 Table 6 presents the first insight of how these monitoring proxies are distributed across the size 
classes and how they influence the agency issues associated with managerial discretion over free cash 
flow. Although both mid-sized conglomerates and large conglomerates have appreciably high levels of 
free cash flow, there are significant differences between how these two types of conglomerates are 
overseen. Mid-sized firms have significantly less analyst coverage than their larger counterparts. The 
mean (median) mid-sized conglomerate is followed by a paltry 2.02 (1.00) analysts whereas large 
conglomerates are widely followed by a mean (median) 9.31 (7.00) analysts. Small firms have an almost 
non-existent institutional following with a mean (median) 0.22 (0.00) analysts, but this unlikely to be 
problematic given their heightened exposure to product market discipline. 
Small firms appear substantially reliant on the external capital markets and are frequently 
subjected to its supervision. On average, small conglomerates issue 5.09% of their asset base in net 
external capital each year. The mean (median) mid-sized and large firms issue 3.67% (-0.56%) and 0.97% 
(-0.77%) in excess net external capital, respectively. Generalizations are somewhat difficult to make in a 
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univariate context since both the means and the medians are significant in opposite directions. Although 
some mid-sized and large conglomerates issue substantial amounts of external capital, the median firm 
does not. Mid-sized conglomerates do issue significantly more capital, on average, than large 
conglomerates, but both the median mid-sized and large conglomerates are net distributors of capital. 
Consequently, it is unlikely that they either are significantly overseen by the capital markets since they do 
not rely upon them for financing.  
All that remains to oversee the mid-sized conglomerates is the corporate control markets. Mid-
sized conglomerates reside in relatively more active takeover markets than large conglomerates, but their 
industries are relatively quiet when compared to the small firms. On average there are 22 takeovers in the 
small firms‘ industry each year while mid-sized firms reside in industries with 17 takeovers each year. 
The differences are significant at the 1% level or better.  
Overall, the mid-sized conglomerates are lacking the analyst oversight of large conglomerates 
and they are not as exposed to the capital or corporate control markets as the small conglomerates. Table 
7 investigates the prediction of Hypothesis 2 that the dearth of external monitoring pressure for mid-sized 
firms is responsible for their lower excess values and whether improved monitoring mitigates the free 
cash flow problem. 
[Table 7] 
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that analyst oversight should be most beneficial for those firms with high 
free cash flow, but are not otherwise widely followed. Since Vega (2006) shows that firm size is a 
powerful positive predictor of media coverage, the mid-sized conglomerates most closely fit that 
description. While analyst coverage has little impact on the resource allocation process overall, coverage 
has a significant positive impact the internal capital market efficiency of mid-sized firms. The coefficient 
on Number of Analysts is positive and significant at the 3% level indicating that this form of external 
monitoring eliminates the significant cross-subsidization that mid-sized firms exhibit. Furthermore, 
analyst coverage has the strongest value impacts for mid-sized conglomerates. The coefficient on Number 
of Analysts is largest for this size class and is significant at better than the 1% level. The coefficient 
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implies that, for every analyst tracking the mid-sized firm, the firm‘s market value will increase by 2.4%. 
It would take roughly seven analysts tracking these firms to make up the roughly 15% valuation gap 
between mid-sized and large conglomerates. It is interesting to note that this is the exact number tracking 
the median large firm. Analyst coverage also has a significant positive impact on large conglomerates and 
for the sample as a whole which implies a universally beneficial effect. These results are consistent with 
Bens and Monahan (2004) and provide strong support for Hypothesis 2.
41
  
There is no evidence that the issuance of large amounts of capital improves the resource 
allocation in small, mid-sized, or large conglomerates. There is some evidence that large issuances might 
actually hurt internal capital market efficiency. If so, this would be consistent with the notions advanced 
by Matsusaka and Nanda (2002) who argue that internal capital markets add value through the avoidance 
of the capital markets, an objective clearly defeated by those who issue capital. It is also possible that a 
single large securities issuance might engender an endowment effect among corporate managers who 
might then allocate capital in a sub-optimal manner. If this proposed behavior is systemic, it could explain 
these results since Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) document that managers often do not 
deploy cash windfalls to value-maximizing uses.  
The issuance of external capital does have a strong positive effect on the value of the firm. For 
the full sample, the issuance of capital has a positive and significant impact on firm value. The effect 
appears economically large. The coefficients imply a powerful positive relation between the increase in 
excess issued capital and firm value. This relation is also strongly statistically sense as the coefficients 
significant in excess of the 1% level in all specifications. The positive influence of the external capital 
markets is uniform across each of the size classes, although mid-sized conglomerates appear to benefit the 
least. 
                                                          
41 It should also be noted that there is a non-linear relation between the number of analysts following the firm and excess value. For the mid-sized 
conglomerates, the estimate on the number of analysts is 0.03651 (p-value 0.00) and the estimate on the number of analysts squared is -0.00081 
(p-value 0.00). For the large conglomerates, the estimate on the number of analysts is 0.01279 (p-value 0.00) and the estimate on the number of 
analysts squared is -0.00029 (p-value 0.00). Adding a non-linear term does nothing for the small conglomerates. Both the number of analysts and 
the number of analysts squared are insignificant. 
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Since managers are more likely to issue capital when their valuations are high, endogeneity may 
be an issue. To alleviate this concern, the models in Panel B are re-estimated in unreported tests using the 
lagged value of excess net external capital but the conclusions are unchanged using this alternative model. 
Although the magnitude of the coefficients decreases substantially, the issuance of capital continues to 
have positive and significant impact on firm value. The concurrent specification is retained to avoid any 
survivorship bias induced by requiring three consecutive years of data.
42
 The results for net external 
capital provide weak or mixed support for Hypothesis 2. 
The corporate control markets have a significant positive impact on the resource allocation 
process for the full sample. The coefficient on the relation between Relative Investment and the Number 
of Mergers is positive and significant. Further, the positive effect is concentrated in mid-sized firms. The 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% level and is insignificant in all other size classes. The 
amount of corporate control activity also has a positive and significant impact on firm Excess Value, but 
the influence is restricted to larger conglomerates. Berger and Ofek (1996) contend that the corporate 
control markets are most active around the value-destroying conglomerates. Since the mid-sized 
conglomerates are chiefly responsible for the observed cross-subsidization and exhibit the largest 
diversification discounts, this evidence is supportive of Berger and Ofek‘s (1996) results and of 
Hypothesis 2. 
 Overall, there is substantial support for Hypothesis 2, especially for mid-sized conglomerates. If 
mid-sized diversified firms chose to expose themselves to intensive monitoring by outside forces, they 
could significantly improve their resource allocation process and excess value. The impact of analyst 
oversight alone is enough to overcome the relative discount faced by mid-sized firms conglomerates to 
their larger counterparts. 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 Excess net external capital requires two years of data to compute. The results of this robustness test are available upon request. 
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VI. The Impact of Payout Policy on the Free Cash Flow Problem 
The final pieces of the puzzle for explaining the size-excess value relation fall into place when 
one examines whether diversified firms choose to pay out free cash flow. Management can commit to 
paying out excess cash flow by either initiating or increasing their dividends or they can lever-up the firm 
and bond themselves to pay out free cash flow in the form of regular interest payments. To proxy for the 
extent to which a firm commits to pay out free cash flow to shareholders, a dummy variable is constructed 
for whether a firm pays a dividend. Dividend Paying Firm is a (0,1) indicator variable of whether the firm 
paid out a dividend in the current fiscal year. Berger and Ofek‘s (1995) Excess Segment Leverage is used 
to measure the extent to which a firm commits to pay out free cash flow to bondholders. It is defined as  
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where ASSET is firm assets, SALE is firm sales, SALESj are segment sales, DEBT is total firm debt, and 
DEBTj
SS
/ASSETj
SS
 is the median debt-to-asset ratio of the single-segment firms in segment j‘s industry. 
Table 6 shows that the mean and median firm pays some sort of dividend each year for the full 
sample. Fifty-eight percent of firms pay a dividend which amounts to a mean (median) 1.21% (0.38%) of 
sales. There is substantial cross-sectional variation in the payout policy. Not surprisingly, small firms 
almost never pay a dividend as 86% of them choose to retain any profits for future investments. The vast 
majority of large conglomerates choose to pay a dividend which amounts to a mean (median) 1.88% 
(1.29%) of total firm sales. In contrast, mid-size conglomerates return significantly less capital to their 
investors than large firms. While they produce a comparable level of free cash flow to the large firms, 
mid-sized firms pay only a token amount of their top line. The mean mid-sized diversified firm pays only 
0.87% and the median firm pays nothing. The mean and median differences between the two are 
significant at better than the 1 % level. 
As in Berger and Ofek (1995), the conglomerates in my sample generally have higher degrees of 
leverage than their focused counterparts. The mean (median) firm in my sample has excess leverage of 
5.19% (3.12%). The break down by size shows that this is concentrated in the smallest firms who are 
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highly dependent on both debt and equity capital for growth. Mid-sized firms have relatively more 
leverage than large firms by a margin of about 2%. 
[Table 8] 
Table 8 shows that the decision to pay out free cash flow affects the resource allocation process 
and firm value. There is no evidence that paying out free cash flow negatively impacts the efficiency of 
the internal capital market for the full sample. The coefficients on Dividend Paying Firm and the 
Dividends / SALE x CF/SALE interaction term are both positive, but not significant at any conventional 
level. There is some evidence that small conglomerates are maximizing value by retaining any excess 
cash flow. The coefficient on the interaction term indicates that small firms significantly impair their 
resource allocation process by committing to pay out large portions of their limited free cash flow. The 
dividend commitment likely shifts resources to high cash flow divisions over those with high growth 
opportunities. 
The commitment to pay a dividend has a positive impact on firm value and that there is strong 
support for Hypothesis 3a in Panel B. Consistent with Lang and Litzenberger (1989), the initiation or 
increase of a dividend has the greatest value impact for those firms previously identified as prone to 
overinvest. The coefficient on Dividend Paying Firm is only significant for the mid-sized conglomerates 
and the coefficient on the Dividends / SALE x CF/SALE interaction term is highest for these firms. Both 
are significant at the 1% level. By choosing to pay a dividend, the results suggest that mid-sized 
conglomerates can add 5% to their market capitalization and add another 9 b.p. for each 1% of their sales 
that they choose to return to shareholders. The interaction term is also positive and highly significant for 
large conglomerates, but the Dividend Paying Firm indicator does not come in significant due to the small 
effect size.  
Table 8 shows that one must be cautious when using debt to constrain the diversified manager. 
Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006) document that leverage often disrupts the resource allocation process in 
diversified firms. They show management tends to allocate their debt service to high q divisions while 
simultaneously focusing their investment on the highest cash flow producing divisions. Panel A shows 
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that leverage can have a detrimental effect in small conglomerates. For those small firms with positive 
free cash flow, the introduction of additional leverage negatively impacts Relative Investment as small 
conglomerates divert their resource allocation away from their high q divisions to their low q divisions. 
The coefficient on the interaction of Excess Segment Leverage and CF/SALE is significantly negative at 
the 2% level. There is little evidence of any other effect on the resource allocation for mid-sized and large 
conglomerates or for the sample as a whole. 
Leverage has significant impacts on firm value, but the effects are not as clear cut as when 
diversified managers pay out free cash flow in the form of dividends. Consistent with the arguments of 
Hart and Moore (1995), the use of leverage can be beneficial. For the full sample of diversified firms, the 
coefficient on the relation between Excess Segment Leverage and Excess Value is positive and significant 
at better than the 1% level. Further, the positive influence of leverage on excess value holds across all 
three size classes. This is broadly consistent with Hypothesis 3b. 
However, as in Mansi and Reeb (2002) and Ahn, Denis, and Denis (2006), too much leverage can 
negatively impact firm excess value as well. For the entire sample, the coefficient on the relation between 
Excess Value and the Excess Segment Leverage x CF/SALE interaction is negative and highly significant. 
A closer examination reveals that the effect is concentrated in the small and mid-sized conglomerates.  
For these firms, high free cash flow and large amounts of leverage are associated with significantly lower 
excess values. There are no significant detrimental effects for large conglomerates which is congruent 
with Hart and Moore‘s (1995) contention that the use of leverage is most beneficial for mature firms. 
Overall, shareholders unilaterally reward management for paying out excess cash flow in the 
form of dividends, especially for the mid-sized and large conglomerates where free cash flow is a 
problem.  There are varied implications when it comes to debt. While investors in large conglomerates 
reward paying free cash flow in the form of interest as well, there are mixed value impacts for small and 
mid-sized conglomerates. These results are broadly consistent with Hypotheses 3a and 3b. 
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VII. Robustness 
Results Using Alternative Proxies for Free Cash Flow and Corporate Investment 
It is possible that CF/SALE does not measure free cash flow correctly since it is before any 
commitments to bondholders, stockholders, or the government. As an alternative proxy for free cash flow, 
a supplemental measure is computed that represents the residual free cash flow after all required interest, 
tax, and dividend obligations have been taken care of and all that is left is the cash flow that has been 
retained by management. Undistributed Cash Flow to Sales is specified as 
SALE
DIVIDENDTAXINTERESTEBITDA 
Sales  toFlowCash  tedUndistribu  
where EBITDA is my proxy for cash flow, INTEREST is interest expense, TAX is income tax expense, 
DIVIDEND is the sum of common and preferred dividends paid, and SALE is the consolidated firm‘s total 
sales. 
It is also possible that investors are not concerned with the use or abuse of free cash flow on 
capital expenditures, but are also concerned with its use on a wider range of investment projects. As an 
alternative measure of firm investment, Total Investment to Sales is computed as 
Sales
nsAcquisitiosInvestmentCAPX 
Sales  toInvestment Total  
where CAPX represents firm capital expenditures, Investments represents other firm investments such as 
joint ventures or subsidiary investment, Acquisitions represents cash acquisitions, and Sales is the 
consolidated firm‘s total sales. 
[Table 9] 
 As in Tables 4, 7, and 8, Panel A of Table 9 shows that large amounts of coincident undistributed 
cash flow and corporate investment are detrimental to the efficiency of corporate internal capital markets 
and the effect is concentrated in those firms with the free cash flow problem. Relative Investment is 
significantly negatively related to the interaction of Undistributed CF/SALE and Total Investment/SALE 
for mid-sized and large conglomerates. As in Section V, analyst coverage and corporate control activity 
significantly improve the resource allocation in mid-sized conglomerates. A new result emerges that was 
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not apparent in Table 8. Although dividend payments are still detrimental for small firms, mid-sized 
conglomerates would significantly improve their resource allocations if they chose to pay out free cash 
flow as a dividend rather than retain it for additional investment. 
 In Panel B, coincident free cash flow and total investment continues to destroy shareholder value 
under the alternative proxies. The coefficient on the interaction between Undistributed CF/SALE and 
Total Investment/SALE is negative and significant for mid-sized and large conglomerates as well as for 
the entire sample as a whole. The capital and corporate control markets continue to benefit the 
shareholders of diversified firms. As before, the beneficial effects are concentrated in those firms that 
have substantial excess cash flow. Increased corporate control activity significantly benefits large firms 
while increased analyst coverage significantly benefits mid-sized firms, large firms, and the entire sample. 
The issuance of external capital benefits conglomerates of every size category. As in Table 8, the 
initiation of a dividend is most beneficial for mid-sized conglomerates as is increasing the dividend with 
the level of free cash flow. The coefficients on Dividend Paying Firm and Dividend/SALE x Undistributed 
CF/SALE are both positive and significant for mid-sized firms and for the sample as a whole. Leverage 
continues to have mixed effects under the alterative proxies. 
 
Results Using Only the SFAS 14 (1979-1997) Subperiod 
Although there is no indication in Figure 2 that use of the more recent segment data is driving the 
results, it is possible that this data is somehow fundamentally different and the inferences drawn here are 
spuriously caused by the newer data. To test the robustness of my results, the sample is restricted to the 
1979-1997 subperiod that utilizes only the SFAS 14 data. This subperiod sample consists of 859 small, 
4,090 mid-sized, 2,933 large, and 7,882 total firm-year observations. 
[Table 10] 
 Even after restricting the sample to include only the Pre-SFAS 131 subperiod (1979-1997), high 
levels of free cash flow and corporate investment remain detrimental to the efficient operation of the 
corporate internal capital market. The coefficient on interaction of CF/SALE and CAPX/SALE in Table 10 
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Panel A is negative and significant at the 1% level. This implies that the free cash flow problem is not just 
a recent phenomenon or a spurious result generated by a change in reporting standard. Although some 
significance is lost for the size-subsamples, the coefficient is everywhere negative for all size classes.  
Panel B shows that managerial discretion over free cash flow remains an issue when attention is 
restricted to the 1979-1997 subperiod. The relation between firm value and the interaction of free cash 
flow and corporate investment negative is significant for the entire sample. The dual-effect holds as well 
during this subperiod as Relative Investment is significantly positive. Thus, the free cash flow problem 
subverts the resource allocation process which destroys value indirectly and the free cash flow problem 
directly destroys value through overinvestment. By examining each size class, these results show that the 
detrimental impact continues to be focused on those conglomerates that demonstrate relatively high levels 
of free cash flow, namely the mid-sized and large conglomerates. 
The oversight of the analyst community and the decision to pay dividends are again a factor in the 
pre-SFAS 131 (1979-1997) subperiod. The mid-sized conglomerates could significantly increase 
shareholder value by increasing their disclosure and garnering more analyst coverage. The coefficient on 
the Number of Analysts is positive and significant for both the Relative Investment and the Excess Value 
regressions. Again, this factor alone can account for the relative valuation discount between mid-sized 
and large conglomerates. The decision to pay out free cash flow as a dividend to shareholders improved 
the resource allocation and the total value of the firm for mid-sized firms. The coefficient on the Dividend 
Paying Firm variable is positive and significant in both the Relative Investment and the Excess Value 
regressions. The use of leverage maintains the same mixed effects as reported earlier. Overall, the 
implications of Hypothesis 1-3 appear robust across alternative methodologies and across subperiods.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
All diversified firms are not created equal. This paper shows that there are significant differences 
in the investment behavior and market valuation of diversified firms. A stratification by size reveals that 
mid-sized conglomerates, those with sales between $20 M and $400 M, are those most responsible for the 
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frequently documented ―diversification discount.‖ In these firms, coincidently high levels of free cash 
flow and corporate investment are detrimental to both the operation of an efficient internal capital market 
and to firm excess value. This paper also documents that mid-sized and large conglomerates can 
significantly improve shareholder value by garnering increased analyst coverage and by initiating or 
increasing their dividend payouts. 
 These results imply that some of the lower investor valuation associated with corporate 
diversification is both predictable and avoidable. If management subjects itself to the monitoring forces of 
outside information producers and the capital markets or if they take steps to credibly pay out free cash 
flow to shareholders, they can significantly increase shareholder wealth. Furthermore, this study identifies 
which types of firms are most prone to the dark side of corporate diversification. Institutional and activist 
investors should focus their monitoring efforts on the mid-sized conglomerates which would otherwise go 
unwatched. 
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Appendix – Preparation of Segment Data and Treatment of SFAS 14 / SFAS 131 
Under SFAS 14, publicly traded firms are required to report financial data for material firm 
operations across industry lines of business (LOB). This standard was utilized by conglomerates from 
1976 until 1998. In June of 1997
43
, FASB issued SFAS 131 which resulted in material alterations to the 
way firms report financial data for their business segments. The following discussion details how I bridge 
the gap between the SFAS 14 and SFAS 131 reporting standards for the universe of firms in the 
Compustat segment database.
44
 The Compustat Business and Operating Segment database contains 
financial and industry membership data for 213,296 industrial firm-years and 372,687 firm-segment-years 
for fiscal years 1978 through 2005.  
The measures utilized in this paper rely heavily upon imputed values from industry benchmarks 
which require an SIC code for appropriate matching. Although 87,721 firm-segment-years are missing 
their primary SIC codes,
45
 many are recoverable through backfilling and certain assumptions. For those 
21,814 firm-segment-years where the reported business segment is the only one for that firm-year, firm‘s 
SIC code is assigned to the business segment. There are 11 segment-years with an NAICS code, but not 
an SIC code. These observations are translated using the conversion tables available from the US Census 
Bureau.
46
 Since each segment reports a unique identifier,
47
 it is possible to systematically isolate a given 
business segment across calendar time. Those business and operating segments missing their primary SIC 
code are backfilled on the basis of segment ID. This retrieves an additional 28,695 segment SIC codes. 
Finally, although many firms choose not to report immaterial unallocated corporate assets,
48
 others do 
                                                          
43 Effective December 15, 1997. 
44 Hund, Monk, and Tice (2007) conduct a similar procedure to utilize the SFAS 131 segment data. 
45 To assist in the comparability of pre- and post-SFAS 131 data, Compustat re-assigned segment SIC codes to conform to the new standard for as 
far back as 1990. The ―old‖ SIC code assignments are available as a separate dataset covering fiscal years 1984 to 2004 and the compliance 
between the ―new‖ and ―old‖ SIC code assignments is 99.9% consistent. See Wharton Research Data Services Knowledge Base article titled In 
the Compustat Segment data, why do the SSIC1/SSIC2 variables only go back to 1990? And why do the SSICB1/SSICB2 variables only cover 
1984-2004?. 
46 http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naicstab.htm 
47 Segment IDs (SID) are unique for each business, operating, and state segment within a given firm and remain with a given segment for ―as long 
as the data for that segment is comparable from one year to the next‖ (Compustat User‘s Guide). 
48 Undisclosed and unallocated corporate assets occur frequently in the SFAS 14 data. Berger and Ofek (1995) exclude 8.1% of their sample due 
to gross amounts (deviations of more than 25% of firm totals) of undisclosed assets. 
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with a separate reported business or operating segment.
49
 These overhead segments are assigned an SIC 
code of -9999 for future identification. After all of these assignments are made, I am still unable to 
identify SIC codes for 23,386 business segments. 
SFAS 131 changed the way firms report their business segments in two fundamental ways. First, 
business segments are no longer organized solely across industry lines,
50
 but instead as they are organized 
internally within the firm. Berger and Hann (2003) show that most firms still identify their segments in 
the same basic manner as they did under SFAS 14: LOB segments and Geographic segments. However, 
many firm‘s operating segments are now reported across both lines of business (LOB) as well as 
geographic region. The effect is that SFAS 14 LOB segments with sales in several geographic regions 
now report additional operating segments for each geographic region under SFAS 131. Second, individual 
segment financials are reported as they are to the firm‘s chief operating decision maker (CODM) and no 
longer must equate to the consolidated firm financials. This often leads to the creation of two new 
business segments for many multi-segment firms. Any transactions between business segments are now 
reported within the originating segment‘s financials if done so internally but are netted out in an 
―eliminations‖ segment and the firm must disclose the values of the reconciling intersegment 
eliminations.
51
 Remaining unallocated items such as income taxes, cash and marketable securities, 
pension assets & liabilities, or the corporate headquarters building are typically assigned to a ―corporate‖ 
segment.
52
 See the first and second panel of Table A1 for an example of the contrast between SFAS 14 
and SFAS 131. 
To adjust the SFAS 131 segment data so that it is comparable to the SFAS 14 data, the following 
algorithm is implemented. First, as in Berger and Hann (2003), financial data for all SFAS 131 operating 
segments with the same 4-digit SIC and 6-digit NAICS codes are aggregated across industry lines. Berger 
and Hann show that this resolves the major incongruence between the SFAS 14 and SFAS 131 and averts 
                                                          
49 I identify these segments on the basis of name. They are most frequently titled ―corporate‖ (12,678), ―other‖ (6,423), and ―corporate and other‖ 
(3,685). This can also include other business activities not considered material enough to warrant their own segment. 
50 LOB segments were organized by 4-digit SIC code under SFAS 14. 
51 See FASB SFAS 131 ¶32. These segments are identified as SID = 99 and are typically titled ―consolidating,‖ ―eliminations,‖ or 
―reconciliations.‖  
52 Sales, assets, capital expenditures, and profits are only allocated to the segment if they are reported internally to the firm‘s CODM. I identify 
these ―corporate‖ segments, which contain the unallocated items, as SIC -9999 in my sample. 
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the problem of inflation in the number business segments solely due to a reporting standard change. They 
further show that the procedure does not alter the correlation between segment and industry performance 
which leads them to conclude that this procedure does not materially alter the data. See the third panel of 
Exhibit A1 for an example of this procedure. There are 2,716 firm-year observations where firms report 
an operating segment representing and this represents 14,051 firm-segment-years. Of that number, 2,537 
firm-year observations require aggregation and the corresponding operating segments are aggregated into 
8,168 firm-segment-years. 
Once the operating segments have been recombined, the contents of the ―eliminations‖ segments 
are reallocated back to the other business segments. There are 196,343 firms-years in which the sum of 
segment sales (assets) are within 1% (25%) of consolidated firm sales (assets) and 4,579 of these report 
an ―eliminations‖ segment. Segments engaging in inter-segment transactions report the amounts of these 
figures along with other segment financials.
53
 The amounts of each financial statement item reported on 
the ―eliminations‖ segment are reassigned to the traditional business segments on an intersegment 
eliminations-weighted basis.
54
  See the fourth panel of Exhibit A1 for an example of this procedure. Any 
firm which reports an ―eliminations‖ segment with sales or assets representing more than 10% of the 
consolidated figures is excluded so as not to contaminate the sample.  
Finally, the ―corporate‖ segments are treated in a similar manner as they were handled under 
SFAS 14 in the conglomerate literature.
55
 The typical ―corporate‖ segment reports little or no sales and 
capital expenditures, but often reports positive asset values. These unallocated assets typically comprise 
of corporate overhead and other items in which there is no appropriate means of allocating them to the 
business segments. Any firm with a ―corporate‖ segment with sales or assets greater than 10% of the 
consolidated firm totals is excluded as it is unlikely that these segments are actually immaterial. The 
                                                          
53 The actual reporting of intersegment sales in Compustat varies by firm. Some firms include intersegment sales in the reported segment sales 
and then remove them via the ―eliminations‖ segment while others remove intersegment sales from segment sales but retain the ―eliminations‖ 
segment for other reconciling items (such as in Table A1). 
54 I alternatively reallocate the ―eliminations‖ segment on a sales-weighted basis for those firms with incomplete, nonsensical, or missing values 
of intersegment eliminations. 
55 Some papers using the SFAS 131 segment data choose to eliminate firms containing ―corporate‖ segments (see Ahn, Denis, and Denis 2006). 
This could be problematic if the existence of ―corporate‖ segments is non-random across sample firms. Unreported univariate comparisons show 
that firms with ―corporate‖ segments are significantly larger (in terms of assets, sales, and market value), more diversified, and have lower CAPX 
/ Sales ratios than firms that do not. Thus, eliminating these firms would likely bias the sample. 
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existence of the reported overhead segments for the remaining firms are disregarded, but it is still required 
that consolidate segment sales be within 1% of firm totals. Using the methodology forwarded by Berger 
and Ofek (1995), the remaining segment assets are grossed-up, when necessary, so that the resultant 
business segment assets equal the consolidated amounts. For large deviations, any firm where 
consolidated segment assets are not within 25% of firm totals are excluded. See the fifth panel of Table 
A1 for an example of this procedure. There are 189,574 firm-years meeting all of the above requirements 
and, of these, 2,321 report an ―eliminations‖ segment while 5,938 report a ―corporate‖ segment. 
Several tests are conducted to ensure that the above adjustment process does not bias or 
materially alter the segment data or the key financial ratios derived from it. First, following Givoly, Hayn, 
and D‘Souza (1999) and Berger and Hann (2003), the correlations between segment sales and pure-play 
industry total sales are computed for those firms reporting an eliminations segment and those that do not. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients for the eliminations and the non-eliminations firms are 0.059 and 
0.064, respectively. Next, a comparison is conducted of the correlation of segment sales, assets, and 
capital expenditures between segment-years from the first year that a firm reports an eliminations segment 
and the prior year. The correlation coefficients for sales, assets, and capital expenditures are 0.96, 0.98, 
and 0.87, respectively. Finally, firm-segment fixed effects regressions are conducted with calendar time 
dummies on the capex-to-sales ratio and the capex-to-assets ratio of each business segment. If the above 
algorithm biases these ratios, then dummy variables indicating an eliminations segment or a corporate 
segment should come in either positive or negative and significant. However, the dummy variables are 
never significant for any of the specifications at conventional levels. While it is possible that the 
aggregation algorithm adds noise to the segment data, these results fail to uncover any evidence of a 
discernable bias in the procedure. 
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Size Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LS EV 15.88% -5.61% -8.53% -4.44% -5.03% -3.92% 1.06% 0.41% -0.38% 5.18%
Prob T 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.58 0.59 0.00
BO EV 2.10% -18.79% -19.07% -11.82% -12.62% -10.66% -4.30% -3.42% -1.21% 5.79%
Prob T 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00
Figure 1: Excess Value by Size Decile and Methodology 
for Compustat Universe
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Size Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
BO EV(SFAS 14) 3.81% -16.46% -18.19% -12.91% -12.12% -10.51% -4.74% -1.57% -1.73% 5.78%
Prob T 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.00
BO EV (SFAS 131) -0.25% -22.32% -20.52% -10.21% -13.40% -10.91% -3.59% -6.85% -0.21% 5.80%
Prob T 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.92 0.00
Figure 2: Excess Value 
by Size Decile and Reporting Regime 
for Compustat Universe
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Size Decile 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
LS EV 0.87% -8.76% -9.01% -6.53% -5.68% -7.13% 0.47% -0.23% -0.04% 4.36%
Prob T 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.80 0.97 0.00
BO EV -5.11% -20.63% -21.42% -17.20% -13.36% -16.51% -5.30% -4.73% -5.13% 3.54%
Prob T 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Figure 3: Excess Value by Size Decile and Methodology 
for Sample Firms
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Table 1 - Sample Size by Year and Firm Size 
Sample summary statistics for 11,111 diversified firm-years from the Compustat Industry Segment database for 1979-2005. 
Small firms are those falling in the smallest decile of the sample where size is measured as firm sales in 1986 dollars. Mid-
sized firms are those firms falling in the 2nd through the 6th size deciles while large firms are those firms falling in the 7th 
through the 10th deciles. 
Year Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms Total 
1978 12 116 76 204 
1979 23 140 91 254 
1980 26 162 91 279 
1981 31 187 95 313 
1982 38 176 77 291 
1983 44 192 56 292 
1984 62 287 194 543 
1985 66 251 173 490 
1986 57 234 140 431 
1987 50 221 145 416 
1988 53 256 193 502 
1989 58 232 193 483 
1990 40 212 169 421 
1991 47 181 138 366 
1992 42 205 160 407 
1993 47 210 150 407 
1994 46 229 169 444 
1995 40 222 204 466 
1996 46 217 220 483 
1997 38 191 220 449 
1998 46 306 252 604 
1999 49 222 204 475 
2000 36 179 177 392 
2001 26 155 181 362 
2002 31 173 163 367 
2003 22 151 181 354 
2004 21 125 161 307 
2005 14 123 172 309 
Total 1,111 5,555 4,445 11,111 
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Table 2 - Summary Statistics 
Sample summary statistics for 11,111 diversified firm-years from the Compustat Industry Segment database for 1979-2005. Total 
Assets and Net Sales are both deflated to 1986 dollars. Excess Value is Berger and Ofek's (1995) excess value from diversification 
measure. Relative Investment is Ahn and Denis' (2004) internal capital market efficiency measure multiplied by 1000. Firm Cash 
Flow to Sales is EBITDA to Sales. 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Min Median Max 
Measures of Firm Size and Scope 
Total Assets (1986 $s) 11,111 1,282.49 4,189.39 1.11 187.80 159,080.92 
Net Sales (1986 $s) 11,111 1,146.39 3,220.57 1.01 221.84 102,813.00 
Number of Business Segments 11,111 2.74 0.98 2.00 2.00 10.00 
Number of 2-Digit SIC Codes 11,111 1.98 0.82 1.00 2.00 8.00 
 
Measures of Firm Value and ICM Efficiency 
Excess Value 11,111 -10.58% 50.16% -138.42% -12.10% 138.42% 
Relative Investment  11,111 -0.27 28.15 -115.11 0.00 121.85 
 
Measures of Free Cash Flow and Firm Investment 
Firm Cash Flow to Sales 11,111 12.38% 10.00% -90.82% 13.21% 41.11% 
Firm Capital Expenditures to Sales 11,111 7.88% 11.50% 0.10% 4.27% 107.78% 
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Table 3 – Excess Value, Internal Capital Market Efficiency, Free Cash Flow, and Investment by Firm Size and Subperiod 
Sample summary statistics for 11,111 diversified firm-years from the Compustat Industry Segment database for 1979-2005. Small firms are those falling in the smallest decile of the sample 
where size is measured as firm sales in 1986 dollars. Mid-sized firms are those firms falling in the 2nd through the 6th size deciles while large firms are those firms falling in the 7th through the 
10th deciles. Panel A displays the entire pooled sample while Panel B and C report statistics for the 1979-1997 and 1998-2005 subperiods. Total Assets and Net Sales are both deflated to 1986 
dollars. Excess Value is Berger and Ofek's (1995) excess value from diversification measure. Relative Investment is Ahn and Denis' (2004) internal capital market efficiency measure multiplied 
by 1000. Firm Cash Flow to Sales is EBITDA to Sales. ***, **, * indicate the value is statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full Sample (1979-2005) 
  All Firms   Small Firms   Mid-Sized Firms   Large Firms   Sm v. Lg Sm v. Mid Mid v. Lg 
Variable Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z 
Measures of Firm Size and Scope 
Total Assets (1986 $s) 1,282.49 
*** 
187.80 
*** 
11.56 
*** 
8.34 
*** 
137.72 
*** 
77.20 
*** 
3,030.78 
*** 
1,212.56 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Net Sales (1986 $s) 1,146.39 
*** 
221.84 
*** 
10.26 
*** 
10.22 
*** 
130.88 
*** 
97.20 
*** 
2,699.47 
*** 
1,256.74 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of Business Segments 2.74 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
2.34 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
2.53 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
3.10 
*** 
3.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of 2-Digit SIC Codes 1.98 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
1.83 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
1.92 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
2.09 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Measures of Firm Value and ICM Efficiency 
Excess Value -10.58% 
*** 
-12.10% 
*** 
-5.11% 
*** 
-12.35% 
*** 
-17.82% 
*** 
-20.42% 
*** 
-2.90% 
*** 
-3.78% 
*** 
0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Relative Investment -0.27 0.00 
*** 
-0.15 0.00 
*** 
-0.74 
** 
0.00 
*** 
0.29 0.00 
** 
0.64 0.02 0.55 0.59 0.06 0.00 
 
Measures of Free Cash Flow and Firm Investment 
Firm Cash Flow to Sales 12.38% 
*** 
13.21% 
*** 
3.65% 
*** 
7.03% 
*** 
12.17% 
*** 
12.71% 
*** 
14.83% 
*** 
14.32% 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Capital Exp to Sales 7.88% 
*** 
4.27% 
*** 
10.03% 
*** 
3.59% 
*** 
7.81% 
*** 
3.80% 
*** 
7.42% 
*** 
4.86% 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.08 0.00 
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Panel B: SFAS 14 Sample (1979-1997) 
  All Firms   Small Firms   Mid-Sized Firms   Large Firms   Sm v. Lg Sm v. Mid Mid v. Lg 
Variable Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z 
Measures of Firm Size and Scope 
Total Assets (1986 $s) 1,004.71 
*** 
144.28 
*** 
10.43 
*** 
7.83 
*** 
121.92 
*** 
68.38 
*** 
2,526.94 
*** 
1,126.09 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Net Sales (1986 $s) 1,046.53 
*** 
192.35 
*** 
10.06 
*** 
10.02 
*** 
126.90 
*** 
89.34 
*** 
2,632.48 
*** 
1,251.31 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of Business Segments 2.70 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
2.29 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
2.49 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
3.10 
*** 
3.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of 2-Digit SIC Codes 2.07 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
1.89 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
1.99 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
2.22 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Measures of Firm Value and ICM Efficiency 
Excess Value -9.99% 
*** 
-11.81% 
*** 
-2.69% 
 
-9.32% 
* 
-16.82% 
*** 
-19.56% 
*** 
-2.60% 
*** 
-4.03% 
*** 
0.96 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Relative Investment -0.70 
** 
-0.23 
*** 
-1.41 -0.70 
*** 
-0.97 
** 
-0.23 
*** 
-0.12 
 
-0.12 
*** 
0.26 0.01 0.72 0.23 0.21 0.01 
 
Measures of Free Cash Flow and Firm Investment 
Firm Cash Flow to Sales 12.94% 
*** 
13.69% 
*** 
5.73% 
*** 
7.96% 
*** 
12.75% 
*** 
13.25% 
*** 
15.31% 
*** 
14.96% 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Capital Exp to Sales 7.81% 
*** 
4.32% 
*** 
10.25% 
*** 
3.88% 
*** 
7.70% 
*** 
3.78% 
*** 
7.25% 
*** 
5.03% 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.08 0.00 
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Panel C: SFAS 131 Sample (1998-2005) 
  All Firms   Small Firms   Mid-Sized Firms   Large Firms   Sm v. Lg Sm v. Mid Mid v. Lg 
Variable Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z 
Measures of Firm Size and Scope 
Total Assets (1986 $s) 1,960.54 
*** 
351.99 
*** 
15.42 
*** 
10.80 
*** 
181.83 
*** 
104.86 
*** 
4,008.15 
*** 
1,387.04 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Net Sales (1986 $s) 1,390.17 
*** 
333.03 
*** 
10.93 
*** 
10.98 
*** 
142.00 
*** 
116.61 
*** 
2,829.40 
*** 
1,271.86 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of Business Segments 2.84 
*** 
3.00 
*** 
2.50 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
2.63 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
3.11 
*** 
3.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
# of 2-Digit SIC Codes 1.77 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
1.63 
*** 
1.00 
*** 
1.72 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
1.84 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
Measures of Firm Value and ICM Efficiency 
Excess Value -12.04% 
*** 
-12.84% 
*** 
-13.36% 
*** 
-26.12% 
*** 
-20.63% 
*** 
-22.32% 
*** 
-3.49% 
*** 
-2.63% 
** 
0.01 0.00 0.07 0.58 0.00 0.00 
Relative Investment 0.79 
* 
0.00 
 
4.14 
** 
0.00 
 
-0.08 
 
0.00 
*** 
1.07 
* 
0.00 
 
0.06 0.82 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.02 
 
Measures of Free Cash Flow and Firm Investment 
Firm Cash Flow to Sales 11.03% 
*** 
11.99% 
*** 
-3.41% 
*** 
3.95% 
 
10.56% 
*** 
11.41% 
*** 
13.88% 
*** 
13.12% 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm Capital Exp to Sales 8.03% 
*** 
4.18% 
*** 
9.26% 
*** 
2.75% 
*** 
8.11% 
*** 
3.90% 
*** 
7.76% 
*** 
4.49% 
*** 
0.04 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.40 0.00 
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Table 4 - Free Cash Flow, Firm Investment, and Internal Capital Market Efficiency 
Internal Capital Market efficiency regressions where the dependent variable in each regression is Ahn and Denis' (2004) Relative Investment x 1000 for 
11,111 diversified firm-years from the Compustat Industry Segment database for 1979-2005. Small firms are those falling in the smallest decile of the 
sample where size is measured as firm sales in 1986 dollars. Mid-sized firms are those firms falling in the 2nd through the 6th size deciles while large 
firms are those firms falling in the 7th through the 10th deciles. Inverse of Average q is the inverse of the mean of the imputed Tobin's qs of each of the 
firms segments where imputed Tobin's q is determined by industry medians. # 2-digit SIC Codes is the number of unique 2-digit SIC codes represented 
by the firm's business segments. Size is the natural log of deflated firm sales in 1986 dollars. CF/SALE is EBITDA to sales and CAPX/SALE is firm 
capital expenditures to sales. All regressions utilize firm fixed effects and calendar year effects. 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Inverse of Average q 12.98 0.00 23.31 0.05 19.36 0.00 0.68 0.86 
# 2-digit SIC Codes 1.19 0.08 6.93 0.08 -0.25 0.83 0.93 0.28 
Size 0.46 0.56 16.93 0.00 3.11 0.02 -6.19 0.00 
CF/SALE -2.58 0.61 -5.58 0.68 -1.93 0.80 12.17 0.32 
CAPX/SALE 19.43 0.00 19.68 0.14 30.70 0.00 18.34 0.28 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -16.46 0.54 58.43 0.31 -84.02 0.05 -213.14 0.03 
         
F-Statistic 1.89 0.00 1.94 0.00 1.65 0.00 1.95 0.00 
N 11,111   1,111   5,555   4,445   
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Table 5 - Free Cash Flow, Firm Investment, and Excess Value 
Firm excess value regressions where the dependent variable in each regression is Berger and Ofek's (1995) Excess Value for 11,111 diversified firm-years 
from the Compustat Industry Segment database for 1979-2005. Small firms are those falling in the smallest decile of the sample where size is measured as 
firm sales in 1986 dollars. Mid-sized firms are those firms falling in the 2nd through the 6th size deciles while large firms are those firms falling in the 7th 
through the 10th deciles. Relative Investment is Ahn and Denis' (2004) Relative Investment internal capital market efficiency measure multiplied by 
100,000. # 2-digit SIC Codes is the number of unique 2-digit SIC codes represented by the firm's business segments. Size is the natural log of deflated firm 
sales in 1986 dollars. CF/SALE is EBITDA to sales and CAPX/SALE is firm capital expenditures to sales. All regressions utilize firm fixed effects and 
calendar year effects. 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Relative Investment 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.44 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.28 
# 2-digit SIC Codes -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.37 -0.04 0.01 -0.01 0.12 
Size -0.11 0.00 -0.33 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -0.20 0.00 
CF/SALE 0.26 0.00 -0.16 0.33 0.43 0.00 0.75 0.00 
CAPX/SALE 0.75 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.92 0.00 1.22 0.00 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -1.10 0.00 0.67 0.35 -2.04 0.00 -3.71 0.00 
         
F-Statistic 8.07 0.00 4.80 0.00 7.26 0.00 10.25 0.00 
N 11,111   1,111   5,555   4,445   
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Table 6 – Proxies for External Monitoring, Internal Control, and Payout Policy 
Univariate statistics for 11,111 diversified firm-years from the Compustat Industry Segment database for 1979-2005. Small firms are those falling in the smallest decile of the sample where size 
is measured as firm sales in 1986 dollars. Mid-sized firms are those firms falling in the 2nd through the 6th size deciles while large firms are those firms falling in the 7th through the 10th 
deciles. Number of Analysts is the maximum number of analysts making annual earnings forecasts in a fiscal year available in I/B/E/S. Excess Net External Capital is the sales-weighted excess 
net external capital measure developed by Peyer (2002). # of Completed Mergers is the number of completed deals in the firm's Fama and French (1997) industry and calendar year available 
from Compustat. Dividend Paying Firm is a (0,1) indicator variable of whether the firm pays a dividend. Excess Segment Leverage is Berger and Ofek's (1995) measure of abnormal leverage 
held by the diversified firm. ***, **, * indicate the value is statistically different than zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  All Firms   Small Firms   Mid-Sized Firms   Large Firms   Sm v. Lg Sm v. Mid Mid v. Lg 
Variable Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Mean   Median   Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z Prob T Prob Z 
Proxies for External Monitoring and Internal Control 
Number of Analysts 4.76 
*** 
2.00 
*** 
0.22 
*** 
0.00 
*** 
2.02 
*** 
1.00 
*** 
9.31 
*** 
7.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Excess Net Ext Capital 0.03 
*** 
-0.01 
 
0.05 
*** 
0.00 
*** 
0.04 
*** 
-0.01 
** 
0.01 
*** 
-0.01 
*** 
0.00 0.01 0.05 0.54 0.00 0.00 
# of Completed Mergers 16.57 
*** 
11.00 
*** 
21.57 
*** 
15.00 
*** 
16.71 
*** 
12.00 
*** 
15.14 
*** 
10.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Proxies for Payout Policy 
Dividend Paying Firm 0.58 
*** 
1.00 
*** 
0.14 
*** 
0.00 
*** 
0.48 
*** 
0.00 
*** 
0.83 
*** 
1.00 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Dividends to Sales 1.21% 
*** 
0.38% 
*** 
0.27% 
*** 
0.00% 
*** 
0.87% 
*** 
0.00% 
*** 
1.88% 
*** 
1.29% 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Excess Segment Leverage 5.19% 
*** 
3.20% 
*** 
7.79% 
*** 
6.60% 
*** 
5.53% 
*** 
3.57% 
*** 
4.10% 
*** 
2.24% 
*** 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 7 - Internal Capital Market Efficiency, Excess Value, and External Monitoring 
The dependent variable in Panel A is Relative Investment multiplied by 1000. The dependent variable in Panel B is 
Berger and Ofek (1995) Excess Value. Small firms are those falling in the smallest decile of the sample where size is 
measured as firm sales in 1986 dollars. Mid-sized firms are those firms falling in the 2nd through the 6th size deciles 
while large firms are those firms falling in the 7th through the 10th deciles. In Panel B, Relative Investment is 
multiplied by 100000. # 2-digit SIC Codes is the number of unique 2-digit SIC codes represented by the firm's business 
segments. Size is the natural log of deflated firm sales in 1986 dollars. CF/SALE is EBITDA to sales and CAPX/SALE 
is firm capital expenditures to sales. Number of Analysts is the maximum number of analysts making annual earnings 
forecasts in a fiscal year available in I/B/E/S multiplied by 10. Excess Net External Capital is the sales-weighted excess 
net external capital measure developed by Peyer (2002). # of Completed Mergers is the number of completed deals in 
the firm's Fama and French (1997) industry and calendar year available from Compustat multiplied by 100. All 
regressions utilize firm fixed effects and calendar year effects. 
Panel A: Internal Capital Market Efficiency Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Inverse of Average q 12.85 0.00 24.63 0.04 18.63 0.00 0.65 0.87 
# 2-digit SIC Codes 1.20 0.08 6.62 0.09 -0.15 0.90 0.96 0.26 
Size 0.51 0.54 17.73 0.00 2.15 0.13 -6.30 0.00 
CF/SALE -3.27 0.51 -8.62 0.53 -3.11 0.68 10.28 0.40 
CAPX/SALE 21.52 0.00 24.62 0.08 31.32 0.00 20.02 0.24 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -18.32 0.50 68.67 0.24 -77.07 0.07 -214.47 0.03 
Number Of Analysts -0.67 0.52 -52.20 0.12 5.55 0.03 0.12 0.91 
Net External Capital Issued -3.25 0.06 -4.31 0.49 -3.25 0.17 -3.46 0.28 
Number of Mergers 6.53 0.06 -9.39 0.57 14.66 0.01 2.08 0.67 
         
F-Statistic 1.89 0.00 1.94 0.00 1.66 0.00 1.94 0.00 
N 11,111  1,111  5,555  4,445  
                  
Panel B: Excess Value Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Relative Investment 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.18 
# 2-digit SIC Codes -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.45 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.05 
Size -0.13 0.00 -0.34 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.22 0.00 
CF/SALE 0.36 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.48 0.00 0.99 0.00 
CAPX/SALE 0.51 0.00 0.16 0.33 0.68 0.00 0.92 0.00 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -0.85 0.01 0.76 0.27 -1.66 0.00 -3.02 0.00 
Number Of Analysts 0.10 0.00 0.35 0.39 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Net External Capital Issued 0.43 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.47 0.00 
Number of Mergers 0.04 0.27 -0.03 0.90 -0.02 0.73 0.09 0.08 
         
F-Statistic 8.77 0.00 5.15 0.00 7.93 0.00 11.06 0.00 
N 11,111  1,111  5,555  4,445  
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Table 8 - Internal Capital Market Efficiency, Excess Value, and Payout Commitments 
The dependent variable in Panel A is Relative Investment multiplied by 1000. The dependent variable in Panel B is Berger and Ofek (1995) 
Excess Value. Small firms are those falling in the smallest decile of the sample where size is measured as firm sales in 1986 dollars. Mid-sized 
firms are those firms falling in the 2nd through the 6th size deciles while large firms are those firms falling in the 7th through the 10th deciles. 
In Panel B, Relative Investment is multiplied by 100000. # 2-digit SIC Codes is the number of unique 2-digit SIC codes represented by the 
firm's business segments. Size is the natural log of deflated firm sales in 1986 dollars. CF/SALE is EBITDA to sales and CAPX/SALE is firm 
capital expenditures to sales. Dividend Paying Firm is a (0,1) indicator variable of whether the firm pays a dividend. Dividends to Sales is total 
dividends paid normalized by sales. Excess Segment Leverage is Berger and Ofek's (1995) measure of abnormal leverage held by the 
diversified firm. All regressions utilize firm fixed effects and calendar year effects. 
Panel A: Internal Capital Market Efficiency Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Inverse of Average q 12.65 0.00 23.32 0.05 19.09 0.00 -0.03 0.99 
# 2-digit SIC Codes 1.19 0.08 7.40 0.06 -0.20 0.86 0.99 0.25 
Size 0.40 0.62 16.75 0.00 3.27 0.02 -6.35 0.00 
CF/SALE -1.46 0.79 13.65 0.36 -6.92 0.40 5.67 0.66 
CAPX/SALE 20.03 0.00 20.93 0.11 30.33 0.00 17.82 0.29 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -26.30 0.34 10.35 0.86 -86.00 0.04 -214.49 0.03 
Dividend Paying Firm 1.71 0.16 2.44 0.71 1.19 0.47 1.77 0.40 
Div/SALE x CF/SALE 174.78 0.27 -2,160.87 0.06 310.54 0.28 231.25 0.21 
Excess Segment Leverage 0.95 0.77 12.06 0.23 -7.51 0.12 -5.05 0.53 
Ex Seg Lev x CF/SALE -38.73 0.02 -93.76 0.02 -16.48 0.53 9.75 0.83 
         
F-Statistic 1.90 0.00 1.96 0.00 1.66 0.00 1.94 0.00 
N 11,111   1,111   5,555   4,445   
                  
Panel B: Excess Value Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Relative Investment 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.53 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.32 
# 2-digit SIC Codes -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.27 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.18 
Size -0.11 0.00 -0.33 0.00 -0.07 0.00 -0.20 0.00 
CF/SALE 0.44 0.00 -0.01 0.94 0.65 0.00 0.67 0.00 
CAPX/SALE 0.81 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.97 0.00 1.25 0.00 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -1.68 0.00 0.15 0.84 -2.44 0.00 -4.14 0.00 
Dividend Paying Firm 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.64 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.50 
Div/SALE x CF/SALE 9.75 0.00 11.91 0.39 9.09 0.01 8.82 0.00 
Excess Segment Leverage 0.37 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.43 0.00 0.18 0.04 
Ex Seg Lev x CF/SALE -1.61 0.00 -0.87 0.09 -2.00 0.00 -0.60 0.23 
         
F-Statistic 8.24 0.00 4.79 0.00 7.45 0.00 10.31 0.00 
N 11,111   1,111   5,555   4,445   
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Table 9 - Internal Capital Market Efficiency and Excess Value using Alternative Measures 
The dependent variable in Panel A is Relative Investment (x 1000). The dependent variable in Panel B is Berger and Ofek (1995) 
Excess Value. In Panel B, Relative Investment is multiplied by 100000. # 2-digit SIC Codes is the number of unique 2-digit SIC 
codes represented by the firm's business segments. Size is the natural log of deflated firm sales in 1986 dollars. Undist CF/SALE 
is EBITDA less taxes, dividends, and interest payments normalized by sales and Total Investment/SALE is the sum of capital 
expenditures, investments, and cash acquisitions normalized by sales. All regressions utilize firm fixed effects and calendar year 
effects. 
Panel A: Internal Capital Market Efficiency Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Inverse of Average q 11.67 0.00 20.96 0.08 17.85 0.00 0.82 0.84 
# 2-digit SIC Codes 1.09 0.11 6.50 0.10 -0.21 0.86 0.95 0.27 
Size 0.60 0.47 17.95 0.00 2.80 0.05 -6.71 0.00 
Undistributed CF/SALE -13.26 0.02 -0.62 0.96 -19.36 0.06 -6.11 0.67 
Total Investment/SALE 3.33 0.18 1.13 0.89 5.29 0.16 5.34 0.32 
Undist CF/SALE x Tot Inv/SALE 8.93 0.17 8.33 0.53 -27.93 0.04 -39.66 0.09 
Number Of Analysts -0.74 0.48 -41.06 0.22 6.39 0.01 0.03 0.98 
Net External Capital Issued -2.82 0.15 -0.99 0.88 -1.75 0.51 -4.56 0.26 
Number of Mergers 5.78 0.10 -11.37 0.49 14.50 0.01 1.82 0.71 
Dividend Paying Firm 1.99 0.09 1.31 0.84 1.22 0.44 2.40 0.25 
Dividend x Undist CF/SALE 167.72 0.21 -2982.09 0.02 463.09 0.05 -140.03 0.47 
Excess Segment Leverage -3.49 0.19 4.97 0.63 -9.27 0.02 -6.96 0.19 
Ex Seg Lev x Undist CF/SALE -16.32 0.27 -56.00 0.09 20.01 0.43 59.23 0.19 
         
F-Statistic 1.89 0.00 1.96 0.00 1.67 0.00 1.94 0.00 
N 11,111  1,111  5,555  4,445  
                  
Panel B: Excess Value Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Relative Investment 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.45 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.17 
# 2-digit SIC Codes -0.03 0.00 0.04 0.44 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.07 
Size -0.12 0.00 -0.31 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.21 0.00 
Undistributed CF/SALE 0.19 0.00 -0.10 0.50 0.63 0.00 0.83 0.00 
Total Investment/SALE 0.29 0.00 0.13 0.19 0.43 0.00 0.22 0.00 
Undist CF/SALE x Tot Inv/SALE -0.23 0.00 0.08 0.62 -0.66 0.00 -0.51 0.04 
Number Of Analysts 0.10 0.00 0.36 0.37 0.24 0.00 0.05 0.00 
Net External Capital Issued 0.34 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.37 0.00 
Number of Mergers 0.04 0.38 -0.05 0.81 -0.03 0.64 0.10 0.05 
Dividend Paying Firm 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.88 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.53 
Dividend x Undist CF/SALE 8.08 0.00 -8.71 0.57 6.15 0.02 -1.18 0.57 
Excess Segment Leverage 0.11 0.00 0.07 0.59 0.20 0.00 -0.05 0.35 
Ex Seg Lev x Undist CF/SALE -1.35 0.00 -0.51 0.20 -2.22 0.00 -0.01 0.98 
         
F-Statistic 8.88 0.00 5.14 0.00 8.17 0.00 10.91 0.00 
N 11,111  1,111  5,555  4,445  
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Table 10 - Internal Capital Market Efficiency and Excess Value for the Pre-SFAS 131 Reporting Regime 
Internal Capital Market efficiency and firm excess value regressions for the 1979-1997 subperiod. The dependent variable in Panel A is 
Relative Investment (x 1000). The dependent variable in Panel B is Berger and Ofek (1995) Excess Value. All regressions utilize firm fixed 
effects and calendar year effects. 
Panel A: Internal Capital Market Efficiency Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Inverse of Average q 17.14 0.00 32.22 0.03 21.00 0.00 5.64 0.32 
# 2-digit SIC Codes 0.78 0.37 5.92 0.20 0.32 0.82 0.15 0.89 
Size 1.88 0.10 15.48 0.01 3.71 0.05 -7.07 0.00 
CF/SALE 6.56 0.43 15.85 0.44 -11.26 0.25 -1.10 0.94 
CAPX/SALE 21.02 0.00 35.57 0.04 22.61 0.04 -26.45 0.25 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -100.56 0.01 -106.43 0.29 -76.03 0.18 -126.09 0.32 
Number Of Analysts -2.32 0.10 -89.52 0.06 5.36 0.10 -0.46 0.76 
Net External Capital Issued -5.11 0.02 -4.42 0.55 -5.80 0.06 -4.90 0.30 
Number of Mergers 1.87 0.71 -19.65 0.37 4.86 0.52 3.36 0.65 
Dividend Paying Firm 4.05 0.04 4.96 0.50 1.63 0.40 1.63 0.59 
Div/SALE x CF/SALE -10.55 0.33 -2,849.63 0.05 887.26 0.03 274.08 0.21 
Excess Segment Leverage 5.80 0.16 18.27 0.14 -3.94 0.51 -4.55 0.66 
Ex Seg Lev x CF/SALE -47.81 0.03 -109.88 0.07 -7.11 0.83 44.99 0.43 
         
F-Statistic 2.20 0.00 2.04 0.00 1.87 0.00 2.49 0.00 
N 7,882   859   4,090   2,933   
                  
Panel B: Excess Value Regressions 
  Full Sample Small Firms Mid-Sized Firms Large Firms 
  Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value Estimate P-Value 
Relative Investment 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.52 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.41 
# 2-digit SIC Codes -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.62 -0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.13 
Size -0.12 0.00 -0.37 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.20 0.00 
CF/SALE 0.45 0.00 -0.14 0.55 0.59 0.00 0.84 0.00 
CAPX/SALE 0.45 0.00 0.03 0.87 0.50 0.00 1.14 0.00 
CF/SALE x CAPX/SALE -0.92 0.02 2.60 0.02 -1.27 0.02 -4.47 0.00 
Number Of Analysts 0.08 0.00 -0.65 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.59 
Net External Capital Issued 0.42 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.40 0.00 
Number of Mergers 0.06 0.21 0.05 0.83 0.04 0.62 0.01 0.92 
Dividend Paying Firm 0.02 0.27 0.05 0.55 0.02 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Div/SALE x CF/SALE 5.19 0.01 5.40 0.73 8.60 0.03 1.57 0.43 
Excess Segment Leverage 0.29 0.00 0.06 0.64 0.39 0.00 0.31 0.00 
Ex Seg Lev x CF/SALE -1.57 0.00 -0.25 0.70 -2.44 0.00 -1.29 0.01 
         
F-Statistic 10.09 0.00 5.29 0.00 9.65 0.00 12.47 0.00 
N 7,882   859   4,090   2,933   
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1998 AMF Bowling Inc - Year Prior to Implementation of SFAS 131
SID SNAME STYPE SSICB1 snaics1 SALE CAPX AT INTSEG OPS
1 BOWLING CENTERS BUSSEG 7933 713950 540.9 56.9 1233.4 . 44.7
2 BOWLING PRODUCTS BUSSEG 3949 339920 197.2 9.5 706.1 . -11.8
1999 AMF Bowling Inc - Raw Segment Data
SID SNAME STYPE SSICB1 snaics1 SALE CAPX AT INTSEG OPS
3 Bowling Centers-U.S. OPSEG 7933 713950 461 34.1 810.4 0 11
4 Bowling Centers-International OPSEG 7933 713950 124.7 9.4 315.8 0 8.6
5 Bowling Products-U.S. OPSEG 3949 339920 68.1 7.9 607.6 18.1 -33.4
6 Bowling Products-International OPSEG 3949 339920 78.9 0.4 64.3 4.2 -10.1
7 Corporate OPSEG -9999 0 0.3 28 0 -24.9
99 Eliminations OPSEG . 0 0 3.5 22.3 1.3
1999 AMF Bowling Inc - After Berger and Hann (2003) Aggregation
SID SNAME STYPE SSICB1 snaics1 SALE CAPX AT INTSEG OPS
3 [A] Bowling Centers-U.S.; 
Bowling Centers-International
OPSEG 7933 713950 585.7 43.5 1126.2 0 19.6
5 [A] Bowling Products-U.S.; 
Bowling Products-International
OPSEG 3949 339920 147 8.3 671.9 22.3 -43.5
7 Corporate OPSEG -9999 0 0.3 28 0 -24.9
99 Eliminations OPSEG . 0 0 3.5 22.3 1.3
1999 AMF Bowling Inc - After Eliminations Segment Aggregation
SID SNAME STYPE SSICB1 snaics1 SALE CAPX AT INTSEG OPS
3 [A] Bowling Centers-U.S.; 
Bowling Centers-International
OPSEG 7933 713950 585.7 43.5 1126.2 0 19.6
5 [A] Bowling Products-U.S.; 
Bowling Products-International
OPSEG 3949 339920 147 8.3 675.4 0 -42.2
7 Corporate OPSEG -9999 0 0.3 28 0 -24.9
1999 AMF Bowling Inc - After Asset Re-Weighting
SID SNAME STYPE SSICB1 snaics1 SALE CAPX AT INTSEG OPS
3 [A] Bowling Centers-U.S.; 
Bowling Centers-International
OPSEG 7933 713950 585.7 43.5 1143.703108 0 19.6
5 [A] Bowling Products-U.S.; 
Bowling Products-International
OPSEG 3949 339920 147 8.3 685.8968917 0 -42.2
Table A1 - Example of Aggregation Algorithm
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Year
Total Number 
of Firms
Number of 
Firms 
Reporting 
Eliminations 
Segments
Number of 
Firms 
Reporting 
Corporate 
Segments
Eliminations 
Segment Size 
- % of Firm 
Sales
Eliminations 
Segment Size 
- % of Firm 
Assets
Corporate 
Segment Size 
- % of Firm 
Sales
Corporate 
Segment Size 
- % of Firm 
Assets
1978 5,042 0 171 . . 1.98% 3.25%
1979 5,018 0 154 . . 2.19% 3.17%
1980 5,088 0 145 . . 2.06% 3.38%
1981 5,071 0 122 . . 2.00% 2.38%
1982 5,394 0 81 . . 1.35% 1.72%
1983 5,669 0 58 . . 1.53% 1.98%
1984 5,803 0 33 . . 0.89% 1.78%
1985 6,262 0 39 . . 0.49% 1.60%
1986 6,649 0 33 . . 1.15% 1.73%
1987 6,742 0 30 . . 0.81% 1.66%
1988 6,644 0 33 . . 1.02% 3.54%
1989 6,546 0 30 . . 0.81% 4.39%
1990 6,646 0 43 . . 0.73% 2.78%
1991 6,819 0 41 . . 0.34% 2.77%
1992 7,248 0 41 . . 0.26% 3.55%
1993 7,708 0 48 . . 0.28% 3.32%
1994 8,088 0 46 . . 0.33% 2.66%
1995 8,992 0 57 . . 0.35% 3.45%
1996 9,154 0 55 . . 0.34% 2.78%
1997 8,868 2 59 0.00% 0.55% 0.19% 3.66%
1998 8,571 21 164 0.00% 1.65% 0.33% 3.47%
1999 8,147 305 679 0.17% 0.59% 0.00% 4.31%
2000 7,683 347 734 0.14% 0.35% 0.00% 3.96%
2001 7,226 336 662 0.12% 0.08% 0.00% 3.95%
2002 6,840 336 644 0.06% 0.34% 0.00% 4.18%
2003 6,526 349 611 0.06% 0.48% 0.00% 4.42%
2004 6,124 337 600 0.04% 0.40% 0.00% 4.06%
2005 5,006 288 525 0.15% 0.31% 0.00% 4.06%
189,574 2,321 5,938
Table A2 - Number of Firms Reporting Eliminations and Corporate Segments and Median Segment Sizes
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Abstract – This paper asks if there are agency costs to managerial indiscretions. It investigates whether 
the personal lives of top management influence returns to shareholders or if their extracurricular activities 
are separable from their responsibilities at the firm. To answer these questions, I assemble a unique 
sample of executives who have allegedly engaged in ethically questionable, but non-business-related 
behavior which potentially compromises the integrity of their personal, professional, or legal 
environments. The sample events are distinguished from other forms of malfeasance studied in the 
literature in that they are, by construction, unrelated to the business activities of the firm and reflect 
personally upon the character of top management. The evidence indicates that personal managerial 
indiscretions negatively impact firm value and performance. On average, there is an immediate 3.2% loss 
in shareholder value at the disclosure of an indiscretion.  Moreover, the operating performance suffers an 
abnormal decline of 2.5% in the same fiscal year. These losses are likely attributable to a distraction of 
top management from concentrating on their responsibilities governing the firm. However, shareholder 
value losses persist even for those indiscretions which present a low potential for distraction. This 
suggests that investors are concerned with the integrity of top management as well. Executives accused of 
committing an indiscretion significantly manage their reported earnings upward during the year in which 
the indiscretion is disclosed, further supporting the notion that these events signal an impairment of 
managerial character. The evidence indicates that better governance structures might decrease the 
likelihood of an indiscretion occurring.  
JEL classification: G34, G39 
Keywords: managerial indiscretions, management quality, integrity, earnings management, corporate 
governance 
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comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are my own. 
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1. Introduction 
The subject of managerial integrity is an oft-discussed issue in the financial and academic press 
as well as in the classroom. Despite that ethics are frequently placed at the forefront of company policy 
and even congressional legislation,
58
 the headlines remain littered with cases of executives whose 
personal life choices have disrupted the firms they lead. Boeing‘s Harry Stonecipher, RadioShack‘s David 
Edmonson, Staples‘ Martin Hanika, and Raytheon‘s William Swanson were all placed under the spotlight 
for engaging in alleged extramarital affairs, substance abuse, domestic violence, or public displays of 
dishonesty. Many of today‘s chief executives recognize that these activities might put the corporation at 
risk. Shelly Lazarus, CEO of multibillion dollar marketing firm Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide, says that in 
a 24/7 news world, ―everything a C.E.O. says and does is no longer personal. It is attributed to the 
company‖ [Gordon (2007)]. 
Although some executives‘ extracurricular activities are quite sensational, other cases suggest that 
management‘s personal behavior does not translate into poor performance for the firm. Oracle‘s CEO, 
Larry Ellison, is purported to have had strings of senior-subordinate romances and a hard-charging 
lifestyle, but the Silicon Valley software-maker remains one of the market darlings. Microsoft‘s CEO 
Steve Ballmer, aka ‗Bad Boy Ballmer,‘ has successfully executed his strategic plan and maintained the 
firm‘s considerable market power during his tenure. This is in spite of accusations of poor self-control 
which reference a violent outburst against an employee who left for rival firm, Google. Virgin Group‘s 
Richard Branson and billionaire entrepreneur Mark Cuban have both cultivated successful empires 
despite well-known reputations as perennial rebels. 
This paper investigates the issue of whether a manager‘s personal and professional lives are 
separable or if acts of questionable integrity in one‘s private affairs signal a greater problem brewing at 
the firm. That is, do those managers who engage in personal improprieties represent a greater moral 
hazard when executing the duties of their office?  While almost universally revered as a desirable quality, 
                                                          
58 Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that all companies subject to the act adopt a code of ethics policy or explain why they have 
chosen not to. 
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the issue of managerial integrity has received scant attention in the finance and economics literatures. 
While integrity is difficult to measure, allegations of personal misconduct might provide useful insight to 
the character of an executive. To investigate this issue, I assemble a unique sample of personal 
misconduct on the part of the top management team. The managerial indiscretions analyzed in this paper 
include incidences of sexual misadventure, substance abuse, violence, and public dishonesty. These 
events, which might arguably provide a distraction to the executive, could also provide a relative proxy 
for the integrity of the top management team. 
In this paper, I present four competing, but non-mutually exclusive hypotheses that address how 
managerial indiscretions might affect shareholders. The pure skills hypothesis states that these tangential 
activities do not impact firm value or operating performance and that only management‘s raw abilities are 
relevant for creating value. The managerial risk aversion hypothesis advances the notion that firms run by 
indiscretion executives, due to an increased appetite for risk, face lower agency costs associated with 
inducing the top management team to undertake risky, value-maximizing projects. Challenging the pure 
skills and managerial risk aversion hypotheses, the distraction hypothesis contends that managerial 
indiscretions adversely impact firm value from either the physical distraction of top management while 
they partake in these activities or from the disruption created at the firm when the consequences of their 
extracurricular activities force their removal from the company. Alternatively, the managerial character 
hypothesis argues that managerial indiscretions impair the trust and confidence that investors, 
subordinates, and customers have with management. As a result, this engenders an environment with 
excessive contracting costs and greater perceived information asymmetries.  
The evidence provided herein does not appear to support the pure skills or the managerial risk 
aversion hypotheses since firm value and operating performance decrease significantly around the 
disclosure of an indiscretion. There is an immediate 3.2% loss in shareholder value at the revelation of an 
indiscretion, which translates to an average loss of $129 million in market capitalization. The sample 
firms also suffer a significant abnormal decline of -2.48% in ROA the fiscal year in which an indiscretion 
is disclosed. The results are consistent with the distraction hypothesis, although I find evidence that 
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indicates that investors are concerned with the character and values of top management as well. Firm 
value remains adversely affected even for those indiscretions that offer a low potential for distraction. 
Further, the evidence indicates that executives accused of an indiscretion significantly manage their 
reported earnings upward for the year in which the indiscretion is disclosed. These last results provide the 
most support for the managerial character hypothesis. 
This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first is the literature that examines the 
importance of top management as a factor of production. Existing work documents the role that the top 
management team plays to either create or destroy shareholder value [Fama and Jensen (1983), Lang, 
Stulz, and Walkling (1989)]. However, much of the extant literature on managerial quality focuses on the 
technical skills and experience of an executive when investigating their importance as an input factor of 
production [Bertrand and Schoar (2003)]. Some authors have considered how certain behavioral biases 
might affect economic decisions by the top management team [Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Malmendier 
and Tate (2005)]. Nonetheless, the available literature on managerial traits and behavior is limited in 
scope to the realm of normal firm activities (ex. agency costs associated empire building during M&A 
activity, overconfidence and executive compensation, etc). This paper contributes to the literature by 
documenting the importance to firm value and performance of those non-business related activities that 
consume top executives and how a manager‘s personal life may influence the firm‘s production function.  
The second strand of literature related to this paper studies the importance of reputation and trust 
in economic exchange [Blau (1964), Tirole (1996)]. Recently, Erhard, Jensen, and Zaffron (2008) have 
argued that the integrity of the top management team is a factor of production. This notion has precedent 
in the literature. Mutual trust between two economic agents may serve as a substitute for excessive 
contracting which affords the opportunity to forgo the transaction costs imposed by these controls 
[Williamson (1975)]. These frictions are especially relevant in the market for corporate control. Investors 
face a market for lemons when allocating capital [Akerlof (1970)]. Since not all outcomes are 
contractible, the costs of agency and information asymmetries between managers and investors can be 
substantial [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984)]. When the trust among economic 
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agents is breached, the offending agent‘s reputation is damaged. Most interestingly though, the 
repercussions resulting from the damaged reputation are often many times the actual harm associated with 
the offending event. For example, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2006) show that, while the legal penalties for 
corporate fraud average only $24 M, investors punish the firm‘s market capitalization by over seven times 
that amount. This holds even for lesser breaches of expectations between shareholders and managers. 
Yermack (2006) shows that when CEOs unexpectedly implement lavish corporate jet programs, the stock 
price drops by 1% at the announcement and then underperforms similar risk firms by 4% per year 
thereafter. Again, the loss of shareholder value is many times that the actual cost of the corporate jet 
program itself. A common characteristic of the existing work on managerial excess and malfeasance is 
that the events studied are intertwined with the business itself. Thus, each offending action could have 
been undertaken by corporate managers attempting, in their own best business judgment, to increase 
shareholder value. This study extends the existing literature by analyzing activities which are, by 
construction, explicitly tangential to the operations of the firm, but still reflect personally upon character 
and quality of the executives in question. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection process and describe the sample 
observations. Section 4 presents the empirical evidence while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
There is an extensive literature that documents the importance of top management to 
shareholder value. Successful firms capitalize on the growth opportunities that others either cannot or 
choose not to capture [Zingales (2000)]. Fama and Jensen (1983) charge senior management with the 
responsibility of initiating and implementing the strategies which exploit these opportunities. The 
market for corporate control punishes those firms in which management does not develop available 
opportunities either because of self-dealing [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Lang, Stulz, and Walkling 
(1989), Yermack (2006)] or from a lack of ability [Hayes and Schaefer (1999), Fich (2005)]. 
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Much of the extant literature on managerial quality focuses on the technical skills and 
experience of the executive when investigating their importance as an input factor of production 
[Rosen (1981), Bertrand and Schoar (2003)]. In this view, managers are able to completely separate 
their personal and professional lives and only their raw abilities matter. Kaplan, Klebanov, and 
Sorensen (2007) support the notion that only talent is relevant to firm value using a detailed sample of 
CEO ability and personality assessments from an executive search firm utilized by VC and LBO 
clients. They find that private equity firms value the ‗hard‘ abilities of potential managers and that only 
quantitative skills impact the success of a private equity deal. ‗Soft‘ skills, such as personal integrity or 
team-working ability, do not appear to improve performance and may even negatively affect 
outcomes. Frank and Goyal (2007) provide additional evidence for publicly traded companies using a 
vector of CEO personal characteristics including: age, gender, education, career experience, and tenure 
at the firm. The authors find that, while compensation packages and education significantly explain the 
firm‘s capital structure, other personal traits exhibit no relation. These results imply that the value of 
corporate management is dependent largely on the skills and talents each executive brings to the firm 
and that education and career experience are the key personal characteristics that matter. 
Hypothesis 1: Pure Skills – Only the pure skills of senior executives affect shareholders. 
Managerial indiscretions that occur while an executive is away from the job and do not directly 
affect the company’s operations have no bearing on firm value or performance. 
It is often argued that executives are too risk-averse and may pass up risky, albeit value-
maximizing investment opportunities if they threaten their job security [Smith and Stulz (1985)]. To 
the extent to which engaging in risky personal behavior in one‘s external affairs signals a greater 
appetite for risk for a particular executive, managers engaging in indiscretions may be more willing to 
take risks that lead to enhanced shareholder value. Indeed, Lane, Cherek, and Tcheremissine (2004, 
2005) document that when users of recreational drugs and alcohol are faced with two financial 
gambles, they preferred the riskier of the two options. The typical solution for inducing managers to 
utilize firm resources in shareholders‘ interests is to design compensation contracts which are convex 
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in their payoffs with firm performance, but these plans are not without an added cost [Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2005)]. If individuals who engage in perilous personal behavior are, in fact, less risk-
averse, then firms led by indiscretion-executives would also enjoy lower explicit contracting costs 
associated with ensuring their executives have proper incentive alignment. 
Hypothesis 2: Managerial Risk Aversion – Managerial indiscretions are associated with higher 
firm value and performance, since these organizations are led by management teams with greater 
appetites for risk and are more inclined to undertake risky, value-maximizing projects. 
There are reasons to believe that management‘s private life could have a detrimental influence 
on their professional affairs. Some authors have argued that other factors, such as behavioral biases, 
might affect firm performance rather than just the pure skills of top management [Malmendier and 
Tate (2005)]. In Becker‘s (1965) model, managers allocate time in a utility-maximizing manner in 
which they trade-off the rewards from private life activities and labor for productive outcomes. 
Bennedsen, Pérez-González, and Wolfenzon (2007) provide evidence of executives faced with this 
choice using a sample of limited liability companies in Denmark. They find that the sudden death of 
one of the CEO‘s immediate family members negatively impacts performance as time is taken out to 
address the personal crisis. Managers‘ private affairs might also affect firm performance if the 
consequences of these activities force the removal of the executive either from legal complications or 
disciplinary turnover. In this event, the sudden loss of a top executive could have a disruptive effect on 
firm operations. Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan, and Newman (1985) and Bennedenson et al. (2007) 
document that the sudden death of a senior executive is associated with negative stock price reactions. 
Other authors have found a negative effect for disciplinary turnovers as well [Khanna and Poulsen 
(1995)]. Thus, managerial indiscretions might adversely affect firm performance if the executive 
allocates time to these private life activities away from more productive endeavors at the firm or if the 
sudden loss of the executives disrupts the firm‘s ongoing operations. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Distraction – Managerial indiscretions negatively impact firm value and 
performance because they distract from the executive’s obligations or because of the disruption 
caused by the sudden loss of the executive due to legal complications or disciplinary turnover. 
Unlike the observations in Bennedenson et al. (2007), managerial indiscretions also reflect 
personally upon the quality and character of the executive in question. Previous work has shown the 
importance of reputation and trust in economic exchange [Blau (1964), Tirole (1996)]. Erhard, Jensen, 
and Zaffron (2008) argue that managerial integrity is a factor of production which is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for success. As the integrity of management becomes impaired, the organization no longer 
functions properly or to its potential.
59
 In this environment, contracts and controls become substitutes 
for trust and additional transaction costs are incurred [Williamson (1975)]. The result is a reduction in 
the opportunity set and the restricted ability to capitalize on the growth options described by Zingales 
(2000). 
Prior research documents a relation between the character of top management and firm value. 
Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) examine executive credibility surrounding initial public offerings and 
find that firms with more reputable management enjoy higher post-IPO stock price performance, 
higher operating performance, and lower underpricing at the issuance. Further, investor reactions to 
signals of impaired managerial integrity are often substantially larger than the cash flow impact of the 
events themselves [Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2006), Yermack (2006), Bernile and Jarrell (2008)]. 
Although each of the abovementioned studies examines business-related activities, the implication is 
that negative signals regarding the character and integrity of management adversely affect firm value. 
In this view, managerial character and integrity are inseparable from the organization and are 
intimately linked to future performance. 
Hypothesis 3b: Managerial Character – Managerial indiscretions negatively impact firm value 
and performance since managerial character and integrity are factors of production. Executives 
                                                          
59 The authors utilize the analogy of removing spokes from a wheel to demonstrate the impairment of integrity. A complete wheel does not 
guarantee a fast bike, but the removal of spokes from the wheel impairs the performance of such a machine. An organization where top 
management does not maintain integrity, i.e. keep its word, does not achieve its full potential in the context of its employees, suppliers, or 
customers due to a lack of trust among agents. Such an environment would require excessive contracting and high residual losses. 
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who are visibly out of integrity in their personal lives engender a professional environment with 
excessive contracting costs. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Sample Selection 
To test the hypotheses presented in Section 2, I assemble a unique sample of executives who have 
engaged in questionable ethical behavior that potentially compromise the integrity of their personal, 
professional, or legal environments. The cases are identified using targeted search strings in the Factiva, 
LexisNexis, and ProQuest news retrieval services.
60
 The sample is arranged along four broad categories: 
sexual misadventure, substance abuse, violence, and dishonesty. Sexual misadventure refers to extra-
marital affairs, senior-subordinate inter-office romances, accusations of sexual harassment, and the like. 
Substance abuse cases are reported DUIs, illicit drug arrests, etc. Violence refers to instances of domestic 
violence, sexual battery, rape, or assault.
61
 Dishonesty cases include falsifying credentials, perjury, and 
plagiarism. Sexual misadventure and dishonesty case represent the breaking of explicit or implicit 
agreements in the executive‘s personal or professional environment while substance abuse and violence 
cases are violations of the executive‘s legal obligations. These observations are chosen such that the 
activities are explicitly tangential to the operations of the firm or the normal business-related activities of 
the executive. Other questionable activities, such as fraud, embezzlement, or securities violations, which 
might also signal the integrity of the executive are specifically excluded since these are potentially 
undertaken to further the goals of the organization and may have an ambiguous impact on future 
performance.
62
  
[TABLE 1] 
                                                          
60 The following is an example LexisNexis search string which searches for dishonesty: (CEO OR COO OR CFO OR executive OR president OR 
chairman) w/p (lied OR lie OR credentials OR resume OR dishonest OR plagiarism OR falsification OR falsified OR padded resume OR lied on 
resume). 
61 Some violence acts, such as sexual battery or rape, might also be classified as sexual misadventure. The distinction is made here since these 
cases are criminal in nature as opposed to the strictly personal or civil complaints involved in the misadventure category. 
62 For a discussion of the costs and benefits of fraud to the organization, see Murphy, Shrieves, and Tibbs (2008). 
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I identify 142 potential indiscretion observations involving C-level executives (CEO, COO, 
CFO), division heads, and board members from 1978 to 2006. Table 1 shows that, after screening for 
COMPUSTAT and CRSP data and excluding confounding events, there is a final sample of 94 
indiscretions.
63
 It is likely that there are many more instances of indiscretions than I am able to identify. 
These types of events are often summarily swept under the rug and never reported as neither the firm nor 
the executive have a vested interest in disclosing them [Murray (2007)]. Since the sample construction is 
dependent on the media reporting the indiscretions, the identified incidents likely understate the 
prevalence of these sorts of events. To the extent that these unidentified events remain hidden in any sort 
of matched control group, this should bias against finding a change in relative performance. 
[TABLE 2] 
3.2 Sample Characteristics 
As shown in Table 2, there is substantial skewness in the size of the firms in the sample as they 
range from very small to rather large capitalization firms. The mean (median) level of assets, sales, and 
market capitalization are $12.3B ($1.3B), $21.6B ($1.1B), and $9.6B ($1.0B), respectively. Comparing 
these figures to those in other studies of managerial reputation, they are somewhat smaller than those in 
Yermack (2006), but substantially larger than those in Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005).  The average 
(median) market-to-book ratio of 7.91 (2.44) is also somewhat higher than in other corporate work, 
indicating that the sample firms are more growth oriented. Consistent with the growth firm 
characterization, the mean firm in the sample exhibits a negative return on assets during the year in which 
the indiscretion is disclosed, although the median firm is profitable. 
[TABLE 3] 
Table 3 the documents participants, characteristics, and outcomes of the sample indiscretions. 
The proportion of founding families in the sample, at 35%, is twice the level of found in other studies of 
U.S. industrial firms [Fahlenbrach (2006)]. Roughly two-thirds of the sample indiscretions involve either 
                                                          
63 Three observations were excluded because no specific indiscretion date could be found in the news articles. Three were eliminated because 
they were not listed on CRSP/COMPUSTAT while twelve firms were not yet publicly traded at the time of the announcement. Nine were 
excluded because the executive was no longer at the firm when the event was reported (ex. Thrifty Payless was spun-off from K-Mart in the 
midst of an affair involving Thrifty‘s CEO). The remaining 21 were excluded because of confounding events. 
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the Chairman or the CEO. Seventy-three percent of the sample involves the Chairman, a C-level 
executive, or the President. The remaining 27% executives are either division CEOs in multi-line 
corporations or senior vice-presidents (not reported). The average indiscretion lasts for a little more than 
two years prior to disclosure and a significant fraction results in some form of legal action against the 
executive, the firm, or both.  
It appears that the board of directors is not convinced that these activities impair firm value or 
future performance since only 27% of executives are terminated for committing an indiscretion despite 
the fact that 32% are repeat offenders. For example, in January 2007 U.S. Airways CEO Doug Parker was 
arrested for driving under the influence and served a 24-hour jail sentence before returning to run the 
airline. Although the 45-year-old executive denied that the arrest pointed to a pattern of behavior, court 
records document that he has two prior DUI convictions [Martin (2007)]. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Managerial Indiscretions and Firm Value 
Standard event-study methodology [Brown and Warner (1985)] is employed to test whether 
managerial indiscretions affect firm value, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, 3a and 3b, or whether only 
professional characteristics matter, as predicted by Hypotheses 1. Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) 
demonstrate that the market quickly processes and incorporates new information regarding the firm 
almost immediately into the price of the stock. Thus, the sign and significance of the stock returns at the 
announcement of an executive indiscretion should provide an unbiased forecast of how management‘s 
personal behavior impacts the value of the firm. The disclosure date for each managerial indiscretion from 
the first news article mentioning the event is recorded as the announcement date. Daily market-adjusted 
abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the continuously compounded firm stock return 
and that of the CRSP value-weighted index (including distributions). Cumulative abnormal returns are 
defined as the three-day (-1,+1) summations of the daily abnormal returns surrounding the announcement 
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date. The multi-day windows should take into account any information leakage prior to the announcement 
or any delays in processing the information. 
[TABLE 4] 
Under the assumed hypothesis of an efficient market, the sign and significance of the stock 
returns at the announcement suggests that management‘s personal indiscretions negatively impact current 
and future performance. As shown in Table 4 Panel A for the full sample of 94 observations, the mean 
(median) three-day cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement of an indiscretion are -3.22% (-
1.84%). These values are both significant at the 1% level. In dollar terms, this translates into an average 
of $129 M in market capitalization evaporating at the disclosure of the indiscretion. The losses associated 
with managerial indiscretions can be especially severe in some cases, with losses totaling as much as $7.1 
B in shareholder value destroyed. Considering that only a minority of the cases involve some form of 
corporate settlement (see Table 3, Panel D), it is clear that investors are reacting to more than the legal 
consequences presented by an executive‘s alleged elicit behavior.  
In Panel B, the announcement returns are segmented by executive title. The negative 
announcement returns are generally larger in magnitude when the executive in question is either the 
Chairman or the CEO. The mean (median) 3-day CARs for the 60 Chairman / CEO subsample are -3.55% 
(-2.47%) while the 34 other executive CARs are -2.63% (-1.06%). The median CARs are significantly 
lower for the Chairman / CEO group at conventional levels (not reported). 
 
4.2 Managerial Indiscretions and Firm Operating Performance 
Barber and Lyon‘s (1996) methodology is employed to detect abnormal operating performance. 
Each sample firm is assigned to an industry and pre-event performance matched control group which is 
defined as all firms having the same 2-digit SIC code and an ROA within 90%-110% of that of the 
sample firm. Since the typical indiscretion begins two years prior to disclosure, the matching algorithm is 
performed at this point and abnormal operating performance is observed from the start of the indiscretion 
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until one year after the disclosure. Abnormal operating performance is defined as the difference between 
the observed operating performance of the sample firm and that of the industry control group. 
[TABLE 5] 
Consistent with the event study evidence in Section 4.1, Table 5 indicates that managerial 
indiscretions negatively impact the firm‘s operations in addition to shareholder value. Panel A shows that, 
on average, the sample firms suffer a significant abnormal decline of -2.48% in ROA the year in which an 
indiscretion is disclosed. Panel B reveals that the negative abnormal operating performance results are 
driven by the CEO / Chairman subgroup. For the fiscal year in which an indiscretion is disclosed, this 
group experiences a mean (median) abnormal decline of -4.62% (-1.61%) which is both statistically and 
economically significant. Unlike the above results for firm value, there is no evidence of abnormal 
operating underperformance for the ‗other executive‘ subgroup. This might be expected given their 
relatively smaller influence over the strategic direction of the firm. 
Overall, the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 do not support either the pure skills or managerial risk 
aversion hypotheses, since it appears that managerial indiscretions adversely affect both shareholder 
value and firm operations. The data tends to support both the distraction and managerial character 
hypotheses. The evidence provides slightly stronger support for the distraction hypothesis since there is 
some evidence of abnormal operating underperformance prior to the disclosure of the indiscretion. On 
average, the CEO / Chairman subgroup suffers an abnormal decline of -6.64% the year prior to disclosure 
during the period in which the indiscretion is occurring but remains unknown to the marketplace. 
 
4.2 Managerial Indiscretions, Distraction, and Managerial Character 
Section 4.1 provided evidence that is supportive of both hypotheses 3a and 3b, but is unable to 
fully distinguish between the two. The managerial indiscretions investigated here could reflect negatively 
upon the character of top management, but they might also provide a distraction. This section will attempt 
to utilize the characteristics of each of the managerial indiscretion categories to distinguish between the 
two sub-hypotheses. While it is difficult to state which one is the most distracting, arguably the sexual 
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misadventure, substance abuse, violence indiscretions have the greatest potential to occupy the time of the 
manager. In contrast, it is unlikely that the dishonesty indiscretions cause an ongoing distraction and are 
instead reflective of the character of the executive in question. While an observed effect in the high 
distraction subsample would be consistent with both sub-hypothesis, an effect in the low distraction 
subsample would be consistent with only the managerial character hypothesis. 
[TABLE 6] 
Table 6 presents the results when the sample is partitioned into high and low distraction subsets. 
As shown in Panel A, there are significant negative investor reactions to both broad indiscretion 
categories. The mean (median) reaction to the high distraction disclosures is -3.01% (-2.06%) while the 
reaction to the low distraction disclosures is -3.99% (-1.69%). The differences are not significant at 
conventional levels. Panel B documents the results for abnormal operating performance. Although there is 
evidence of significant negative abnormal performance for the high distraction subgroup, I fail to uncover 
evidence of abnormal performance for the low distraction subgroup.  
Overall, the results appear to support both the distraction and managerial character hypotheses. 
The results show that, for high distraction events, there is significant firm underperformance and a 
detrimental impact to firm value. However, there is also evidence to support the notion that investors are 
concerned with the character and quality of top management as well. 
 
4.3 Managerial Indiscretions and Earnings Management 
Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 6) define earnings management as what ―occurs when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead 
some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers‖ (emphasis added). The firm‘s 
financials are some of the only indications available to outside investors as to the health of the company. 
In a market for potential lemons, shareholders are forced to rely on management‘s word for the veracity 
of the firm‘s reported earnings. 
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Thus, trust in management to accurately portray the firm‘s financials is crucial to the efficient 
allocation of capital in the economy. Stephen McClellan, a 32-year Wall Street veteran and 19-year 
Institutional Investor All-American analyst was quoted, ―a critical part of the investment appraisal and 
company evaluation process is gauging management effectiveness, quality, character and values. I am put 
off by executives with a litany of ex-wives, messy public divorces, marriages to bimbos, visits to strip 
clubs, [or] heavy drinking. [McClellan (2008)].‖ If indiscretions are signals of poor character due to 
deceit in an executive‘s personal affairs, they may also be indicative of deception in how a manager 
portrays the firm‘s financials. Consequently, searching for evidence of earnings management presents a 
fruitful avenue to disentangle the distraction and managerial character hypotheses. While it is unclear 
how distractions associated with one‘s personal affairs might lead to a manipulation of reported corporate 
profits, someone who is duplicitous in their private life is increasingly likely to be so professionally. 
Thus, evidence of explicit earnings management would be supportive of the managerial character 
hypothesis. 
To detect the presence of earnings management, I focus on the manipulation of discretionary 
accruals that can be used to manage reported income upwards or downwards. I compute total accruals as: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖 ,𝑡 =  ∆𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡 /(𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1) 
where TAi,t is total accruals, ΔCAi,t is the change in current assets, ΔCLi,t is the change in current 
liabilities, ΔCashi,t is the change in cash and marketable securities, ΔSTDi,t is the change in short-term 
debt, Depi,t is depreciation and amortization, and Ai,t-1 is beginning of period total assets. 
While the total change in accruals is immediately observable, it is not obvious to investors what 
portion of accruals vary involuntarily due the daily business operations of the firm and the portion of 
which that have been altered in an attempt to manage earnings. Consequently, one must first estimate the 
level of non-discretionary accruals that arise from the day-to-day operations at the company using an 
assumed model for the benchmark level of accruals. In this paper, non-discretionary accruals are 
computed using the modified Jones (1991) model as the benchmark level of accruals. This  approach, 
which mirrors the that taken by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 
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(2003), involves estimating the typical level of total accruals by running annual cross-sectional 
regressions upon each two-digit industry in the COMPUSTAT universe with available data. The assumed 
model used for determining non-discretionary total accruals takes the following form: 
𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼1 1/𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2 ∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼3(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖 ,𝑡) 
where NDAt (the estimated level of non-discretionary accruals for each two-digit industry at time t) is 
level of total accruals for each benchmark firm, Ai,t-1 is beginning of period total assets, ΔREVi,t is the 
change in revenues, ΔRECi,t is the change in accounts receivables, PPEi,t is the level of property, plant, 
and equipment. Discretionary accruals are defined as the residual of the difference between total accruals 
and the predicted level of non-discretionary accruals. 
 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑁𝐷𝐴𝑡  
To determine whether managerial indiscretions are associated with material levels of earnings 
management, I follow the experimental design presented in Dechow et al. (1995) for detecting earnings 
management. For the universe of firms in COMPUSTAT with available data, I create a (0,1) Indiscretion 
indicator takes the value ‗1‘ for each firm-year in which a member of the top management team has 
committed an indiscretion. For those firm-years in which no indiscretion has been disclosed, the indicator 
takes on a ‗0‘ value. Cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions of the following form are 
estimated to detect earnings management: 
 𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  0,1 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
where DAi,t is the estimated level of discretionary accruals, Indiscretion is an indicator variable demarking 
a managerial indiscretion, Controls indicates a vector of firm, two-digit industry, and calendar year 
controls, and εi,t is the error term. 
[TABLE 8] 
The results presented in Table 8 suggest pervasive earnings management at firms where a 
member of the top management team has committed a personal indiscretion. In model (1), the coefficient 
on the Indiscretion indicator variable is both positive and significant at the one-percent level, denoting the 
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presence of significant earnings management during the fiscal year in which a managerial indiscretion is 
disclosed. The estimates are economically significant as well. Dechow et al. (1995) report that, for a 
typical firm, the average level of discretionary accruals amounts to 0.2% of total assets, with a standard 
deviation of 11.9%. The point estimate on the Indiscretion indicator implies that, for firms run by a top 
management team committing an indiscretion during the fiscal year, discretionary accruals are higher by 
as much as 32% of total assets relative to those at the typical company. Being more than two standard 
deviations larger than at the benchmark firm, this is indicative of an aggressive upwards management of 
reported earnings. Model (2) demonstrates that this effect is robust to the inclusion of both industry and 
year fixed effects. 
Models (3) – (5) expand upon the base specification to include several relevant firm and 
governance covariates. Model (3) includes controls for firm size (total assets), leverage (long-term debt to 
assets), and return on assets (EBITDA to assets). Model (4) accounts for the role that corporate 
governance plays by including CEO-Chairman duality (0,1), board size, classified board (0,1), hand-
picked board (0,1) [Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007)], and Delaware incorporation (0,1) as explanatory 
variables in the regression model. Model (5) uses all the additional explanatory variables introduced in 
models (3) and (4) for the full specification. Each model includes both industry and year fixed effects. 
The results indicate that leverage is significantly positively related to the level of discretionary accruals. 
The presence of onerous debt covenants resultant from high degrees of leverage likely necessitate the 
need to manage accruals to avoid technical default. ROA appears positively associated with the level of 
earnings management as well. The parameter estimate on the classified board indicator implies that 
staggered boards (argued by some as a signal of poor corporate governance [Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)] 
are also associated with earnings being managed upwards. In all three specifications, the coefficient on 
the Indiscretion indicator remains positive and significant at conventional levels, with estimates of 
abnormally high accruals ranging from 26% to 31% of total assets. Thus, after controlling for several firm 
and governance characteristics, managerial indiscretions remain associated with significant levels of 
earnings management.  
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Despite the explicit controls utilized in models (2)-(5), it is possible that there is some 
unobservable factor which is correlated with managerial indiscretions, but is omitted from the regression 
model. Model (6) attempts to account for any possible omitted variable biases by implementing firm and 
calendar year fixed effects. This is the equivalent of having a (0,1) indicator for each firm within the panel 
and should control for any time-invariant unobservable factors omitted from the regression. As in the 
earlier specifications, the coefficient on the Indiscretion indicator is positive and the point-estimate is 
nearly unchanged with abnormal accruals at 32% of total assets. However, the introduction of the firm 
indicator variables led to a substantial loss in the number of degrees of freedom and, as a result, the 
indiscretion indicator is only significant at the six percent level. Nonetheless, overall the association 
between managerial indiscretions and the level of earnings management seems fairly robust. 
The results in this section show that managers committing indiscretions also appear willing to 
coerce the reported earnings in a manner in which makes their firms appear more favorable to outside 
investors. I interpret this evidence of the manipulation of the firm‘s financial statements by the top 
management team as supportive of the managerial character hypothesis. These results should be 
especially concerning to the shareholders of the indiscretion firms since several studies have documented 
that the upward management of corporate earnings is associated with long-run stock price 
underperformance [Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Chou, Gombola, and Liu (2006)]. 
 
4.4 Determinants of Managerial Indiscretions 
Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 document the adverse effects of managerial indiscretions upon firm 
value, operating performance, and the quality of reported earnings. This provided support for the 
distraction and managerial character hypotheses over the pure skills and managerial risk aversion 
hypotheses. Section 4.4 investigates whether certain firm or executive characteristics might predispose 
one to committing an indiscretion or if there are governance structures which might serve to prevent 
them.  
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Prior research has provided insights as to which factors might predispose executives to commit 
various forms of malfeasance. Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2008) document that founder-led firms are 
associated with greater information asymmetry, larger agency costs, and lower firm performance. Further, 
corporate founders arguably make less of a distinction between themselves and their firms, given their 
substantial personal investment in the company. Consequently, founders might be especially prone to 
engage in these activities. Others have shown that the size of the board is an important marker for poor 
managerial oversight and increased agency costs [Yermack (1996)]. Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find that 
both of these factors are important determinants for malfeasance as founder firms and board size each 
increase the likelihood of fraud.  
[TABLE 8] 
I begin by assembling a matched sample using the Barber and Lyon (1996) procedure described 
in Section 4.2. Each sample observation is paired with its closest match from its industry control group. 
This yields a total matched sample of 188 firm-year observations, however complete data is currently 
available for only 41 of these. Table 8 presents three logistic regression models which estimate the 
propensity for a managerial indiscretion to occur. The dependent variable in each model is a (0,1) 
indicator of whether any indiscretion, a CEO or Chairman indiscretion, or a subordinate (non-CEO/non-
Chairman) indiscretion occurs. In addition to standard firm controls such as firm size, profitability, and 
prior year stock return, the independent variables of interest in each model are a (0,1) founder firm 
indicator and the size of the board. The results appear consistent with prior research. Founder status is 
significantly positively related to the likelihood of a managerial indiscretion occurring. Looking at the 
model for CEO or Chairman indiscretions, founder status remains a significant predictor. Further, larger 
boards are also associated with a significantly greater likelihood of either the CEO or Chairman to engage 
in an indiscretion. However, it appears that subordinate indiscretions are completely idiosyncratic as no 
significant relation predicting these events is uncovered. These results are consistent with the argument 
that poor governance structures increase the likelihood of a managerial indiscretion occurring. 
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5. Conclusions 
 This paper studies the importance of management‘s personal life to shareholder value and 
operating performance. It investigates whether questionable ethical behavior in one‘s non-business-
related affairs represents a greater moral hazard or if these tangential activities are simply fodder for the 
popular press and irrelevant to the firm. A unique sample of personal managerial indiscretions, which 
include instances of sexual misadventure, substance abuse, violence, and dishonesty, is collected to 
examine this issue. These events are explicitly chosen such that they have no direct link to the business 
operations of the firm. 
The data indicates that managerial indiscretions pose a significant risk to the company and 
impose substantial agency costs upon shareholders. On average, there is an immediate 3.2% loss in 
shareholder value at the disclosure of an indiscretion and operating performance suffers an abnormal 
decline of 2.5% during the same fiscal year. These losses may attributable to a distraction of top 
management from concentrating on their responsibilities governing the firm. However, shareholder value 
losses persist even for those indiscretions which present a low potential for distraction, indicating that 
investors are also concerned with the integrity of top management. Further, the evidence indicates that 
those firms whose executives commit a managerial indiscretion significantly manage their reported 
earnings upward for the year in which the indiscretion is disclosed. 
It is especially troubling that only 27% of executives face disciplinary action for these offenses, 
despite the fact that a significant fraction these executives are repeat offenders. At best, this implies that 
the firm‘s monitors do not feel that this behavior poses a problem. At worst, it implies that these forces 
are ineffective at preventing these events or are simply apathetic to their consequences. The evidence 
suggests that, by improving the firm‘s governance structures, these indiscretions might be avoided. Future 
work should continue along these lines. As a policy implication, the evidence provided here should 
encourage executive selection committees to seriously consider the personal integrity of the managers in 
which they employ and not just their job-related skills. 
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Table 1 - Sample Counts by Disclosure Year and Transgression Type 
This table presents the composition of 94 alleged sample observations by year and type. Sexual misadventure refers to non-
criminal illicit sexual activity, substance abuse represents cases of drug or alcohol abuse, violence reflects cases of battery or 
criminal sexual violence, and dishonesty represents cases of public dishonesty such as plagiarism or résumé fraud. More thorough 
descriptions of each indiscretion are provided in the text. 
Year 
Sexual 
Misadventure 
Substance 
Abuse 
Violence Dishonesty Full Sample 
1978 1 0 0 0 1 
1980 2 0 0 0 2 
1981 0 0 0 1 1 
1984 1 0 0 0 1 
1985 1 1 1 1 4 
1987 2 0 0 0 2 
1988 2 0 0 2 4 
1989 1 1 0 0 2 
1990 0 1 0 0 1 
1991 2 0 0 1 3 
1992 1 0 0 1 2 
1993 6 0 0 0 6 
1994 2 1 1 0 4 
1995 5 0 0 0 5 
1996 1 2 1 0 4 
1997 3 0 2 1 6 
1998 1 0 0 0 1 
1999 2 1 2 0 5 
2000 3 2 0 2 7 
2001 2 0 0 1 3 
2002 5 0 1 4 10 
2003 4 0 0 1 5 
2004 2 0 0 1 3 
2005 4 0 1 1 6 
2006 2 1 0 3 6 
Sample Total 55 10 9 20 94 
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Table 2 - Firm Sample Statistics 
Sample summary statistics for 94 managerial indiscretion observations. Assets, sales, and market value are the total assets, net 
revenues, and market value of common equity, respectively, in millions for the indiscretion firm. Total debt to assets is long-
term debt and short term-debt divided by total assets, ROA is the return on average total assets, and market-to-book is the 
market value of common equity divided by the book value of common equity. Previous Year Stock Return is the sum of the 
log daily holding period returns for the 250 trading days preceding the fiscal year-end.  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Firm Characteristics (t) 
      Total Assets ($M) 94 12,314.68 30,491.88 119.09 1,307.19 7,404.93 
Sales ($M) 94 21,581.01 105,498.23 120.96 1,088.91 5,395.70 
Market Value ($M) 94 9,649.90 32,047.43 55.13 1,036.15 7,616.44 
Total Debt to Assets 94 25.81% 23.51% 4.98% 21.18% 39.08% 
ROA 94 -2.78% 17.49% -2.68% 2.22% 7.40% 
Market-to-Book  92 3.56 3.30 1.28 2.40 4.24 
Previous Year Stock Return 79 3.74% 41.11% -16.37% 12.60% 32.88% 
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Table 3 - Sample Executives' Title, Characteristics, and Outcomes 
This table describes the type of executives involved in the 94 sample indiscretions as well as the outcome of each event for the executive and the firm. Founding family, 
CEO or Chairman, and Subordinate Indiscretion indicate whether the executive in question is a member of the founding family, is the CEO or Chairman, or is another 
executive who is not the CEO or Chairman. Indiscretion length is the number of days over which each applicable indiscretion occurs and repeat offender indicates whether 
the executive has committed the same offense in the prior to the current indiscretion. Executive turnover indicates whether the executive leaves the firm within 90 days of 
the first disclosure of the indiscretion. Arrest indicates whether the executive was arrested for the offense. Personal legal action and corporate legal action each indicate 
whether the executive or the firm face civil litigation or criminal prosecution as of a result of the indiscretion. Corporate settlement and settlement amount describe whether 
the firm arranges a settlement with the aggrieved party and the amount of that settlement (if disclosed). The number of observations with available data is in listed in 
parentheses. 
Panel A: Title Held by Executive 
Founding 
Family 
CEO or 
Chairman 
Chairman Director CEO COO CFO President 
Division 
Head 
Other 
Exec 
 35.11% 63.83% 44.68% 64.89% 59.57% 4.26% 4.26% 31.91% 6.38% 20.21% 
 (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) 
 
           Panel B: Personal Characteristics 
Male Age 
Bachelors 
Degree 
Masters 
Degree 
M.B.A. 
Degree 
Ph.D. 
Degree 
Financial 
Education 
Technical 
Education 
Finance 
Career 
Exp. 
Technical 
Career 
Exp. 
Military 
Exp. 
97.87% 50 80.25% 43.21% 29.63% 7.41% 50.00% 38.75% 30.00% 24.44% 18.60% 
(94) (88) (81) (81) (81) (81) (80) (80) (90) (90) (86) 
           Panel C: Indiscretion Characteristics and Outcomes 
Indiscretion 
Length 
(Days) 
Repeat 
Offender 
Executive 
Turnover 
Arrest 
Personal 
Legal 
Action 
Corporate 
Legal 
Action 
Corporate 
Settlement 
Settlement 
Amount    
764 31.91% 26.60% 19.15% 56.38% 41.49% 22.34% $880,400 
   (58) (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) (94) (10) 
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Panel D: Sexual Misadventure Characteristics and Outcomes 
Founding 
Family 
CEO or 
Chairman 
Affair Harassment 
Repeat 
Offender 
Executive 
Turnover 
Arrest 
Personal 
Legal 
Action 
Corporate 
Legal 
Action 
Corporate 
Settlement 
Settlement 
Amount 
36.36% 70.91% 34.55% 60.00% 34.55% 23.64% 3.64% 60.00% 63.64% 34.55% $944,889 
(55) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) (55) (9) 
Executive 
Married 
Target 
Married 
Marries 
Target 
With 
Employee 
With 
Executive 
With 
Subordinate 
Executive 
Divorce 
Target 
Divorce    
73.08% 22.45% 5.88% 86.27% 19.61% 76.47% 12.73% 10.20% 
   (52) (49) (51) (51) (51) (51) (55) (49) 
                      
Panel E: Substance Abuse Characteristics and Outcomes 
Founding 
Family 
CEO or 
Chairman 
Drugs Alcohol 
Repeat 
Offender 
Executive 
Turnover 
Arrest 
Personal 
Legal 
Action 
   70.00% 90.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 20.00% 90.00% 90.00% 
   (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) (10) 
                      
Panel F: Violence Characteristics and Outcomes 
Founding 
Family 
CEO or 
Chairman 
Repeat 
Offender 
Executive 
Divorce 
Executive 
Turnover 
Arrest 
Personal 
Legal 
Action 
    22.22% 22.22% 44.44% 22.22% 44.44% 66.67% 77.78% 
    (9) (9) (9) (9) (9) (9) (9) 
                      
Panel G: Dishonesty Characteristics and Outcomes 
Founding 
Family 
CEO or 
Chairman 
Repeat 
Offender 
Executive 
Turnover 
       20.00% 50.00% 15.00% 30.00% 
       (20) (20) (20) (20) 
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Table 4 - Managerial Indiscretions and Firm Value 
This table presents the impact of 94 managerial indiscretions on firm value as indicated by investor reaction at disclosure 
using standard event study methodology [Brown and Warner (1985)]. CEO or Chairman indicates whether the executive 
committing the indiscretion is the firm‘s Chairman, CEO, or some other executive at the firm. P-values using parametric 
Student‘s t tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Overall Announcement Returns 
 
 
(-1,+1) CAR 
 
 
N Mean Median 
 Full Sample 94 -3.22% -1.84% 
 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 
 
   
 Panel B: Announcement Returns by Executive Title  
 
 
(-1,+1) CAR 
 
 
N Mean Median 
 CEO or Chairman 60 -3.55% -2.47% 
 
 
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
 Other Executive 34 -2.63% -1.06% 
 
   
(0.02) (0.01)   
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Table 5 - Managerial Indiscretions and Firm Performance 
This table presents the impact of 94 managerial indiscretions on firm performance as evidenced by abnormal operating 
performance from two years prior to one year after disclosure using the procedure outlined in Barber and Lyon (1996). CEO or 
Chairman indicates whether the executive committing the indiscretion is the firm‘s Chairman, CEO, or some other executive at 
the firm. P-values using parametric Student‘s t tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are reported in 
parentheses.    
Panel A: Full Sample Abnormal Operating Performance 
 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-3) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-2) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-1) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t+1) 
N 94 94 94 94 70 
Mean 0.03% 0.19% -5.28% -2.48% 0.63% 
 
(0.16) (0.82) (0.01) (0.06) (0.92) 
Median 0.00% 0.01% 0.16% -0.31% 0.04% 
 
(0.30) (0.98) (0.50) (0.30) (0.75) 
            Panel B: Abnormal Operating Performance by Executive Title 
 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-3) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-2) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-1) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t+1) 
CEO or Chairman 
N 60 60 60 60 42 
Mean 0.02% -0.30% -6.64% -4.62% 5.23% 
 
(0.50) (0.79) (0.01) (0.01) (0.51) 
Median -0.01% -0.13% -0.08% -1.61% -0.29% 
 
(0.74) (0.45) (0.24) (0.01) (0.78) 
Other Executive 
N 34 34 34 34 28 
Mean 0.05% 1.07% -2.88% 1.30% -6.27% 
 
(0.16) (0.42) (0.32) (0.53) (0.52) 
Median 0.01% 0.23% 0.46% 1.01% 0.59% 
  (0.20) (0.23) (0.59) (0.13) (0.36) 
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Table 6 - Managerial Indiscretions, Distraction, and Managerial Character 
This table presents the impact from high and low distraction events on firm value and performance. High distraction events 
include sexual misadventure, substance abuse, and violence indiscretions while low distraction refers to public dishonesty. P-
values using parametric Student‘s t tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank tests are reported in parentheses.    
Panel A: Evidence from Firm Market Value 
   
(-1,+1) CAR   
 High 
Distraction 
N Mean Median 
 
 74 -3.01% -2.06% 
  
 
(0.00) (0.00) 
  Low 
Distraction 
20 -3.99% -1.69% 
  
 
(0.04) (0.03) 
   
     Panel B: Evidence from Firm Operating Performance 
  
Abnormal ROA 
(t-3) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-2) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t-1) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t) 
Abnormal ROA 
(t+1) 
High Distraction 
N 
 
74 74 74 74 58 
Mean 
 
0.03% -0.31% -5.57% -2.47% 3.86% 
  
(0.21) (0.75) (0.01) (0.07) (0.52) 
Median 
 
0.01% -0.13% -0.005% -0.55% -0.12% 
  
(0.35) (0.47) (0.28) (0.25) (0.88) 
Low Distraction 
N 
 
20 20 20 20 12 
Mean 
 
0.03% 2.07% -4.20% -2.49% -14.98% 
  
(0.56) (0.24) (0.36) (0.48) (0.48) 
Median 
 
0.00% 1.21% 1.53% -0.03% 2.36% 
    (0.72) (0.17) (0.65) (0.92) (0.23) 
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Table 7 - Fixed Effects Regressions of Managerial Indiscretions and Earnings Management 
This table presents evidence on the relation between managerial indiscretions and earnings management. The dependent variable in each model is the level of discretionary accruals as defined in 
Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995). The key independent variable of interest, Indiscretion (0,1), in an indicator variable which takes on the value of ‗1‘ if a managerial indiscretion is disclosed 
during the fiscal year and ‗0‘ otherwise. Firm Size is total assets, Leverage is long-term debt to assets, ROA is EBITDA to Assets, CEO-Chairman is an indicator of CEO-Chairman duality, Board 
Size is the total number of directors on the board, Classified Board is an indicator of a staggered board, Hand-Picked Board is an indicator of whether the 50% or more of the outside directors or 
co-opted as in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2007), and Deleware Incorp. is an indicator of incorporation in the state of Delaware. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable Estimate Prob t Estimate Prob t Estimate Prob t Estimate Prob t Estimate Prob t Estimate Prob t 
Indiscretion (0,1) 0.32 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.31 0.05 0.31 0.05 0.32 0.06 
Firm Size 
    
0.00 0.88 
  
0.00 0.55 0.00 0.88 
Leverage 
    
0.10 0.00 
  
0.18 0.00 0.29 0.00 
ROA 
    
0.02 0.01 
  
0.37 0.00 0.28 0.05 
CEO-Chairman (0,1) 
      
0.00 0.88 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.91 
Board Size 
      
0.00 0.88 0.00 0.54 0.00 0.81 
Classified Board (0,1) 
      
0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.65 
Hand-Picked Board (0,1) 
      
0.01 0.54 0.01 0.53 0.00 0.90 
Delaware Incorp. (0,1) 
      
0.03 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.21 0.01 
Intercept 0.08 0.00 -0.19 0.56 -0.23 0.48 -0.62 0.00 -0.78 0.00 
  
             Firm Fixed Effects No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
Yes 
 Industry Fixed Effects No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 Year Fixed Effects No 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
             Likelihood Ratio 13.60 0.00 17.72 0.00 17.27 0.00 14.23 0.00 14.16 0.00 1.30 0.00 
N 23,681   23,681   23,612   11,812   11,785   11,785   
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Table 8 - Determinants of Managerial Indiscretions 
This table presents evidence for the determinants for a managerial indiscretion to occur using a reduced sample. For the 188 
firm-year matched sample, available data exists for only 41 observations at this point. The dependent variable in each model is 
a (0,1) indicator variable signifying whether an indiscretion, CEO or Chairman indiscretion, or Subordinate indiscretion 
occurred in the fiscal year. Firm size is total assets, profitability is the return on sales, stock return is the raw stock return for 
the fiscal year, founder firm indicates whether the firm is founder managed, and board size is the total number of directors on 
the board. All independent variables are as of 1 year prior to the disclosure of an indiscretion. 
  
Indiscretion 
CEO or Chairman 
Indiscretion 
Subordinate Indiscretion 
Variable Estimate p-value
 
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
Intercept -1.51 0.34 -2.79 0.08 -0.42 0.78 
Firm Size 0.00 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.29 
Profitability -2.55 0.34 -3.44 0.14 2.10 0.45 
Stock Return -0.23 0.83 -0.27 0.78 0.21 0.84 
Founder Firm 2.35 0.09 2.15 0.06 -0.60 0.60 
Board Size 0.22 0.17 0.27 0.06 -0.10 0.46 
       Likelihood Ratio 6.71 0.24 7.31 0.20 2.27 0.81 
N 41   41   41   
 
 
